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Increased attention has been given in the past few years to strength-
ening intellectual property rights (IPRs) in plant breeding. The
number of countries that grant such rights has grown, the types of
inventions that can be protected have expanded, and the scope of
protection offered by extant IPR systems in different countries has
also broadened. The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS 1993) of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) requires all WTO members to introduce at
least a minimum level of protection in their national laws for plant
varieties and inventions in biotechnology. Least Developed
Countries recently managed to extend the deadline to 2013 for
bringing their national IPR laws fully up to the TRIPS standards.
Even so, this extension does not diminish the pressure to develop
IPR legislation for plant varieties in several countries, because bilat-
eral trade negotiations between developing countries and the USA
or EU often include requirements that go beyond the TRIPS require-
ments (the so-called “TRIPS-plus” requirements). These develop-
ments towards strengthened IPRs arise from a trade perspective
rather than from a perspective of increasing innovation in the devel-
oping countries concerned. 
The TRIPS agreement is not the only international agreement
related to regulatory systems affecting plant breeding. Others
include the Convention on Biological Diversity, the International
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, and the
discussions in the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual
Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge, and
Folklore of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). In
addition, the development of a Substantive Patent Law Treaty
(SPLT) as discussed within WIPO is likely to reduce the current flex-
ibility to protect plant varieties (Wallø Tvet 2005). This report con-
centrates on the requirements arising from the TRIPS Agreement
and IPR-related trade discussions, and it refers to the other agree-
ments only when they relate directly to IPRs.
Plant breeding research and seed provision are vital industries
that need to be fostered and stimulated. Plant breeding is important
for food security at the local and global levels; the ability of adapted
varieties to cope with environmental stresses contributes to strate-
gies for sustainable agriculture, and the provision of productive
options for commercial farming is essential for wider economic
development. The twin challenges are first to understand the degree
Executive 
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to which stronger IPRs in plant breeding can help
stimulate these industries and second to deter-
mine whether the IPR systems for plant varieties
that have been developed in industrialized coun-
tries can contribute to development objectives.
This report is based on a field study of the
impact of strengthened IPRs on the breeding
industries in China, Colombia, India, Kenya, and
Uganda. The analysis also makes use of secondary
data and interviews with stakeholders from other
countries. 
IPRs AND PLANT BREEDING
Although a range of attempts have been made to
provide some type of IPRs for plant varieties, only
within the last several decades has a mechanism
for plant variety protection (PVP) firmly taken
hold in industrialized countries. The UPOV
(International Union for the Protection of New
Varieties of Plants) Conventions provide the most
widespread model for PVP, and most countries of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development and a growing number of develop-
ing countries have implemented legislation com-
patible with one of these Conventions. However,
UPOV is not the only possible option for design-
ing a PVP system, and even within the UPOV
Conventions there is a fair degree of flexibility that
developing countries must appreciate and take
advantage of if they are to design IPR regimes for
plant breeding that meet their specific conditions
and priorities. Of particular importance are issues
related to farmer seed saving and exchange and
issues concerning access to protected varieties for
further research and development.
Increasingly, IPR regimes for plant breeding
include attention to patent systems, particularly for
biotechnology. Most of the genes and tools used in
the development of transgenic crops are patented.
Even many of the diagnostic and selection pro-
cesses used in conventional plant breeding are
patented, and their protection has implications for
researchers’ ability to use these tools and release
varieties developed through these techniques.
Developing countries still have relatively limited
experience in managing patents for biotechnology.
It is also important not to lose sight of the fact
that other mechanisms can protect the rights of
plant breeders and seed producers and provide
incentives for commercial seed system develop-
ment, even in the absence of IPRs. Among the
more important examples are biological (hybrid
technology), regulatory (seed law and, more
recently, biosafety law), legal (contract law), and
commercial (business practices) mechanisms.
PLANT BREEDING AND
SEED SECTORS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Until fairly recently in most developing countries,
seed was supplied through the public sector.
Recent private sector involvement has been a
function of policy change. Any assessment of the
specific impact of IPR regimes on seed industry
performance and investment must be seen in the
context of these wider changes in the commercial
and policy environment. In the majority of devel-
oping countries, most of the plant breeding and
some seed production still depend on the public
sector, particularly national agricultural research
institutes (NARIs), often supported by interna-
tional agricultural research centers (IARCs). 
Plant breeding and seed production are already
subject to a set of national regulations on variety
release and seed quality control. These regulations
have played an important part in determining the
current evolution of seed systems in developing
countries. Recently established IPR systems in the
seed sector are meant to act in concert with con-
ventional seed regulations, and in some cases they
are the impetus for further changes in national
seed regulations. 
IPR LEGISLATION AND
MANAGEMENT FOR
PLANT BREEDING
Relatively few developing countries have any sig-
nificant experience with protecting varieties. The
preliminary evidence indicates that the applica-
tion of PVP in these countries tends to reinforce
major domestic trends in the development of com-
mercial seed systems rather than to open major
new avenues or opportunities. In systems where
there is heavy emphasis on hybrid varieties and
considerable commercial competition, such as
those in China and India, most interest centers on
PVP for parent lines and hybrids. Where a market
in commercial open-pollinated varieties (OPVs)
is already established, the PVP system provides
welcome additional protection for those markets.
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In some cases in which a domestic seed industry is
just emerging, companies may not feel it is worth-
while to take advantage of PVP. In countries
where the production of ornamental plant materi-
als is important, these materials dominate PVP
applications.
Even though developing countries have rela-
tively little experience with PVP, the systems that
are in place demonstrate a fairly wide range of
approaches to issues such as seed saving, the
range of crops and varieties eligible for protection,
and the treatment of Farmers’ Rights. The case
studies also indicate that many issues concerning
the administration of PVP in developing countries
remain to be addressed. For example, establishing
facilities and providing staff to test varieties for
distinctness, uniformity, and stability (DUS) repre-
sents a significant investment. No comprehensive
guidance exists on how to set charges for PVP, and
it is likely that current fee rates do not provide an
optimal set of incentives for national plant breed-
ing industries. There is also little experience with
the enforcement of PVP.
IMPACTS OF IPRs ON
SEED COMPANIES
The literature analyzing the impact of IPRs on
plant breeding in the North provides only patchy
evidence that PVP regimes have a significant
influence on the size or nature of investments in
the commercial seed sector. Thus it should not be
surprising that it is difficult to document many
instances in which a developing country’s
involvement with PVP has led to marked changes
in direction for its domestic seed industry. One
problem in looking for such relationships is the
fact that the commercial seed sector in most devel-
oping countries is undergoing significant change
because of government liberalization policies,
making it difficult to attribute any changes to the
establishment of an IPR regime.
Nevertheless, it is possible to demonstrate
some positive contributions from recently estab-
lished PVP systems in developing countries.
Where domestic seed companies produce OPVs
for commercial farmers, PVP helps stabilize the
industry and protect companies from their com-
petitors. Where parental lines of commercial
hybrids are subject to misappropriation, PVP pro-
vides additional protection and makes companies
more confident about their research investments.
A PVP system may also make foreign seed com-
panies more confident in sharing varieties with
domestic partners. Even so, commercial seed
industries have developed in the absence of IPRs
(other than trademarks) in several countries,
including India and Uganda. In the near future,
PVP can be expected to have only a modest
impact on the direction of domestic commercial
seed markets, given that most PVP systems in
developing countries cannot control farmer seed
saving and possess very limited enforcement
capabilities (because of inadequacies in legal sys-
tems, insufficient regulatory staff, and insufficient
experience in the companies themselves). 
The protection of transgenic crops has proven
particularly difficult in developing countries.
Most experience with transgenic crops revolves
around Roundup-Ready soybean and Bt (Bacillus
thuringiensis) cotton and shows that the presence
of IPR systems is not necessarily correlated with
the effectiveness of controlling access to seed of
transgenic varieties. Indeed, the most effective
control has been achieved through contracts in
controlled output markets and the application of
seed and biosafety regulations. The experience
with transgenic crops emphasizes the importance
of learning how to use a judicious combination of
seed regulation, biosafety, and IPRs to provide a
reasonable degree of protection to the providers of
transgenic technology. 
IMPACTS OF IPRs ON PUBLIC
SECTOR PLANT BREEDING AND
SEED PRODUCTION
The advent of IPRs for plant breeding has signifi-
cant implications for public sector plant breeding
in developing countries, yet very few NARIs have
well-developed IPR policies or staff that are capa-
ble of dealing with these complex issues. One of
the principal attractions of IPRs for NARIs is the
possibility of using them to raise revenues, espe-
cially when NARIs increasingly are expected to
generate a portion of their income. However, there
are concerns about whether NARIs that focus on
earning royalties can compete effectively (for staff
and market share) with private sector plant breed-
ing. There is also concern over how the focus on
revenue will affect NARIs’ public task. Some
NARIs are beginning to apply for patents on some
of their innovations. The added revenue raises
important administrative challenges about the
division of royalty income within the NARI to
reward innovators sufficiently while maintaining
incentives for research that is less likely to be pro-
tected. The NARIs also need to know how to nego-
tiate access to protected technologies and how to
make the best use of their own innovations in the
bargaining process.
The IARCs all have IPR policies, although most
of these are still subject to adjustment and elabora-
tion. The increased use of IPRs has caused IARCs
to reevaluate their modes of interaction with both
NARIs and seed companies. Varied approaches
have been taken to ensure that NARI germplasm
reaches the farmers for whom it is intended.
Although IARCs make use of many protected
technologies, they have very limited experience in
assessing their freedom to operate or in knowing
how and when to pursue patent protection for
particular inventions.
LESSONS
IPRs should not be considered a silver bullet for
commercial seed industry development. Because
seed systems differ widely among countries and
also within countries, between crops, and across
regions, blueprint advice cannot be given to policy
makers on how to design the ideal IPR system for
plant breeding. Rights that are excessively broad
in scope may obstruct the flow of technologies to
resource-poor countries and farmers. On the other
hand, IPRs may contribute to the development of
commercial seed systems in certain sectors, and
they may assist in the creation of effective public-
private partnerships. This outcome will material-
ize, however, only when other conditions for
business development are favorable.
Pressure to strengthen IPRs in plant breeding in
developing countries presents both immediate
and long-term challenges to policy makers and
donors. The immediate challenges are related to
framing and implementing appropriate legislation
that is consistent with TRIPS and that supports
national agricultural development goals. The
longer-term challenges are derived from the fact
that an IPR regime, on its own, is not likely to pro-
vide the incentives that elicit the emergence of a
robust plant breeding and seed sector; attention to
other institutions and the provision of an enabling
environment are also necessary.
National policy makers must give immediate
attention to the establishment and implementation
of appropriate IPR legislation for plant breeding.
Several sui generis models are available, including
the UPOV Conventions, but even reliance on a
model requires a number of choices. The most
important parameters to determine are related to
seed saving, seed exchange, the scope of protec-
tion, the breadth of coverage, and the relation of
PVP and patents to the concerns of Farmers’
Rights. These parameters deserve careful consid-
eration before a decision is made on the use of a
particular model for national legislation. Policy
makers must also consider cost-effective means
for implementing an IPR regime and ensuring that
the IPR system is consistent with enforcement
capabilities.
If they are to have their intended effect, IPR sys-
tems in plant breeding must be tailored to the con-
ditions of national seed systems. Even within a
single country, the requirements and conditions of
different crop production systems are not uniform,
and countries may consider legal options that
address this variability. For example, strong pro-
tection may be provided for export agriculture
and weak or no protection for noncommercial sec-
tors that primarily cater for subsistence farmers.
The absence of commercial incentives in noncom-
mercial sectors, however, creates a (continued)
responsibility for public investments in plant
breeding and seed support systems.
Systems for PVP contain flexibility to balance
benefits for breeders and farmers—a flexibility
that is much more difficult to create within patent
systems. Some patent systems have created open-
ings for flexibility, however, either by excluding
certain inventions from patentability or certain
claims from being honored, or by providing
explicit exemptions when protection may unduly
affect farmers.
Developing IPRs for biotechnology in plant
breeding requires greater attention to strengthen-
ing capacities in national patent offices. Countries
that use transgenic varieties will need to ensure
adequate protection, although in many cases cred-
ible enforcement of the right combination of
biosafety regulations, seed laws, and PVP may
offer adequate protection for transgenic varieties,
at least in the early stages of their availability in
developing countries. 
Policy makers must recognize that the develop-
ment of a commercial seed sector depends on
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attention to other factors in the enabling environ-
ment, including seed regulations and the growth
of agribusiness. Particular attention is also needed
to ensure that policies encourage NARIs to fulfill
their public sector mandate while taking advan-
tage of IPRs to gain access to technology, guide the
diffusion of their varieties, and, where appropri-
ate, earn royalties.
The World Bank can assist developing countries
by providing immediate support to national efforts
at developing and implementing PVP legislation as
well as by instituting longer-term strategies that fos-
ter the development of seed sector institutions. In
the short term, the Bank can support opportunities
for national (or, where relevant, regional) forums
that promote debate and discussion about the shape
of PVP legislation and its implementation.
Discussions should emphasize (1) the necessity of
structuring IPR regimes to evolve in concert with
national seed systems, including the possibility of
providing different levels of protection to different
crops, and (2) the importance of key parameters
within IPR models. The Bank can also sponsor
meetings and other activities that explore possibili-
ties for regional collaboration in the administration
and management of PVP, and it can encourage
stronger regional mechanisms for patent applica-
tions, including those in biotechnology. In addition,
the World Bank can support further research that
monitors experience with IPRs in developing coun-
tries and that examines issues related to the cost-
effective management of IPR regimes. 
There are also longer-term opportunities for
the Bank to support the growth of seed sector
institutions. Capacity building in national PVP
and patent offices, as well as support for effective
seed regulatory regimes, will be useful. Capacity
building for regional collaboration is needed in
both the IPR and seed regulatory domains. Bank-
supported agribusiness projects should include
reviews of IPR regimes and their implications for
project success. World Bank support for NARIs
should help develop adequate IPR policies and
strategies, encourage more effective interaction
with the private seed sector, and build competence
in accessing protected technology. 

1THE STRENGTHENING OF IPRs
The past few years have seen increased attention to the strengthen-
ing of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in plant breeding. The num-
ber of countries that grant such rights has grown, the types of
inventions that can be protected have expanded, and the scope of
protection offered by extant IPR systems in different countries has
broadened as well. The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS 1993) of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) dramatically changed the importance of IPRs in
developing countries by requiring all WTO members to introduce at
least a minimum level of protection of intellectual property in their
national laws. Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement asks all mem-
bers to provide some form of protection for plant varieties. Patent
protection needs to be available for all other inventions, including
those in plant biotechnology. 
The nature and scope of IPRs for genetic resources, including plant
varieties, are also discussed in the frameworks of the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD) and the International Treaty on Plant
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (IT PGRFA), which en-
tered into force in 1993 and 2004, respectively. Additional pressure to
protect plant varieties in developing countries (beyond the minimum
requirements of TRIPS) is being exerted in bilateral trade negotiations
between developing countries and the USA or EU. The importance of
IPRs for plant breeding and the seed industry has been further en-
hanced by the development of plant biotechnology, which not only
has engendered patents for the genes, tools, and processes that are an
increasingly common part of modern plant breeding but has spurred
the introduction of utility patents for plant varieties and hybrids in
some countries. 
IPRs are just one set of regulations based on international agree-
ments that impact plant breeding and seed production. Although
other international agreements influence plant breeding and seed pro-
duction (figure 1.1), such as agreements over rights to traditional knowl-
edge or national sovereignty over plant genetic resources, this report
concentrates on the introduction of IPRs in developing countries as a re-
sult of the TRIPS Agreement. It refers to aspects of other agreements and
organizations only when they are important to the discussion. 
Systems for IPRs have been recognized for more than a century,
yet until recently IPRs have not been an issue in the plant breeding
and seed sector in most developing countries. Although IPR regimes
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for agricultural inventions have been used widely
in industrialized countries for decades, most de-
veloping countries are in the early stages of imple-
menting and/or enforcing IPRs related to plant
varieties. The use of IPRs in plant breeding in
developing countries raises a number of important
issues, including smallholders’ access to technol-
ogy, the role of public agricultural research, the
growth of the domestic private seed sector, the sta-
tus of farmer-developed varieties, and the growing
North-South technology divide that restricts access
to plant germplasm and research tools. Since access
to seed and new crop varieties is fundamental for
agricultural development and rural welfare, it is
important to understand the impact of these legal
systems on the breeding and seed sectors in devel-
oping countries.
IPRs IN PLANT BREEDING
Conventional IPRs protect printed text, inventions,
industrial designs, trademarks, geographical indi-
cations, and trade secrets, all of which have differ-
ent regimes for registration, scope, and duration of
protection. Since none of these property rights is
considered adequate for certain other sectors,
additional, so-called “sui generis” systems have
been developed for the protection of integrated
computer circuits, databases, and plant varieties
(Plant Breeders’ Rights). Plant varieties present
several important challenges for an IPR system.
First, they are biological products that are easily re-
produced and whose very use entails multiplica-
tion. Second, the users (and potential “copiers”) of
the technology are millions of individual farmers
whose compliance with any protection regime is
difficult and expensive to monitor. Third, the agri-
cultural sector involves cultural values and food
security and, in many countries, affects the liveli-
hoods of the rural poor, making the imposition of
any controls a sensitive political issue. Fourth, the
inherent diversity of plant varieties makes it diffi-
cult to apply the narrow technical criteria of nov-
elty and reproducibility used in the conventional
patent system, whereas the use of standard breed-
ing methodologies may frustrate the application
of the “inventive step” criterion. Finally, the devel-
opment of new plant varieties has always relied to
some extent on public research, partly in response
to the traditional public good nature of crop
germplasm, and the application of IPRs to the
products of a publicly funded endeavor can be
problematic. 
The advent of modern biotechnology has brought
additional challenges for the application of IPRs in
plant breeding. Not only do some countries allow
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Figure 1.1 International Agreements that affect Plant Breeding
Convention on 
Biological Diversity 
(CBD)
World Trade
Organization 
(WTO)
World Intellectual 
Property Organization 
(WIPO)
Food and Agriculture
Organization of the
United Nations
(FAO)
Access and
benefit sharing
Cartagena
Protocol
Trade Related
Aspects of
Intellectual
Property Rights
(TRIPS)
Patent
Cooperation
Treaty (PCT),
Substantive Patent
Law Treaty (SPLT)
Intergovernmental
Committee on
Intellectual
Property and
Genetic
Resources,
Traditional
Knowledge, and
Folklore
International
Treaty on Plant
Genetic Resources
for Food and
Agriculture
(IT PGRFA)
Genetic
resources
Living modified
organisms
Breeder’s rights,
patents,
trademarks, trade
secrets
Harmonization
of IPRs
Traditional
knowledge,
genetic resources,
folklore
Facilitated
access, Farmers’
Rights
Source: Authors.
Breeders
Introduction 3
the use of patents to protect plants, varieties, and
genes, but the majority of the tools and processes of
molecular biology and genetic transformation can
be patented as well (Appendix A). Many of the tech-
niques of biotechnology, which are an increasingly
important part of conventional plant breeding, are
also protected, raising implications for the owner-
ship of any variety resulting from such research.
Finally, because biotechnology allows a much more
precise understanding of the genetic makeup of any
crop variety, it opens the door to sophisticated
screening and reverse engineering techniques,
which in turn offer new possibilities for utilizing
protected varieties, leading to pressure for more
stringent protection.
IPRs AS A POLICY ISSUE
Plant breeding research and seed provision are
vital industries that need to be fostered and stimu-
lated. Plant breeding is important for food security
at the local and global levels. The ability of adapted
varieties to cope with environmental stresses con-
tributes to strategies for sustainable agriculture,
and the provision of productive options for com-
mercial farming is essential for wider economic
development. IPR regimes for plant breeding can
play a part in agricultural development, but the
challenge is to strike the right balance between
incentives for innovation and access to productive
resources. An IPR regime in plant breeding should
perform two basic roles. First, in the interest of the
public, the IPR regime should ensure that knowl-
edge and materials enter the public domain at some
point, and it should stimulate improvements and
innovations that increase the choices available to
farmers and consumers. Second, in the interest of
the rights holder, the IPR regime should provide
opportunities for breeders to recoup their invest-
ments, which may include the rights:
• to keep farmers from saving seed of the pro-
tected variety, sharing the seed with neigh-
bors, or engaging in informal sale of the seed;
• to keep competing commercial seed produc-
ers from multiplying and marketing the
protected variety without a license; and
• to keep competing plant breeders from using
a protected variety or technology in the
development of a new variety.
The role of IPRs in agriculture is an exceptionally
controversial subject. The debates involve complex
arguments defended by a range of interest groups.
The optimum design of IPR regimes will vary ac-
cording to local economic, institutional, and agri-
cultural circumstances and will change as these
determining conditions evolve. It is unrealistic to
believe that there are any simple, uniform, or per-
manent formulas that will provide ready-made so-
lutions. It is important to recall that IPR regimes are
rights and privileges that are granted at the na-
tional level in order to contribute to the public
good. It is therefore the responsibility of policy
makers to define the particular societal goals that
IPRs in agriculture are meant to address and to de-
velop appropriate legislation. 
THE ORIGINS OF THIS REPORT
This report is based on an empirical analysis of the
conduct and performance of IPR regimes for plant
breeding in developing countries. It attempts to
draw useful lessons to guide national policy makers
and donors who are concerned with establishing ef-
fective and relevant IPR systems. This report is
based on a study that was commissioned by the
World Bank in late 2003 and carried out in 2004. The
preliminary results and conclusions were discussed
with World Bank staff and specialists in agricultural
IPRs in November 2004, and a summary of the
study has been published (Louwaars et al. 2005).
Because relatively few developing countries
have experience with IPRs in plant breeding, and
because an assessment of that experience requires
in-depth fieldwork, a wide range of evidence had
to be sought in a small number of developing coun-
tries that have started implementing IPR regimes in
agriculture. The five countries chosen for case stud-
ies represent major segments of developing coun-
try agriculture, geographical spread, and levels of
experience with IPRs (box 1.1).
A team of nine researchers from Europe and the
case study countries worked on the study. They re-
viewed the literature and developed interview pro-
tocols for the case study countries to obtain
comparable sets of data. Interviews were con-
ducted with large numbers of stakeholders in each
country, representing public plant breeding and
seed production, the private seed sector, IPR and
regulatory agencies, and farmers and farmer
groups. Data and reports were also collected and
analyzed, and interviews were conducted with
representatives of the commercial seed sector in in-
dustrialized countries. 
The present document summarizes the findings
from the study, includes relevant information
from other developing countries, and draws
lessons for policy makers who are concerned with
designing and operating appropriate IPR regimes
for their countries. 
THE STRUCTURE OF THIS REPORT
Following this brief opening chapter, Chapter 2
introduces the major examples of IPR regimes
for plant breeding, focusing on plant variety pro-
tection (PVP) and patents, and discusses other
mechanisms that provide similar incentives for
the breeding industry. Chapter 3 reviews the in-
stitutional setting for seed system development
in developing countries. Chapter 4 examines the
establishment and management of IPR regimes
in plant breeding in developing countries.
Chapter 5 reviews the impacts of IPR regimes on
seed companies, and Chapter 6 examines their
effects on public research in developing coun-
tries. The final chapter presents a set of lessons
for policy makers and donors who are responsi-
ble for guiding the establishment of IPRs for
plant breeding.
4 Intellectual Property Rights 
Box 1.1 Countries Included in the Study  
Source: Authors.
China is among the most important agricultural
economies in the world and has experience in imple-
menting most relevant IPR systems over the past
several years. It has a substantial domestic capacity in
plant breeding and biotechnology. The seed industry
is developing rapidly through private investment
(local and foreign) and through the commercializa-
tion of a large number of public research and seed
enterprises at the national, provincial, and prefectural
levels. China is a market that attracts investors and
inventors from all over the world. The country also
has a significant area planted to transgenic crops.
Colombia is one of the Latin American countries with
the most experience with IPRs in the breeding and
seed sectors. It has a diverse agriculture, ranging from
subsistence farming to several important agricultural
exports, and an emerging use of transgenic crops.
Different crops attract different seed production
systems, with local companies investing in a number
of food crops and multinational investments in cotton,
maize, and flower seed production.
India has a very well developed agricultural research
capacity in breeding and biotechnology, and its large
market attracts considerable interest from abroad. It
has a thriving private seed sector, with many small-
and medium-scale local companies and a number of
joint ventures with multinationals, existing alongside
an extensive public seed production and research
infrastructure. India’s approach to agricultural IPRs
has resulted in recently enacted legislation that has a
number of unique characteristics and is the product
of prolonged and wide-ranging public debate.
Kenya is the Sub-Saharan African country with the
longest experience with IPRs in the breeding and seed
sector after South Africa. Its very diverse agriculture
ranges from subsistence to export sectors, and Kenya
maintains a relatively open policy towards biotechnol-
ogy. Its national seed company faces growing competi-
tion from local and foreign companies. The
horticultural industry—encompassing both flower and
vegetable crops—established the presence of foreign
providers of planting materials and seed in the country. 
Uganda does not yet have an operational IPR system
in the breeding and seed sector, but it has a diversify-
ing commercial agricultural sector. It may be consid-
ered a representative of the large number of
developing countries that are still in the process of
establishing an IPR regime. Its public seed enterprise
has been privatized and is losing market share to
emerging private seed companies. Seed production of
field crops for export is emerging, as is the flower
industry, which depends on Kenya-based suppliers
of planting materials. 
More detailed information on the seed systems of
these countries is presented in Appendix B.
5Various attempts have been made to establish IPR systems for plant
varieties, but the concept of PVP and the possibility of plant patents
emerged just under a century ago. This chapter summarizes the his-
torical development of IPR systems for plant varieties and looks at the
major factors that distinguish them from other intellectual property
systems. More detailed information can be found in Appendix C.
Although the patent system has been in operation for a much longer
time, it still must be adjusted to the field of plant biotechnology so
that appropriate and equitable incentives become available. This
chapter outlines some of the major areas of concern, especially in re-
lation to supporting agricultural production in developing countries.
The discussion emphasizes that formal IPR regimes are not the only
method for protecting the interests of plant breeders and seed pro-
ducers, and it reviews some of the major alternatives.
THE PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND VARIETIES
The evolution of IPRs for plant varieties
Almost from the beginning of modern plant breeding, there have
been arguments for establishing some mechanism to reward the cre-
ativity inherent in new crop varieties and to establish plant breeder’s
rights. European efforts eventually culminated in the Convention for
the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (Paris, 1961), which also es-
tablished UPOV (the Union for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants) to support the implementation of the harmonized system
and to expand it to more crops and countries. UPOV provides pro-
tocols for assessing and describing the unique characteristics of a
new variety, ensuring that it is distinct, uniform, and stable (DUS).
These standards are adapted to the mode of reproduction of the pro-
tected species: cross-fertilizing crops admit a wider tolerance than
the relatively strict requirements for uniformity in vegetatively
propagated crops. Any variety that fulfills the DUS criteria and that
is “new” (in the market) is eligible for protection, and there is no
need to demonstrate an inventive step or industrial application, as
required under a patent regime. A DUS examination involves grow-
ing the candidate variety together with the most similar varieties of
common knowledge, usually for at least two seasons, and recording
a comprehensive set of morphological (and in some cases agro-
nomic) descriptors. 
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The UPOV system—revised in 1972, 1978, and
1991—has gradually strengthened the rights of the
breeder. The rights defined under UPOV are
known as “plant variety protection” (PVP). By late
2005, 59 countries (plus the EU) had ratified a
UPOV Convention (32 countries follow the 1991
Convention, 25 the 1978 version, and 2 still operate
under older versions). Most countries of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) are members of UPOV, and
a growing number of developing countries, partic-
ularly in Latin America, have joined. The UPOV
system is the major example of a sui generis method
for the protection of plant varieties, and it is seen by
many as the most straightforward choice for coun-
tries wishing to comply with the TRIPS Agreement.
UPOV offers important harmonization functions
because members use the same technical guide-
lines for DUS testing, even though UPOV member
countries may provide quite different levels of pro-
tection for plant varieties. UPOV makes it easier for
countries to share information and may reduce
transaction costs. Countries that now wish to join
UPOV need to comply with the rules of the latest
Convention (1991). However, countries that want to
comply with TRIPS do not have to become a mem-
ber of UPOV. They can either design their own “ef-
fective sui generis system” or design a system based
on one of the older versions of UPOV. For example,
Indonesia has a PVP system based on the 1978
Convention. Even though it is not eligible to join the
Union, Indonesia considered the flexibility pro-
vided by the older Convention more appropriate
for its agricultural conditions. India, on the other
hand, has designed a law incorporating several fea-
tures that are dissimilar to any UPOV Convention. 
An alternative to PVP is provided by the utility
patent system in a limited number of countries.
A 1985 U.S. court decision (reaffirmed in 2001)
ruled that plants were eligible for utility patents,
opening the door to a flood of applications for this
higher level of protection (Evenson 2000; Supreme
Court of the United States 2001). Only plant vari-
eties invented or discovered “in a cultivated area”
are eligible for patents, thus limiting the possibility
of patents on wild relatives. Under the 1978 UPOV
Convention, a variety could not be protected by
both a patent and PVP, but the 1991 Convention al-
lows this double protection. Only a few other coun-
tries (for example, Australia and Japan) allow
patents for plant varieties. In Japan, the patent sys-
tem is used only for plant varieties that are consid-
ered innovative and not merely a product of nor-
mal plant breeding. The EU does not issue patents
for plant varieties, although the effective scope of
protection of its biotechnology patents may include
a variety or group of varieties. Based on the study
conducted for this report, utility patents for plant
varieties are not considered a reasonable option for
developing country IPR systems. Nevertheless, as-
pects of patents for plant varieties are discussed
throughout this report because of the pressure
from some parts of the seed industry to move in
this direction and because this option is included in
some of the bilateral trade negotiations between the
USA and several Latin American countries.
A number of important parameters must be con-
sidered in designing an appropriate IPR system for
plant varieties. The major parameters of the most
common sui generis protection systems and the util-
ity patent system are listed in table 2.1. The most
prominent issues in the sui generis systems involve
the so-called “farmer’s privilege” and “breeder’s
exemption.” The farmer’s privilege provides the
farmer with some exemptions to IPRs, ranging
from the right to save seed for his or her own use to
the right to exchange or sell seed, depending on the
national law. The issue of seed saving is a good ex-
ample of how IPRs in plant breeding must be tai-
lored to the conditions of national seed systems.
Even within a single country, the requirements and
conditions of different crop production systems are
not uniform, and countries could consider legal op-
tions that address this variability. The breeder’s ex-
emption provides that any person is allowed to use
a protected variety for further breeding without re-
quiring the consent of the rights holder. Under
some laws, a newly bred variety may be considered
an “essentially derived variety” (EDV), and the
IPRs to that variety then depend on the rights to the
original variety. 
The patent system does not include such ex-
emptions, even though the EU Directive 98/44/EC
on this matter has specifically included a farmer’s
privilege provision, in the event that the scope of a
biotechnology patent extends to a group of plant
varieties. Some countries in Europe explicitly in-
clude a breeder’s exemption in such cases.
The farmer’s privilege should not be confused
with the concept of “Farmers’ Rights,” which has
been codified in the IT PGRFA (2001) and in
some national laws. There is no uniform inter-
pretation of Farmers’ Rights in relation to IPRs
on plant varieties. 
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Further details on differences between protec-
tion systems, on Farmers’ Rights, and on the pro-
tection of biotechnological inventions can be found
in Appendix C.
ADDITIONAL STRATEGIES THAT
PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF THE
PLANT BREEDER
Policy makers considering the design of IPR legis-
lation for the plant breeding industry must recog-
nize that a number of other mechanisms are
available to protect the interests of plant breeders
and contribute to the development of a competitive
and dynamic national seed sector. Decisions on
IPRs should not be made without understanding
and considering the other instruments that
are available to promote plant breeding and seed
production. The alternatives include biological
processes, conventional seed law, contract law,
biosafety regulations, brands and other IPRs (such
as trademarks), and trade secrets. As with patents
and PVP, the effectiveness of these alternatives
depends on the local capacity for enforcement.
Biological protection
The oldest mechanism for protecting a plant vari-
ety is hybridization. Hybrids are the products of a
cross between two (or more) parent lines or popu-
lations. The discovery of the phenomenon of hy-
brid vigor in the early 20th century opened new
possibilities for producing high-yielding and uni-
form varieties of cross-fertilizing crops and offered
two distinct advantages for protecting the interests
of commercial seed provision. First, seed of hybrid
origin will lose some yield potential and other
Table 2.1 Comparison of Major Intellectual Property Systems for Plant Varieties
Criterion UPOV 1978 UPOV 1991 Utility patents (USA)
Protection Varieties of species or genera as
listed
Varieties of all genera and species Sexually reproduced plants (and
genes, tools, methods to produce
varieties)
Exclusion Nonlisted species None First-generation hybrids, unculti-
vated varieties
Requirements Novelty (in trade)
Distinctness
Uniformity
Stability
Novelty (in trade)
Distinctness
Uniformity
Stability
Novelty (in public knowledge)
Utility
Nonobviousness
Industrial application
Disclosure Description (DUS) Description (DUS) Enabling disclosure
Best mode disclosure
Deposit of novel material
Rights Prevent others from commercial-
izing propagating materials
Prevent others from commercial-
izing propagating materials and,
under certain conditions, using
harvested material
Prevent others from making,
using, OR selling the claimed
invention or selling a component
of the invention
Seed saving Allowed for private and noncom-
mercial use
For use on own holding only (for
listed crops only)
Not allowed without consent of
patent holder
Seed exchange Allowed when noncommercial Not allowed without consent of
rights holder
Not allowed without consent of
patent holder
Breeder’s
exemption
Use in breeding allowed Use in breeding allowed (but
sharing rights in case of EDV)
Not allowed without consent of
patent holder
Duration 15-20 years (depending on crop) 20-25 years (depending on crop) 20 years from filing or 17 years
from granting (prior to June 1995)
Double
protection
(PVP and patent)
Not allowed Allowed Allowed
Source: Adapted from Helfer (2002), Krattiger (2004), and van Wijk et al. (2003). 
valuable characteristics (such as uniformity) in sub-
sequent generations, which reduces farmers’ in-
centives for saving seed. Second, competing seed
companies cannot duplicate a particular hybrid va-
riety if they do not have access to the inbred lines
used to develop the hybrid variety. If the inbreds
can be physically protected, they have the charac-
ter of a trade secret. In contrast, companies can eas-
ily duplicate an open-pollinated variety (OPV) by
obtaining seed of that variety. The use of hybrids
thus provides a steady demand for seed, overcom-
ing much of the uncertainty in the conventional
seed market, where factors such as the weather de-
termine how much seed is saved on the farm and
hence the demand for fresh seed. Hybrid seed is
more expensive to produce than seed of OPVs, but
if the hybrid varieties are superior in yield poten-
tial and homogeneity, substantially higher seed
prices can be charged.
A more recent example of biological protection
mechanisms is the introduction of genetic use re-
striction technologies, operating at the variety level
(V-GURTS) (Louwaars et al. 2002). In the absence of
special treatments, plants containing these tech-
nologies produce sterile seed, thereby ensuring that
farmers cannot save commercial seed of self-
fertilizing crops like wheat and beans for subsequent
planting. The technologies also make it difficult for
other breeders to use the protected germplasm.
Companies are using the methods of genetic trans-
formation to develop several such protection mech-
anisms. None are commercially viable yet, but the
possibility of this so-called “terminator technology”
has led to widespread debate and concern in the
popular press and has caused the technology to be
specifically banned in India’s Protection of Plant
Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act.
Seed laws
Conventional seed law can provide opportunities
for controlling access to plant varieties, even in the
absence of IPR legislation. Seed laws usually spec-
ify the extent to which seed must be certified and
define the types of variety that may be offered for
sale. A certification scheme defines seed classes of
specified origins, so that any certified seed can be
traced back to a seed lot produced by the main-
tainer of the variety (usually the breeder). Where
seed certification is compulsory, the breeder may
determine who is producing seed by controlling ac-
cess to breeder’s (or pre-basic) seed. Any unautho-
rized multiplication will not be acceptable to the
certification agency. These requirements mean that
a public or private breeder can establish an exclu-
sive contract with a seed company for the produc-
tion of specified varieties, even in the absence of
IPRs. When a variety is not protected by PVP (for
example, after the rights have expired), the author-
ities can assign one or more maintainers to meet the
continued demand for seed. Seed certification re-
quirements can also be used to limit informal seed
sales, especially when they occur on a large scale. 
Where seed law specifies that a variety must be
approved (through a registration process or on the
basis of performance tests) before entering com-
mercial seed production, this provision can also
prohibit the sale of a released variety under a dif-
ferent name. In this way, the law limits the extent
to which a competing company can market seed of
a protected or an essentially derived version of a
released variety, including the unauthorized use
of a transgene.
Contract law
Various types of contracts can be effective in pro-
viding legally enforceable agreements that restrict
the use of a breeder’s variety and offer comple-
ments or substitutes to IPRs. Such contracts are ef-
fective only if the provider of the genetic materials
has exclusive access or established rights to the ma-
terials or can offer particular benefits to the other
contracting party. The contracts are ineffective if
third parties have easy access to the varieties or
genes. Some contracts are aimed primarily at pre-
venting seed saving and multiplication, whereas
others are aimed at protecting the germplasm from
being used in competitors’ breeding programs.
One type of contract that is increasingly preva-
lent in the U.S. seed market is the grower contract,
or “bag tag.” This simple (unsigned) agreement re-
stricts the farmer from using or disposing of any
part of the harvest as seed. Farmers are considered
to comply with the provisions of such contracts
when they open the seed bag. 
If it is possible to control the market for the har-
vested product, then another type of contract can
be enforced. The breeder can oblige a grower to use
the plant variety in certain ways and can impose
restrictions on the saving or multiplication of plant-
ing material. For example, in the cut flower indus-
try, the vast majority of the output is sold in a
limited number of wholesale markets in the North.
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If a flower variety is protected in the country where
a major wholesale market is located, growers in
other countries may have to sign contracts limiting
multiplication or unauthorized sale of that variety,
or they risk being denied further access to the major
market. This type of contract can be effective even
if the flower-growing country has no IPR system.
Control of output markets can also be used to
regulate access to certain field crop varieties.
Chapter 5 presents several examples of how access
to transgenic crop varieties is controlled. 
Access to germplasm may also be controlled
through material transfer agreements (MTAs),
which may be seen as another form of contract reg-
ulating the use of breeding material. When MTAs
are established between genebanks or other public
institutions and private breeders, they can establish
exclusive access, stipulate the type of benefit shar-
ing in the case of commercialization, and prohibit
legal protection by the recipient of the materials “in
the form received.” Commercial firms may also use
MTAs (box 2.1).
Biosafety regulations
Biosafety regulations are not meant to serve as
IPRs but are intended primarily to protect the en-
vironment and promote the safe use of biotech-
nologies. Even so, aspects of the biosafety system
can create property-like rights. For example, in
cases where national IPR systems do not provide
adequate protection, biosafety regulations may be
used to prohibit the sale of varieties that include
the unauthorized use of a privately owned trans-
gene. In addition, biosafety data themselves may
be valuable property. The biosafety system gener-
ates data from extensive testing to demonstrate en-
vironmental and food safety. Such testing can be
very expensive, especially when feed and food tri-
als are necessary, and most of the costs are paid by
the company that wants to register the transgene.
Regulations in some countries require biosafety
analysis for each new transgenic variety, even if
the variety is based on a previously approved
“event” (the introduction of a particular construct
in a particular place in the genome). Since such
data are usually confidential, they have great com-
mercial value and create the basis for contracts that
effectively create rights over genes. Although
biosafety regulations may help control the unau-
thorized use of transgenic varieties in countries
without relevant IPRs, it is important to recognize
that a biosafety agency’s mandate, budget, and
personnel are directed towards environmental
protection and not the enforcement of rights or ac-
cess to biotechnology.
Brands and trademarks
Brands and trademarks are part of intellectual
property law, but their utility in the seed industry
is often overlooked in the policy debate about
IPRs. Seed companies frequently register their
brands and trademarks as a way of distinguishing
their products from those of their competitors and
building up a loyal customer base. In the absence
Box 2.1 MTAs and the Seed Industry
MTAs and other contractual arrangements can be used
by private companies to control access to genes or
transgenic varieties that are protected by IPRs in one
country, even if the recipient country does not recog-
nize the particular IPR. For example, when a national
agricultural research organization contracts with a
major biotechnology company to use particular propri-
etary transgenes, the contract may specify how the na-
tional organization is to use the genes, the rights to
anytechnologies that are produced, and the company’s
obligations (for example, to provide training or other
assistance). In some developing countries, multina-
tional corporations (MNCs) may find that commercial-
ization of their own transgenic varieties requires too
much attention to marketing seed, policing violations,
and enforcing rights, and they may prefer to license the
rights to a transgene to local seed companies. Access
to various tools and processes of biotechnology, such
as genetic transformation techniques or diagnostic
methods, is also usually subject to contracts specifying
limitations on their use and the rights of the provider in
relation to commercial products.
Source: Authors.
of other intellectual property instruments, the de-
velopment of a strong brand image and reputation
can protect a company from some types of compe-
tition. While trademarks can be effective in com-
munication with customers (farmers), they do not
protect a breeder from competitors who “steal” the
variety and include it in their own (branded) prod-
uct portfolio.
It is much less common for crop varieties to be
trademarked. Usually there is a prohibition against
using a variety name registered under PVP as a
trademark, but in some cases a trademarked vari-
ety name may be very useful. For instance, flower
breeders often register a variety through PVP
under one name but market it under a second,
trademarked name, which can be used and pro-
tected long after the PVP expires. Some countries
prohibit the use of separate trade names and pre-
scribe that the name registered in the PVP or seed
law lists is to be used in commerce.
Trade secrets
In some instances, secrecy is an effective way to
protect certain technologies, and the choice be-
tween patenting and secrecy may depend on the
type of technology and the size of the firm. Trade
secrets may not be included in a separate body of
law but come under standard trade law. In plant
breeding, the primary example of a trade secret is
the protection of the inbred lines used to produce a
hybrid. The ability to exploit this type of secrecy
depends to an important extent on the degree of
physical security that can be provided to plant
breeding facilities and seed multiplication plots.
Registration requirements (under PVP or seed law)
may require the breeder to provide information on
the pedigree (e.g. the specific inbred lines that are
“the formula” for breeding the hybrid) or even de-
posit samples of the different parent lines. This re-
quirement can nullify the trade secret unless the
registration authority can keep the information and
materials confidential. Advances in biotechnology
make this type of secrecy more difficult to main-
tain, as reverse engineering of new varieties be-
comes easier. Even though such actions might be
covered by the enforcement of provisions on EDVs,
they help to explain the pressure from some parts
of the seed industry for further limitations on the
breeder’s exemption. Trade secrets are also useful
for protecting certain aspects of plant biotechnol-
ogy, particularly procedures or techniques that
cannot be detected in the final product, such as
markers and regeneration methods.
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This chapter provides a brief introduction to the major actors in na-
tional seed systems. These systems encompass formal institutions en-
gaged in research and plant breeding, seed multiplication, and seed
marketing and use. They also include informal seed sectors based on
the saving, exchanging, and selling of seed among farmers. Seed sys-
tems are usually subject to some control from regulatory regimes.
Seed systems involve individuals and organizations in the public do-
main, the private sector, and civil society. The overview of seed sys-
tems in this chapter concentrates on trends and differences in the
developing world and touches only briefly on industrialized coun-
tries. Appendix B summarizes information on the seed sectors in the
five case study countries, illustrates some of the differences among
developing countries, and provides background references on some
of the institutions and organizations featuring in the examples cited
throughout this report. 
SEED SYSTEMS IN 
INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES
In industrialized countries, seed multiplication, marketing, and dis-
tribution are almost solely commercial operations. The situation in
plant breeding is somewhat more complex. Commercial enterprises
dominate the market for high-value seed crops like maize, cotton,
soybean, vegetables, and grasses, and companies that initially earned
most of their revenue from seed multiplication and marketing now
invest heavily in plant breeding to maintain their market position.
For lower-value seed crops, such as small grains and legumes, pub-
lic institutions such as universities and government research insti-
tutes still have an important position in plant breeding in some
countries. Basic research in plant breeding, such as the development
of selection methods or research on the genetic control of important
characteristics, used to be the task of public institutions. However,
with the application of biotechnology to plant breeding and the as-
sociated opportunities for patenting, private industry has been very
active in these areas since the early 1980s. This activity has been ac-
companied by a significant consolidation of many conventional seed
companies into a few large multinational enterprises. For these com-
panies, research is not only a service unit to maintain the firm’s posi-
tion in the seed market but is also a profit center in its own right. In
some cases, companies may detach themselves from the seed market,
Plant Breeding and
Seed Sectors in
Developing Countries
3
leaving operations in seed production and market-
ing to specialized companies to whom they license
the technology.
SEED SYSTEMS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
In most developing countries, scientific plant
breeding has largely been the responsibility of the
public sector, often stimulated by the results of in-
ternational agricultural research centers (IARCs).
Plant breeding has received significant emphasis
since the so-called “Green Revolution” in the 1960s
and 1970s, and it has been viewed as contributing
to rural development and national food security
and thus as a public responsibility. Similarly, seed
production and distribution have been seen as
vehicles for technology transfer rather than as
commercial operations. For these reasons, govern-
ments have largely been responsible for organiz-
ing and funding plant breeding research and seed
multiplication.
More recently, some countries have stimulated
commercial seed supply by privatizing public seed
production programs, encouraging the develop-
ment of domestic seed enterprises, and opening up
their seed markets to foreign investors. Developing
countries currently show a wide range of public
and private responsibilities in the seed sector, al-
though basic research and breeding for most crops
remain public responsibilities while a variety of
public, parastatal, and private enterprises cater for
seed production and marketing.
Farmers’ seed systems usually operate along-
side formal seed systems. Farmers’ systems are
characterized by traditional methods of selection
within and among varieties, on-farm seed multi-
plication, and informal diffusion of seed from
farmer to farmer (Almekinders and Louwaars
1999). These systems still provide the vast majority
of all crop seed used by farmers in most develop-
ing countries. Despite the fact that farmers’ seed
systems are built on traditional methods and
processes, they often involve modern varieties,
some of which may be associated with IPRs.
RESEARCH AND PLANT BREEDING
Almost all developing countries maintain national
public organizations for agricultural research,
which are referred to here as national agricultural
research institutes (NARIs). Plant breeding has
traditionally been a key research area of the
NARIs. In many smaller countries, NARIs depend
heavily on IARCs for much of the germplasm and
methods used for breeding field crops. Smaller
NARIs concentrate on selecting material from
IARC “nurseries,” which are collections of poten-
tially useful germplasm that can be tested under
local conditions. More advanced NARIs receive as-
sistance in the design and operation of their breed-
ing programs, including the selection of parents,
the creation of genetic variation, and the develop-
ment of efficient methods for selecting germplasm
possessing desired characteristics. A relatively
small number of stronger NARIs have more ca-
pacity for basic research. 
Many NARIs have faced gradual reductions in
their direct financing from government, in line with
overall reductions in public expenditure, and many
have also been affected by declining donor sup-
port. The IARCs have been instrumental in build-
ing the capacity of the NARIs, but budgets for these
support activities have also declined. The breeding
programs in most IARCs have been reduced in size
over the past two decades as overall research fund-
ing has declined and as plant breeding has faced
growing competition from other research activities
within IARCs.
SEED PRODUCTION
AND MARKETING
National seed programs were established in most
developing countries following the first successes
of the Green Revolution in the 1970s. Many seed
sector development initiatives were supported
through the Seed Development Program of the
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), which
provided assistance for the development of basic
seed farms, seed conditioning facilities, and con-
tract grower schemes. These seed programs were
designed to help spread high-yielding varieties to
as many farmers as possible by making seed avail-
able to government extension services and rural
development projects, often under subsidy
schemes. In a few countries, notably Kenya and
Zimbabwe, seed production was initiated by orga-
nizations serving the needs of large commercial
farmers, but these operations were later brought
under more direct government control.
Seed policies gradually changed in the 1980s and
1990s as seed production was increasingly consid-
ered a potentially commercial economic activity.
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Some national seed programs were transferred to
government corporations (parastatals), which had
different levels of freedom to develop their busi-
nesses. In addition to putting public seed programs
on a more commercial basis, many countries also
began to support the development of local seed
companies and in many cases also opened their
doors to regional or global seed companies. 
Countries differ widely in the success of these ap-
proaches to develop a competitive commercial seed
sector. Larger countries such as China and India
tend to be able to attract a more diversified com-
mercial seed sector, whereas smaller countries may
be able to provide incentives only for a few com-
mercial seed suppliers. Multinational seed compa-
nies tend to concentrate on a very few seed crops
(such as maize or cotton), whereas local companies
tend to offer a wider range of products. Many local
seed companies depend on NARIs for their vari-
eties, while others develop their own breeding pro-
grams for a few important crops. A number of crops
that are critical for national food security, such as
small grains and legumes, are not very profitable
seed products, however. They attract much less at-
tention than vegetable and hybrid seed crops.
SEED USE
Despite all the emphasis on seed industry develop-
ment, most seed in developing countries is still
produced by farmers themselves. The level of farm-
saved seed depends on a number of factors, includ-
ing the crop and the wealth of the farmer. Crops
with a low seed rate that are produced mainly for
the market will be more likely to attract frequent
seed purchase. Farmers with more resources are
more likely to use the commercial seed market. Seed
that cannot be stored easily or that tends to carry
seed-transmitted diseases is also purchased more
regularly. 
Farmers’ seed systems can be very effective in
providing seed of adapted varieties at the right
time and at low cost, but they can be vulnerable to
natural and man-made disasters. These systems are
also the only way that farmers’ varieties can be
maintained and further developed, so they make a
valuable contribution to agro-biodiversity. Modern
varieties are also multiplied and shared in farmers’
seed systems, and in many countries it may even
be official policy to stimulate farmer-to-farmer
exchange of new varieties so that those varieties
can reach remote and resource-poor farmers. More
recently, a range of programs, often sponsored by
donors and nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), have supported farmers’ seed systems
and local seed multiplication and distribution. 
SEED POLICIES
AND REGULATIONS
IPRs are not the only type of legislation relevant to
the seed industry. Both public and private seed sys-
tems are subject to national seed legislation. As
mentioned, seed laws commonly include a variety
approval system and a seed certification and qual-
ity control system, managed by various bodies and
committees. 
A variety approval (or release) system identifies
varieties that have value for farmers and estab-
lishes a system by which the varieties are named
and described. Official variety release is usually
(but not always) a prerequisite for commercial seed
Table 3.1 Costs (US$) of Variety Release in Case Study Countries 
Country Procedures and cost
Source: Compiled by authors from information obtained from national authorities. 
China Agronomic trials in one or more agroecological zones: US$ 150 per season
Colombia Agronomic trials in one or more agroecological zones: US$ 1,718 per zone for supervision
India Private sector entries in All-India Coordinated Crop Improvement Programs (AICCIP) trials: US$ 217
per location per year
Kenya DUS test required: US$ 600 per variety or inbred
National Performance Trials (NPTs): US$ 500 per year, per zone
Uganda Private sector entries in NARO trials: US$ 120 per site (5-7 sites)
sale. The costs of testing for variety release may be
substantial (and are independent of the costs of
testing for PVP, discussed in chapter 4). Costs of va-
riety release for the five case study countries are
presented in table 3.1. 
The certification system introduces strict gener-
ation control for seed production, in which
breeder’s or pre-basic seed is multiplied through a
prescribed number of generations to produce com-
mercial seed. The breeder is in most cases desig-
nated as the maintainer of the variety and the sole
source of this seed. The seed certification process
also usually involves testing for seed quality (ger-
mination percentage, cleanliness, and other quality
characteristics). Seed certification systems may be
compulsory or voluntary. 
The conditions established by seed laws and pol-
icy greatly influence opportunities for private en-
terprise, and seed policy changes and regulatory
reforms are the subjects of continuing discussion in
many developing countries (Tripp 1997; Louwaars
2002). There are important interactions between
seed regulation and IPRs for plant breeding.
Because both seed regulatory regimes and IPR sys-
tems can control access to—and utilization of—
seed, it is important that they are compatible and
complementary. Seed regulatory frameworks and
IPR regimes also share a dependence on enforce-
ment capacities. Seed regulation is usually man-
aged and enforced by the state, although limited
resources often mean that state responsibilities
may not be addressed adequately.
More recently, biosafety regulations have been
developed to guide the introduction of genetically
modified crops (Traynor and Komen 2002). These
regulations are also an important part of the regu-
latory environment of the plant breeding industry,
determining what type of transgenic varieties may
be available and specifying conditions for their
multiplication and sale. 
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This chapter examines the experience to date with the establishment
and administration of IPR legislation for plant breeding in develop-
ing countries. Such an examination is limited by the fact that rela-
tively few countries have yet to enact relevant legislation, so many of
the examples are drawn from the case study countries. The chapter
looks at the implementation of PVP legislation in developing coun-
tries, the scope of protection that is offered, and the administration of
PVP systems. The chapter also briefly discusses the current status of
biotechnology patents in developing countries. 
THE CURRENT STATUS OF PVP IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
IPR legislation
A study of the current state of play for IPRs in plant breeding in the
South shows that few countries have operational PVP systems
(box 4.1). A recent review shows that although more than two-thirds
of low-income countries are members of WTO, only 8 percent are
members of UPOV (adapted from Koo et al. 2004). However, it is im-
portant to understand that national legislation significantly pre-dates
an application to join UPOV, that legislation is not necessarily based
on UPOV models, and that there are cases (most notably India) where
the compatibility of national legislation with UPOV Conventions or
with Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement has yet to be tested. 
Developing countries must also pay increasing attention to bio-
technology patents. The majority of developing countries have func-
tioning patent offices, but only a few have any experience in dealing
with inventions related to plant biotechnology.
The establishment of PVP legislation
Pressure for the establishment of PVP in the South has come from dif-
ferent sources. In Kenya, for example, the protection of plant varieties
was already included in the 1977 seed law, but this protection was not
implemented until that law was substantially revised in 1994. The
major thrust towards implementing PVP in Kenya came from the
flower industry, which currently accounts for the lion’s share of
applications. A special office for PVP was established within the
Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate Service (KEPHIS), and the country
joined UPOV in May 1999. 
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In other countries, crop breeders in public re-
search institutes initiated the pressure to introduce
PVP. In Uganda the first discussions started in
1991, organized by the public research system,
which saw opportunities to earn revenues and
compensate for declining public expenditures. This
situation has been repeated in a range of develop-
ing countries. 
A third impetus for the establishment of PVP is
the TRIPS agreement, which specifies the mini-
mum requirements for protection. Several devel-
oping countries started national debates to design
appropriate laws. While these debates remained
within expert circles in some countries, in others—
notably the Philippines and Thailand—the issue
was picked up by NGOs, which influenced the de-
cision-making process. In India, the government it-
self, together with some leading NGOs, organized
a wide consultation covering all states and a wide
range of stakeholders. After long debate, in 2001
India passed its Act for the Protection of Plant
Varieties and Farmers’ Rights. The original impe-
tus for the Act came from India’s commercial seed
sector, and draft bills produced in 1993, 1996, and
1999 were opposed by NGOs. A Joint Committee of
Parliament then traveled through the country col-
lecting the views of the industry, NGOs, farmers’
groups, and others and redrafted the bill in 2000 for
introduction to Parliament (Ramanna 2003). The
bill was also widely debated in India’s press. 
Identifying institutional responsibilities
There is a time lag between the adoption and actual
implementation of a national PVP law. This time is
used to draft implementation rules, to establish a
PVP office, and to assign responsibilities for variety
testing. This period may also be used to publicize
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Box 4.1 Developing Country Responses to TRIPS
Many developing countries have felt the pressure of
the deadline specified in TRIPS and have tabled their
laws at the last moment. Most exceptions are in Latin
America, where 10 countries followed the 1994 ex-
ample of Argentina and Uruguay and had become
UPOV members by 1999. The African Intellectual
Property Organization (OAPI), comprising 16 (mostly
francophone) countries in West and Central Africa,
initiated procedures to join UPOV 1991; OAPI’s indi-
vidual members have also agreed to produce legisla-
tion consistent with the 1991 Convention. Most Asian
countries with PVP laws have not become UPOV
members, even though in several cases their laws re-
flect the main components of the UPOV 1978 system.
Others, such as India, have applied for membership,
which is still under consideration by the UPOV
Secretariat. India’s 2001 Act for the Protection of Plant
Varieties and Farmers’ Rights includes an exception-
ally liberal allowance for farmers to save, use, and ex-
change seed of protected varieties. Farmers or farming
communities can also register their own varieties.
Some of the provisions seem to go beyond the UPOV
1978 clauses, but UPOV is awaiting the implementa-
tion rules to judge whether the Indian system is in
conformity with the 1978 Convention. (India received
a dispensation to accede to UPOV under the old
Convention.) An authority is currently being estab-
lished under the Ministry of Agriculture to administer
the Act.
Least Developed Countries have more time to de-
velop their systems; as of the publication of this re-
port, the deadline for compliance with the most
relevant aspects of TRIPS had been extended to July
2013. The debate in these countries is complicated
by growing pressure to combine the protection of va-
rieties with concepts from the CBD and the IT
PGRFA, as in the African Model Law. The Indian law
is an appealing model for some, but other countries
cannot judge the adequacy of this legislation until it is
implemented.
Harmonization is a special and important issue in
the design of laws related to Plant Breeders’ Rights
(PBR). All countries of the Andean Community
(Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela)
have agreed to a common PVP regime, but the actual
implementation and enforcement of PVP varies by
country. Although the former East African Union in-
tends to harmonize its seed sector regulations, there
are considerable differences between the Kenyan,
Tanzanian, and (draft) Ugandan PVP legislation.
Source: Authors.
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the operation of the new law among all stakehold-
ers, including the courts. In China, the first appli-
cations were submitted two years after the law was
adopted in 1997; in India, the first applications
were received in 2005, four years after the passage
of the law.
Two common options for the location of a PVP
office are to use existing facilities in the patent of-
fice or to establish a new office within the Ministry
of Agriculture (MoA), as in most UPOV member
countries. (In China, the Ministries of Forestry and
Agriculture take responsibility for PVP for woody
species and other crops, respectively). Both options
have advantages and disadvantages. The patent of-
fice is conversant with administrative procedures
for granting IPRs, but it has no experience with the
biological nature of plant varieties. The MoA com-
monly lacks the legal expertise to operate such an
office, but it knows the seed sector and is familiar
with plant science. It is generally easier for the MoA
to acquire the legal expertise than for the patent of-
fice to acquire skills in biology.
Variety testing is done under the responsibility
of the PVP office. Some countries have developed a
completely new network of testing stations (for ex-
ample, 15 stations in China under the MoA). In
other countries, the task is combined with other
regulatory tasks in agriculture (for example,
KEPHIS in Kenya), and in yet other countries, such
as India, existing research stations test the appli-
cant varieties. Smaller countries with limited
human resources in the fields of taxonomy and
breeding tend to assign responsibility for variety
testing to the national breeding program. This pro-
cedure has the great disadvantage that an institute
may be called upon to test its own varieties for pro-
tection. This conflict of interest can be avoided by
establishing a separate DUS testing unit, often con-
nected to the seed certification agency, which can
combine DUS testing with the post control opera-
tions for certification. Alternatively, varieties from
a particular research institute may be tested by an-
other institute in the same country or abroad. The
examples of the USA, where breeders performs
their own DUS testing, or Canada and Australia,
where breeder testing occurs under different levels
of official supervision, are not commonly followed
in developing countries.
One way to reduce costs and the burden on the
limited human resource base for breeding and vari-
ety testing is regional cooperation in variety testing.
This option is used in the EU, where responsibilities
for particular crops are shared among countries.
Alternatively, countries (especially UPOV mem-
bers) can accept test reports from other countries
based on bilateral agreements. This option is used
in Kenya and Colombia, which use Dutch reports
for flower crops to grant PVP nationally. 
Initial range of crops
Most developing countries that have started to im-
plement PVP are doing so for a limited number of
crop species and genera, mainly because the pro-
cedures differ by crop and because testing agencies
have to be able to handle applications. For exam-
ple, China currently offers protection for 41
species, including many important field crops but
excluding cotton and important horticultural
species. India has developed procedures for 40
species but does not have any practical experience
yet. The UPOV Convention does not require coun-
tries to provide protection for all crop species im-
mediately. Taking time to build facilities, reducing
the administrative costs, or maintaining a more
open playing field for certain crops may all be rea-
sons for initially limiting the range of protected
crops. Countries tend to give priority to major field
crops in developing their protection systems, yet it
may also make sense to concentrate on crops for
which protection would create the best incentive
for investments in breeding—in most cases, the
more commercial horticultural species.
It should be noted that the length of protec-
tion available for varieties can vary. The UPOV
Conventions establish minimum periods for pro-
tection (15 years for field crops under the 1978
Convention and 20 years under the 1991 Conven-
tion). Colombia recently extended its protection
period to 20 years as part of its law, modeled on
UPOV 1978. Many countries establish coverage for
15 years for field crops, but Uganda’s draft legisla-
tion contemplates 20 years.
Extant varieties
Another decision that must be taken in establish-
ing a PVP system concerns the status of existing
varieties. Although PVP is offered for new vari-
eties only, it is considered acceptable to offer pro-
tection for varieties that are released just before
the system comes into force. Countries take dif-
ferent positions on this issue (box 4.2). In most
developing countries enacting PVP legislation,
a number of crop varieties will have been through
the official release process; in many cases these
will be public varieties, sold by either public or
private seed companies. A decision to extend pro-
tection to such extant varieties in effect provides a
windfall profit for the breeder (often a NARI) in
the form of royalties. Royalties may provide a
welcome source of revenue but might in some
cases discourage further seed production. In cases
where PVP legislation includes some restrictions
on farmer’s privilege or breeder’s exemption, the
use of the variety in local seed systems or formal
breeding programs may also be affected. 
Early experience with PVP
The three case study countries that have estab-
lished PVP systems illustrate wide divergence in
the types of crops and varieties that are protected
(table 4.1).
China received 1,150 applications for PVP be-
tween 1999 and 2003. Of these, 411 have been
granted. Although many applications from as far
back as 1999 have not yet been acted upon, the av-
erage time to grant an application is 17 months
(Koo et al. 2003). The vast majority of the applica-
tions are for field crops; maize and rice account for
45 and 32 percent of the applications, respectively.
More than three-quarters of the maize applications
in the MoA office are for hybrids, and more than
three-quarters of the rice applications involve ei-
ther hybrids or inbred lines. Wheat, soybean, and
rapeseed are the other major examples of field
crops seeking PVP. Two-thirds of the applications
come from public research institutions, mostly at
the provincial and prefectural level. (Applications
at the Ministry of Forestry PVP office are mainly
for roses.)
Colombia has received 785 applications for PVP
since 1996, and 448 had been granted by mid-2004.
The vast majority of the applications are for orna-
mentals; roses alone account for 62 percent of all
applications. The major examples of PVP for agri-
cultural crops are rice (12 applications to date;
6 granted) and cotton (25 applications; 8 granted).
Applications for other field crops include soybean,
tobacco, and potato, all from the private sector.
Although hybrid maize is an important crop in
Colombia, sold by several local firms and MNCs,
there are no PVP applications for maize. Other im-
portant agricultural crops, including beans and
wheat, are similarly unrepresented.
Between 1997 and 2003, Kenya received over
600 applications for PVP, but by mid-2004 only
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Box 4.2 Differential Treatment of Extant Varieties
Source: Authors.
Some countries (for example, see Uganda’s draft leg-
islation) offer no protection for extant varieties. In
others, extant varieties may be allowed limited cover-
age. China allowed protection for varieties released
up to four years before the legislation (although the
impact does not seem significant). Colombia allowed
a one-year amnesty for applications, but any protec-
tion granted would cover a period beginning with the
original release date. The Colombian Institute for
Agriculture and Livestock (ICA) chose not to act on
this provision because it felt that its varieties were
already in the public domain, but many private appli-
cations (mostly for ornamentals) took advantage of
the amnesty. India’s legislation permits PVP for public
and private varieties that are already released and
notified. Coverage begins on the original notification
date, which is similar to the position taken by several
countries in the Commonwealth of Independent
States.
The most controversial case regarding extant vari-
eties has arisen in Kenya, which announced an
amnesty that allows a full period of protection
(15 years) for any released variety. This amnesty
would cover, for instance, maize hybrids that were
released in the 1960s and remain in commercial pro-
duction. Most of the eligible varieties are the property
of the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI),
and although KARI has already signed royalty agree-
ments with the Kenya Seed Company (KSC) for many
of them, the amnesty would mean that KARI could
collect royalties from any other seed producer for a
wide range of its crop varieties. The issue has raised
considerable controversy, and the amnesty has not yet
been gazetted. 
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108 certificates had been granted, 70 percent of them
for ornamentals, especially roses and alstroemeria.
Among field crops, maize has the highest number of
applications (accounting for 10 percent of the total); all
of these applications are for hybrids from either the
public sector or the parastatal Kenya Seed Company
(KSC). The rise in domestic applications is partly due
to the amnesty granted in 2001 to previously released
public varieties. The fact that this ruling is being con-
tested is one of the explanations for the relatively low
number of PVP grants issued so far. 
The experience of these three countries with
PVP is quite varied, but it illustrates some general
principles. Not surprisingly, the major interest
in PVP is for those crops whose seed or planting
material represents an important commercial
market. In Colombia and Kenya, the applicants are
predominantly foreign breeding firms producing
ornamentals (table 4.2), and European DUS testing
reports are used for registration. The high interest
in PVP for these crops reflects their commercial
value, their great diversity, and their ease of repro-
duction. A review of PVP grants in all UPOV mem-
ber countries showed that ornamentals account for
more than 51 percent of all grants and that orna-
mental and other horticultural species combined
account for 70 percent of PVP grants worldwide
(Srinivasan 2004). Even in the case of field crops,
commercial interests affect the likelihood of PVP
application. In industrialized countries, where hy-
brid technology usually offers sufficient protection,
hybrids may not be submitted for PVP. On the
other hand, the majority of PVP applications in
China are for hybrid varieties that already have a
certain degree of in-built biological protection but
which require additional legal safeguards in a very
Table 4.1 Numbers of PVP Applications and Certificates Issued in Case Study Countries 
China Colombia Kenya
Crop Applications Granted Applications Granted Applications Granted
Beans 27 1
Cabbage 15 7
Cassava 2 0
Coffee a 4 0
Cotton 25 8 2 0
Fruits 18 8 5 0
Groundnut 10 5
Macadamia a 11 0
Maize 520 = 50% 248 54 = 10% 0
Pasture grasses 10 0
Potato 7 1 5 3 4 0
Peas 7 0
Pepper 10 1
Pyrethrum 23 23
Rapeseed 38 11 14 0
Rice 365 = 34% 82 12 6
Roses a 448 = 62% 279 248 = 42% 61
Sorghum 7 6
Soybean 30 19 8 2 7 0
Sugarcane 5 5 6 2
Sunflower 10 0
Tea a 33 0
Tobacco 4 3
Wheat 84 21 30 0
Other ornamentals a 214 = 29% 139 61 = 11% 15
Other 53 8 6 6 31 0
Total number of varieties 1,050 411 727 451 569 108
Source: Compiled from Louwaars et al. (2004:76-78). 
a. Data from China on woody species, including ornamentals, not included in this study.
competitive commercial seed market (table 4.2). Rice
is the field crop that attracts the most PVP applica-
tions in Colombia because of the competitive and
profitable domestic rice seed market. The public sec-
tor may be slower to apply for PVP for many of its
varieties, especially those without well-established
seed markets; the surge in public applications in
Kenya following the announcement of the amnesty
is the exception that proves the rule. Thus although
PVP can strengthen established seed markets and
provide incentives for further investment, it is more
difficult to prove that PVP—at least at the level
illustrated in the case study countries—is a sufficient
cause of new commercial seed activity.
THE SCOPE OF PVP IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Even though two countries may both be members
of the same UPOV Convention, their enabling leg-
islation may be quite different. For example, issues
addressed in the three case study countries with
PVP legislation include the regulation of farmer
seed saving and seed exchange; the breeder’s ex-
emption; the range of crops to be included in the
early stages of the program; the treatment of ex-
tant varieties; and the wider issues raised by
Farmers’ Rights provisions. Questions also arise
about the relationship between conventional seed
law (variety registration and seed quality control)
and PVP legislation.
Seed saving and exchange
Farmer seed saving is one of the most contentious
issues related to PVP. China’s PVP legislation pro-
vides a broad farmer’s privilege for saving and
reusing one’s own seed, which is seen as impor-
tant in a country dominated by smallholder farm-
ers. The degree to which farmers can sell or
provide seed of protected varieties to others is not
well defined, and there is a great deal of informal
trade in certain varieties. Kenya also permits
farmers to save seed of protected varieties, but
KEPHIS has expressed interest in moving closer to
compliance with the more restrictive 1991 UPOV
Convention. One particular concern is that many
wheat farmers (some of whom cultivate quite
large areas) either save seed or acquire it from
neighbors. Although there is considerable farmer-
to-farmer sale and exchange of seed, this activity
is illegal for any major field crop (whether it is
subject to PVP or not) because of Kenya’s strict
seed certification requirements. 
As mentioned in chapter 2, EU countries that
prohibit seed saving generally exclude small farms
from the rule. In Colombia, a recent ruling
(Resolution 2046 of July 2003) prohibits farmers
with holdings greater than 5 hectares from saving
seed of protected varieties. Those with smaller
farms may save such seed, but they are required to
report to a local ICA office and give details of how
home-saved seed will be processed and used. The
sale of farm-produced seed of protected varieties is
not permitted, although a certain amount of seed
selling does occur and is of particular concern to
the rice seed industry. 
India’s recently passed legislation is exception-
ally liberal in its definition of farm-level seed sav-
ing, allowing farmers to save, use, exchange, or sell
nonbranded seed of protected varieties just as they
have done previously. It appears that selling seed
to a neighbor is permitted as long as the transaction
is conducted informally and the seed is not sold
with any commercial denomination or packaging. 
These cases illustrate a wide range of regulation
and practice with respect to farmers’ utilization of
saved seed of protected varieties. Decisions re-
garding seed saving and exchange must be based
on an assessment of the needs and conditions of the
nation’s farmers, the capacities of the seed indus-
try, and the possibilities of enforcing particular reg-
ulations. Like many aspects of IPR management,
initial legislation can establish broad guidelines
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Table 4.2 Sources of Applications for PVP in China and
Kenya
Source China Kenya
Public research institutions (%) 67 22
- National (%) 3
- Provincial (%) 28
- Prefectural (%) 29
- University (%) 7
Private sector (%) 33 69
- National (%) 32 11
- Foreign (%) 1 58
Joint public-private (%) 9
Total (number of applications) 1,150 602
Source: Compiled from Louwaars et al. (2004:76-78). 
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and then further adjustments can be made as con-
ditions warrant.
Breeder’s exemption
There is less evidence on how the use of protected
germplasm in other breeding programs has been
affected by PVP. UPOV 1978 establishes no re-
strictions on such use, and the private plant breed-
ing industries in most developing countries are
not sufficiently well established for this issue to
have appeared as important. There are no special
arrangements for EDVs in the case study coun-
tries, although China and Kenya are considering
modifying their legislation to address this issue.
The International Seed Federation is debating pro-
posals to limit the breeder’s exemption, mainly to
protect commercial interests in the most competi-
tive markets in Europe and the USA. This issue
could emerge in developing countries as well
when MNCs start to use the national PVP systems
in the South. 
Farmers’ Rights
Both the CBD and the IT PGRFA describe coun-
tries’ obligations to provide mechanisms for shar-
ing benefits from the use of plant genetic resources
with farming communities, but they do not spell
out precise mechanisms or legal instruments. There
are concerns about possible contradictions between
what Article 9 of the IT PGRFA describes as
“Farmers’ Rights” and some aspects of PVP legis-
lation. There is also some debate over whether a
single piece of legislation might try to link PVP
with benefit sharing. Several countries have en-
acted PVP legislation that does not address these
broader aspects of Farmers’ Rights, while others
have combined the two (box 4.3). 
The relation of PVP to national seed law
When countries design and enact PVP legislation,
they need to review its relation to national seed
law. Chapter 3 discussed the fact that in many
cases national seed law (governing variety release
and seed quality control) may complement (or
even substitute for) PVP legislation. Some coun-
tries find that their seed laws must be revised to
come into line with PVP legislation. In India, for
instance, public plant varieties have always
needed to be officially released and notified, a
process that includes testing agronomic perfor-
mance and recording descriptors (sufficient for
seed certification, although not DUS testing). But
private firms could sell their varieties as “research
varieties,” without complying with these release
procedures, although they needed to meet mini-
mum seed quality standards and clearly specify
the variety name on the package. Now that most
new varieties, public or private, are likely to apply
for PVP, a revised Seeds Bill establishes a National
Register of Seeds, which applies to all varieties of-
fered for sale and includes performance testing.
Thus private companies in India have traded their
freedom to sell varieties without passing perfor-
mance tests (but without legal recourse if competi-
tors appropriate their varieties) for an obligation
for registration and testing linked to a legal system
of protection. There is considerable debate in India
Box 4.3 Farmers’ Rights and PVP
One of the most prominent examples of combining
Farmers’ Rights and Breeders’ Rights in one law is
India’s Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’
Rights Act, which includes the possibility that farmers
or farming communities may register their own vari-
eties; the expectation that farmers can claim compen-
sation if a variety does not perform in the manner
described by the breeder; and benefit sharing through
a National Gene Fund. 
The model PVP legislation developed under the
auspices of the Organization of African Unity places
particular emphasis on farmer and community rights
and the protection of the environment. Uganda’s draft
PVP legislation includes treatments of community
rights to local plant varieties and sharing of benefits
from the utilization of local germplasm (through a na-
tional “community gene fund”).
Source: Authors.
over whether the strict new Seed Bill sufficiently
supports Farmers’ Rights.
Both PVP and seed law may be used to limit the
extent of informal (for example, farmer-to-farmer)
seed sale. If the objective is to ensure that legitimate
seed companies are not undermined by large-scale
informal sales of protected varieties, a reasonable
definition of “commercial sale” in a PVP law may
be more feasible than a full-blown mandatory seed
certification scheme that assumes, often unreason-
ably, that a country can provide efficient and effec-
tive certification to serve seed producers in all parts
of the country. Such a definition of commercial sale
may be specified by crop type or other criteria and
does not necessarily imply acceding to the stric-
tures of the UPOV 1991 Convention. 
THE ADMINISTRATION OF PVP
Costs of PVP
It is important to recognize that a PVP system en-
tails significant costs, particularly related to DUS
testing and assessment. A candidate variety must
be grown in carefully controlled and monitored tri-
als, usually for at least two seasons, to ensure that
it is novel and distinct from other varieties and that
its traits are uniform and stable. This process
requires access to good experimental sites and
adequate laboratory facilities. In addition, confir-
mation of distinctiveness requires the capacity to
maintain and grow reference varieties for compar-
ison as well as access to databases describing simi-
lar varieties. All of these activities imply the
availability of well-trained personnel, who in real-
ity may be in short supply in developing countries
and whose assignment to PVP responsibilities may
entail considerable opportunity costs.
The costs of applying for and maintaining PVP
in selected countries are presented in table 4.3, along
with comparative data from the EU and USA. It
should be noted that the costs of application are
substantial; in addition there are significant trans-
action costs (justifying the use of agents to facilitate
the application procedure in countries like China
and Colombia). The maintenance fees rise steadily
over the full or initial period of protection in most
countries; in Kenya there is a flat annual fee for
maintenance. It is important to remember that
these are only the costs of obtaining PVP. Other ex-
penses related to variety testing and release can be
substantial and also must be met (representative
costs for variety release, for example, are presented
in table 3.1).
High fees for PVP can act as a disincentive for
application, but little guidance is available on how
to structure PVP fees (box 4.4). In China, mainte-
nance fees for PVP are substantial, although some
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Table 4.3 Costs (US$) of PVP Applications and Maintenance
Item China Colombia Kenya EU USAa
Application 217 233 200 1,115 432
Testing 556 1,396 600 1,265-1,490 3,220
(155 if done abroad) (depending on
type of crop)
Granting of rights - 39 240 - 682
Annual (1-3): 181 (1): 78 (1-20): 200 (1-20): 540 None
maintenance fee (4-6): 236 (2): 155 (beginning 2006)
(by year) (7-9): 306 (3): 233
(10-12): 398 (4-20): 311
(13-15): 517
(16-18): 672
(19-20): 874
Source: Louwaars et al. (2004), updated with data from PVP office websites.
a. The USA does not charge annual maintenance fees. In addition, in the USA testing is undertaken by the breeder and results supplied to the
Plant Variety Protection Office; the testing fee in the table refers to an examination fee.
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subsidies are offered for public sector applications.
Nevertheless, many public plant breeding insti-
tutes, particularly at the prefectural level, find they
do not have the funds to apply for PVP (Huang et
al. 2003). Research managers estimate that the cost
of a PVP application for a single variety may be the
equivalent of half a researcher’s annual budget.
The private sector in China also complains about
the high costs of PVP. Breeders of ornamentals
point out that they need to protect a number of va-
rieties of a particular species to start commercial
production. The local market for flowers does not
yet sustain such investments, and several foreign
breeders avoid sending their elite materials to
China for this reason.
Another strategy for cost saving is to consider
possibilities for cost sharing and cooperation
(Louwaars et al. 2003). There are several options for
managing DUS testing. The PVP authority itself
may provide all the staff and facilities for DUS test-
ing; this alternative provides a neutral source of
expertise, but it requires hiring and training spe-
cialized personnel. Another option is to leave the
testing to the breeders (whether in public organi-
zations or private firms), with the PVP authority
responsible only for monitoring and evaluation.
This option can lower the costs of establishing a
public institution, but it assumes that the breeding
organizations themselves have the capacity to
carry out DUS testing. (In Australia, breeding firms
often collaborate to manage joint DUS trials, to save
money.) Various combinations of these systems are
also possible. Finally, a national PVP office can con-
tract another authority to conduct the tests. In
Colombia, all the DUS testing for ornamentals is
done abroad, while testing for field crops is done
in-country by ICA staff with part-time responsibil-
ity for DUS testing.
Box 4.4 Determining PVP application and Renewal Fees 
Source: Authors.
Establishing the appropriate fees for PVP is an
important challenge. High fees create a barrier to
widespread participation, especially for public insti-
tutes or smaller firms. On the other hand, low fees
may produce insufficient revenue for the registration
and testing authorities, leading to reduced efficiency
or rent seeking. In each case it is important to decide
the extent to which the government should insist on
cost recovery or, alternatively, be willing to subsidize
the agency as a stimulus to national plant breeding
activity. The need to cover the costs of variety protec-
tion has to be balanced by the need to establish effec-
tive incentives for stimulating widespread invention. 
Different options may be considered for establish-
ing the fee structure: 
• One option assumes that the cost of the author-
ity’s activities will be shared equally among all
applicants and crops. This option will involve a
certain amount of cross-subsidizing between
crops (for example, few applications and high
costs in testing sesame can be compensated
by many applications and relatively low-cost
registration work in rice). 
• Alternatively, countries may establish different
fee levels for separate crop groups (based on the
actual costs of evaluation). This option may lead
to acceptable fees for crops with large numbers
of applications each year, such as major cereal
crops, but it can lead to prohibitive fees if
special facilities need to be maintained, and
charged accordingly for crops with few applica-
tions per year, such as minor vegetable crops. 
• A third option would be to base the fees on the
value of the protection for the applicant. Fees for
varieties with a larger (more lucrative) potential
market can be higher; hybrid rice might attract
higher fees than conventional rice varieties,
or highly commercial crops like maize would
attract higher fees than minor crops like pigeon
peas. Considerations of market size also
illustrate why it is difficult to make comparisons
between countries; the potential market for a
variety may be many times greater in China than
in a small country like Rwanda. 
• Finally, it is also possible to establish different
fee levels for different types of applicant. In the
USA, for example, patent application and main-
tenance fees for individuals, small businesses,
and nonprofit organizations are only half the
fees charged to larger firms. 
The latter option suggests the potential of re-
gional collaboration. In the EU, for example, a DUS
certificate valid in all member countries can be ob-
tained, based on one DUS test done at the request of
the Community Plant Variety Office in one member
state. Breeders still have the option to apply in one
EU member state if they plan to commercialize
in that country only. Regional collaboration for
DUS testing deserves exploration by many devel-
oping countries. For example, the members of
the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) are developing a system of regional variety
release which could be expanded to include re-
gional PVP management. This kind of regional col-
laboration in DUS testing does not necessarily mean
that national PVP laws must be fully harmonized.
Confidentiality
An additional concern regarding the manage-
ment of a PVP system is the requirement for de-
positing germplasm, especially the inbred lines
used to create hybrids. Hybrids can be protected
by PVP on the hybrid itself and/or on the inbred
lines. In the first case, procedures in many coun-
tries require the applicant to reveal “the for-
mula”—the parent lines and their combination.
Because inbred lines are a type of trade secret
(whose confidentiality can be maintained well
after the expiry of a PVP certificate), companies
may be reluctant to turn them over to a testing
authority, even though they value the extra pro-
tection of the hybrid afforded by PVP. In India,
current law requires that the National Bureau for
Plant Genetic Resources (NBPGR) take samples
of imported germplasm for deposit. This law has
been an impediment for some firms wishing
to import inbreds and germplasm under deve-
lopment (as in shuttle breeding programs, for
example), because the owners may worry about
the security of such deposits. India’s new PVP
law requires the deposit of protected varieties
and the inbreds of protected hybrids, and opin-
ion in the seed industry is divided. Some com-
panies feel that the requirement will cause no
problems, while others are wary about the
prospect and anxious to see how the system will
be implemented.
Enforcement
To be effective, a PVP system must include ade-
quate mechanisms for enforcement. It is important
to recognize that PVP is a private right and that the
rights holders are thus responsible for collecting
royalties and detecting violations of their rights.
PVP offices themselves generally are not involved
directly in enforcement, although they may be
called as witnesses or experts in actions taken by
breeders. In a recent example in Colombia, a seed
company asked the PVP office to examine particu-
lar fields and confirm that the cotton variety being
grown was the company’s. The company could
show that the seed was not acquired legally and
used the PVP office testimony to obtain an out-of-
court settlement. Colombian rice seed companies
are concerned about the scale of seed saving and in-
formal seed sales among large-scale producers, and
they hope that the new resolution that limits saving
seed of protected varieties to smaller farms will
provide some relief. But the companies recognize
that they will have to identify the violators them-
selves and bring cases to court. They are concerned
that Colombian PVP law currently has no descrip-
tion of penalties for violations.
The experience of the courts is also an impor-
tant factor in effective enforcement. Chinese plant
breeding institutes often produce seed of their
own (protected) varieties themselves for fear of
losing control of them if they attempt to contract
out. Seed management stations under county agri-
cultural administration departments can check
licenses, and some are apparently supporting
breeders in claiming their rights and imposing
fines. But many breeders complain that the knowl-
edge of the courts is often insufficient to enforce
these rights effectively. 
PATENTS
Patents are national in scope, and an inventor must
apply for a patent in each country where this pro-
tection is desired. Multiple applications are facili-
tated through the Patent Cooperation Treaty
(PCT), which offers a simplified filing system in
124 member states. The PCT facilitates the appli-
cation process and encourages the joint technical
examination of applications. A single application
is made, with the level of fees corresponding to
the number of countries in which protection is
sought. Similarly, regional patent organizations in
Africa—the African Regional Intellectual Property
Organization (ARIPO), mainly in Southern and
Eastern Africa, and OAPI in West and Central
Africa—take much of the burden of processing
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patent applications from the offices of the member
countries. However, mechanisms such as PCT and
ARIPO leave the final responsibility for granting
or rejecting applications with the individual na-
tional patent office. The OAPI is a multinational
system in which one application can be filed and
result in a patent that is automatically effective in
all member states.
Only a few developing countries have experi-
ence with patents related to plant breeding (box 4.5).
No developing country recognizes plant variety
patents, and most are just beginning to consider
how to approach decisions on the protection of re-
search tools and genetic material used in biotech-
nology. The case study countries illustrate a wide
range of approaches and capacities in patenting
related to biotechnology.
Because there are few patents related to plant
breeding in most developing countries, there is
little experience with enforcement. However, un-
like PVP, patents in agriculture can draw upon
experiences with enforcing patents of industrial
applications. Many countries have law firms with
experience in pursuing cases of patent infringe-
ment, and extensive international experience and
the threat of future claims can affect behavior. For
instance, India’s National Botanical Research
Institute (NBRI) decided not to go forward with li-
censing its Bt (Bacillus thuringiensis) gene construct
to local seed companies in 2004 because it was
uncertain if the construct’s components offered suf-
ficient freedom to operate in the climate of the
country’s revised patent law and in light of the
legal capacities of MNC patent holders. 
Box 4.5 Experience in Patenting for Plant Breeding and Biotechnology
Source: Authors.
China has the most experience of the case study
countries. Patents are administered by the State
Intellectual Property Office (SIPO), which is an inde-
pendent organization. China now has more than 20
years of experience with its patent system; 100,000
applications were filed in 2003. Although living
organisms such as plant and animal varieties are not
eligible for patents, genes may be patented. By 2003
there were more than 100 applications for gene
patents related to agriculture. Biological processes,
such as transformation methods, are also patentable.
In addition, “methods of breeding” can be patented,
which effectively allows patent protection of hybrid
varieties. A number of such patents have been
granted, but the scope of allowable claims and the
impact of these patents is not well known. It appears
that the supply of examiners with sufficient biological
expertise for considering biotechnology applications
is not a constraint in China.
India provides a sharp contrast. Although India has
a well-established patent system, the law has specifi-
cally excluded the protection of “methods of agricul-
ture.” The amended law (January 2005) extends
protection to areas such as agrochemicals and the
products of biotechnology. It allows the protection of
microorganisms (as required by TRIPS Article 27) and
genes, although case law will have to determine the
extent to which agricultural exemptions will limit the
inclusion of plant varieties in the scope of protection.
In the period preceding the recent amendment, inven-
tors could deposit an application for a patent in a
so-called “mailbox” procedure, which enabled these
applications to be considered as soon as the new
amendment came into effect. 
In Colombia, the patent office under the supervi-
sion of the Ministry of Commerce received 1,209 ap-
plications in 2003, the majority of which were filed
through the PCT. The office employs 15 examiners,
one of whom works on biotechnology. Genes and
plant varieties cannot be patented (in accordance with
an Andean Community agreement), but microorgan-
isms “not found in nature” and transgenic varieties are
eligible for patents. 
In Kenya, patent applications are handled by the
Kenya Industrial Property Institute (KIPI), which em-
ploys 20 examiners, several of whom have experience
in biotechnology. Kenyan law allows the issuance of
both process and product patents in biotechnology
but excludes patents on plant varieties. In Uganda, the
national patent office has a very limited capacity to
examine applications in biology. Most of its work con-
centrates on examining ARIPO and PCT reports, and it
has not yet approached many of the issues related to
biotechnology patents.
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There are expectations that new or strengthened IPR regimes for
plant breeding in developing countries will provide increased incen-
tives for private seed sector activity. It must be remembered that there
has been significant commercial seed production in many develop-
ing countries for a number of years without any IPRs, so the challenge
is to identify the ways in which new IPR regimes might affect the
priorities and strategies of the commercial seed sector. This chapter
examines experiences in the commercial seed sector with PVP and the
protection of biotechnology.
PVP AND PRIVATE SEED PRODUCTION IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Impact in industrialized countries
There is a limited literature on the impact of IPRs on the seed indus-
try. A full review is beyond the scope of this report (see Lesser 1997;
Srinivasan 2001; Eaton 2002), but the studies provide only limited ev-
idence of the effects of PVP in industrialized countries. Studies in the
USA have examined the trends in variety release and have surveyed
breeders’ perceptions. Taken as a whole, these studies indicate that
private sector breeding in a number of nonhybrid crops increased fol-
lowing the PVP Act of 1970, but in the case of most crops it would ap-
pear that PVP has played only a moderate role in stimulating this
activity (Perrin et al. 1983; Butler and Marion 1985; Kalton et al. 1989;
Butler 1996; Frey 1996; Alston and Venner 2002). For wheat, Alston
and Venner (2002) found that private sector investments in the USA
have remained static, while those of the public sector increased. 
Studies in other countries are also inconclusive about the effects of
PVP. Penna (1994) found an increase in the development of some hor-
ticultural varieties but not of others in the UK after the introduction of
PVP. In Canada, a survey of breeders following the introduction of
PVP reported some increased breeding activity in horticultural crops
but less in grains or oilseeds (Canada Food Inspection Agency 2001).
In Spain, Diez (2002) found a correlation between the number of PVP
certificates granted per crop species and the availability of protection,
through either PVP or the potential to develop hybrid varieties. Even
when there are relationships, however, alternative explanations are
possible. It is thus difficult, if not impossible, to attribute increased
breeding investments to PVP alone because of the long-term changes
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involved and the role played by a number of factors,
such as developments in markets and other policies.
There is not sufficient experience with PVP in
developing countries to allow any kind of statisti-
cal analysis of impact (box 5.1). Even so, a review of
recent events in those countries that have estab-
lished PVP provides some indication of what might
be expected as PVP is instituted more widely.
Company attitudes towards PVP in
developing countries
The attitude of the private seed sector towards new
IPR regimes in a particular country depends to a
considerable extent on the recent history of the do-
mestic seed sector’s development.
In India, an exceptionally diverse and dynamic
seed sector has developed over the past two de-
cades, supported by quite liberal seed laws. Indian
private seed companies are well aware of the new
PVP law, and most hope to register their varieties
despite what they generally consider to be weak
protection. But there is considerable uncertainty
about what such registration will entail, and to
what extent it will be regulated by seed law or PVP
law. Some industry representatives are concerned
about the costs and efficiency of managing the
large-scale DUS testing that will be required. Many
companies welcome the possibility of protecting
their hybrids (especially for controlling the theft of
inbreds), yet some express reservations about the
requirement for depositing protected inbreds with
NBPGR. In addition, many Indian companies hope
that the establishment of PVP will usher in a new
policy that provides greater access to public
germplasm. Most Indian companies express an in-
terest in this possibility and a willingness to pay for
access to such material. 
In China, PVP is only one aspect of major policy
changes in the past decade that encourage private
sector participation in the seed sector and eliminate
the monopoly of the public seed companies. Many
smaller, start-up companies have appeared and
several larger ones are seeking partnerships with
foreign companies. Attitudes towards IPRs differ
depending on the size and nature of the company.
The larger, well-resourced companies, usually with
origins as public corporations, are devoting profes-
sional staff to IPR management, primarily PVP and
trademarks. 
Private seed companies have appeared only re-
cently in Kenya, following the reversal of policies
that supported a monopoly of the partially public
KSC. Kenya established PVP at about the same
time that it started to liberalize the seed market.
Local companies have not yet applied for PVP for
their varieties, even for maize OPVs, partly because
they view the process as involving high transaction
costs. Colombia has had a small domestic private
seed sector for many years; earlier it depended on
public breeding, but it has recently developed its
own breeding capacity for a few key crops. It
would appear that the major domestic breeding
effort that takes advantage of PVP is rice, while
MNCs utilize Colombia’s PVP for other field crops
such as cotton and soybean.
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Box 5.1 Early Evidence of the Impact of PVP
Source: Jaffé and van Wijk (1995). 
An early example of the impact of PVP is found in a
study in Argentina, which enacted PBR legislation in
the 1970s and joined UPOV (1978) in 1994. As of
1994, 79 percent of the 622 PVP titles issued in
Argentina were for OPVs, mostly for field crops such
as soybean, wheat, and alfalfa. In the early 1990s, the
National Seed Institute (INASE) was created to super-
vise seed trade; it was a public institute but financed
entirely by fees. One of its duties was to enforce PVP,
and it was able to police seed sales in the country and
impose fines for violations. By mid-1994, INASE had
levied 163 fines for violations of PVP. The effect was
to greatly reduce the illegal trade in wheat and soy-
bean seed by unregistered dealers and grain elevators
and increase the market share for the small domestic
seed companies that depended on these crops. These
actions have been credited with helping to save this
industry, which was otherwise threatened by wide-
spread informal seed sales, but there is little evidence
that the private sector has put additional resources
into these crops as a result of the establishment and
enforcement of PVP.
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The existence of PVP legislation should also
make foreign companies more willing to provide
their more advanced breeding lines and varieties
to a country, but this willingness depends on the
effectiveness of enforcement. In India, some local
representatives of MNCs say that they still have
only restricted access to the parent company’s
germplasm, while others say that the situation is
improving. In China, foreign companies are watch-
ing the experiences of domestic competitors in
pushing through enforcement cases. Foreign seed
companies have been rather cautious about using
the new PVP system. They are worried about leak-
age of their material during the DUS testing, and
many are concerned about the effectiveness of en-
forcement. In many cases, they cite perceived weak
enforcement possibilities as a reason for refraining
from introducing elite material in the Chinese mar-
ket or investing in major breeding programs (with
partners). The situation with vegetable crops is il-
lustrative. Many domestic companies are applying
for PVP protection but still seem to be concentrat-
ing on hybrids. Foreign companies, some of whom
even use China as a production base for other mar-
kets, have generally limited themselves on the local
market to introducing older varieties whose origi-
nal protection elsewhere has almost expired.
Incentives for OPV production
Given that hybrid varieties already offer a certain
degree of in-built protection, it might be expected
that the major effect of PVP would be to increase in-
centives for plant breeding and seed production for
OPVs. Because most PVP regimes in developing
countries do not limit farmer seed saving, however,
the potential for repeat sales of protected OPV seed
is significantly reduced. This situation helps to ex-
plain the apparently modest impact of PVP on
private investment in OPVs. 
In Colombia, there was already private sector in-
volvement before the establishment of PVP.
Companies now seek protection for their rice vari-
eties, but there is not sufficient evidence to demon-
strate increased private rice breeding activity due
to the IPR regime. Most of the farmers who pur-
chase rice seed manage commercial operations (the
average holding is about 32 hectares), and many
purchase seed rather than saving it, so the rice seed
industry has a reasonable market. Nevertheless,
considerable informal seed sales, and the fact that
no criminal penalties are described for PVP viola-
tions, mean that incentives for seed companies are
still limited. The MNCs operating in Colombia
apply for PVP on soybean and cotton varieties, but
the advent of PVP in Colombia has not seen the
emergence of private plant breeding for crops such
as OPV maize or beans. 
Two Kenyan companies are producing and mar-
keting their own maize OPVs, and KSC also mar-
kets public OPVs, but the private companies have
so far not applied for PVP for their varieties (and
their seed sales for these are modest). Private com-
panies in Kenya are not investing in breeding for
other nonhybrid seed crops. 
There is not yet much indication of any in-
creased private sector interest in breeding OPVs in
China, where PVP was introduced only recently.
One of the largest diversified seed companies,
China National Seed Group, claims that PVP has
not affected its mix of products or breeding strate-
gies. Breeding of OPVs by the private sector (and
the marketing of imported OPVs) is minimal and
concentrates on small market niches where there is
demand from commercially oriented growers who
value access to good quality seed. Both domestic
and foreign companies indicate that they do not yet
have sufficient trust in enforcement possibilities to
consider OPVs seriously. 
The Indian private seed industry is large and di-
verse, and no single attitude can be said to charac-
terize its breeding strategies. There is relatively
little evidence at this early stage that the new PVP
law will elicit much additional breeding activity for
OPVs. A few private companies already have their
own OPVs (for example, of rice, cotton, and certain
vegetable crops); they expect the new legislation
will help protect these varieties from competitors,
but at this point they have no plans to expand their
OPV breeding. A few companies say that if the PVP
legislation is effective they may expand into non-
hybrid seed, but many others reject the possibility,
at least in part because of the very liberal scope for
farmer seed saving and exchange. Some seed com-
panies express interest in nonhybrids as a way into
the hybrid market. For instance, several companies
began conventional rice breeding programs as a
way to gain a foothold in what they hope could be
a lucrative hybrid rice market. 
Industry structure
There is much debate and concern regarding con-
centration in the seed sector. Economic research on
the seed industry for grains and oilseeds in North
America has identified the increased scope of IPRs
as one factor contributing to this trend (for exam-
ple, see Lesser 1998; Fulton and Giannakas 2001;
King 2001; Fernandez-Cornejo 2004). Most atten-
tion has focused on the crop sectors in which
patents play an important role, due to the applica-
tion of modern biotechnology. There is less atten-
tion to the effects of PVP (Lesser 1997), and even
basic statistics on market shares are difficult to
gather, except for publicly listed companies.
Srinivasan (2004) recently examined the degree to
which the ownership of PVP certificates in indus-
trialized countries is concentrated. He finds that al-
though the share of certificates owned by a few
seed companies is not indicative of exceptional
concentration at a global level, individual country
statistics show concentration for particular crops.
Much of this concentration is a result of the many
mergers that took place in the seed sector in the
1990s. But the concentration of ownership of PVP
certificates is more a measure of the number of
product lines available to farmers, and actual mar-
ket shares may be more or less concentrated.
Whether the level of concentration found in in-
dustrialized countries is a matter of concern is
open to debate (for example, see Mooney 2000),
but it illustrates trends that bear scrutiny in devel-
oping countries.
IPR regimes for plant breeding have not been in
effect in developing countries for enough time to
allow any examination of the impact on the struc-
ture of the seed industry. Indeed, many countries
find their commercial seed sectors in a position of
expansion and diversification in response to liber-
alization policies, with or without PVP. But the
possible effects of PVP on industry structure de-
serve monitoring. In India, PVP will likely elimi-
nate many of the companies that sell varieties
developed by other firms under different names
and the fly-by-night operations that sell seed of un-
certain origin. Yet if the new PVP and seed laws
raise the costs of bringing a new variety to market,
small companies that specialize in niche markets
will have fewer incentives to operate. (It has al-
ready been noted that small seed companies in
Kenya currently avoid PVP because of its costs, a
practice that could allow larger competitors to ap-
propriate their varieties.) Another concern in India
is the role of very small private operations, often
farmers, who are linked to public breeding insti-
tutes and play an important role in the initial pro-
duction and popularization of new public rice va-
rieties, particularly in more marginal environments
(Pal et al. 2000). Whether such a system will con-
tinue under the new PVP and seed laws remains to
be seen. 
In Uganda, a number of national seed compa-
nies are emerging in the absence of PVP, which
may be explained more by the gradual decline of
the public seed enterprise (now privatized) during
the past decade than by the prospect of protection. 
Enforcement
Seed companies are learning that most of the re-
sponsibilities for enforcing PVP fall to them. In
some of the larger Indian firms, new staff positions
have been created for monitoring and advising on
intellectual property issues. Some companies have
tried to deal with particular violations of their in-
tellectual property (such as the imitation of brand
names or theft of inbreds) by hiring lawyers and oc-
casionally pursuing court cases, but company in-
tellectual property skills have not grown stronger
as a result. Companies that are part of larger
commercial holdings can draw upon the legal
capacities of the parent company. Several large
companies in India have developed genetic finger-
print data for court cases regarding variety theft,
but they have not yet been able to get such evidence
admitted.
Many smaller Chinese companies, on the other
hand, have established themselves in order to pro-
duce and sell seed of competitors’ varieties ille-
gally, reportedly without knowledge of restrictions
imposed by IPRs. Some of the larger companies de-
scribe the current situation as a learning phase for
a market that does not have a long history of IPRs.
The CEO of one major domestic seed company ex-
plained that they pursue as many PVP infringe-
ment cases as possible, because they feel it is
necessary to “educate” their competitors, as well as
the legal system, about the new rules of the game. 
THE USE OF OTHER METHODS
OF PROTECTION
Hybrids
Despite the biological protection offered by hybrids,
the majority of attention for PVP in China is on hy-
brids or inbred lines, accounting for about two-
thirds of the PVP certificates issued to date for field
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crops. Plant breeders are concerned about the lack
of physical security for their inbreds in seed pro-
duction plots and hence are willing to invest in PVP.
Even though PVP can help improve the protection
of their hybrids, some companies continue to use
(modified) three-way crosses that lower the possi-
bilities that competitors can acquire their inbreds.
The situation is similar in India, where seed
companies are anxious to apply for PVP for their
hybrids. There are many private seed companies,
and seed production usually takes place with
contract farmers in specific areas of the country
that have appropriate agronomic conditions and
grower experience for efficient seed production.
The juxtaposition of many small seed producers for
competing firms and the impossibility of providing
strict monitoring means that inbreds and other
germplasm may be stolen or traded. Some ob-
servers estimate that one popular cotton hybrid has
leaked from the company that developed it and is
now produced and sold under different names by
as many as a dozen competitors. The hope is that
the new PVP and seed laws will allow companies
more control over their inbreds. 
In countries where the physical protection of in-
breds is less problematic (either because crosses are
made outside the country or because commercial
competition is less intense), PVP for hybrids is less
of an issue. This seems to be the case in Colombia,
where neither MNC nor domestic maize hybrids
have sought PVP. The situation in Kenya is more
complex. The public (and parastatal) maize hybrids
are seeking protection, in part because of the possi-
bility of royalties, but the maize hybrids of the
small domestic companies have yet to apply for
PVP. In Uganda, where a local seed company pro-
duces maize hybrids on contract for Monsanto, the
current lack of PVP means that the operation must
be very closely supervised (all inbred parent seed
provided by the company has to be planted and all
the males destroyed immediately after pollination),
which adds to the cost of the seed.
Seed laws
Seed law can also be used by private companies to
protect their rights. In Uganda, exclusive license
contracts with seed producers to produce National
Agricultural Research Organization (NARO) maize
varieties are based not on PVP but on a gentlemen’s
agreement about NARO’s ownership of the vari-
eties, backed by seed certification requirements.
Companies cannot produce commercial seed when
they cannot demonstrate access to NARO-supplied
breeder’s seed. This requirement may not stop them
from commercializing such varieties abroad, but
any such attempt may exclude them from access to
future NARO releases. 
In China, companies are also able to control
some illegal sales of their varieties through seed
regulations that require seed companies to be certi-
fied. Thus smaller, fly-by-night propagators or ven-
dors can be shut down, or bags of seed can be
removed from shops, by bringing violators to the
attention of the local (county or city) office of the
Administration of Industry and Commerce. 
Contracts
The importance of contracts for enforcing rights to
plant varieties is best illustrated by the cut flower
industry, which is able to manage production by
contract growers in countries with and without IPR
regimes. Most flower producers in Colombia and
Kenya are only vaguely aware of the PVP offices in
their own countries, but they are well acquainted
with the royalties that they pay on planting mater-
ial, negotiated with the flower breeding companies
in Europe or elsewhere. 
Given the possibility of controlling illegal pro-
duction through the withdrawal of contracts and
the relative ease of monitoring wholesale markets,
it is fair to question the role of PVP regimes in pro-
ducer countries for the flower industry. Many pro-
ducers in Colombia and Kenya say they saw no
particular change in their conditions or markets
when their countries joined UPOV. On the other
hand, these producers may not be aware of the de-
gree to which their choice of varieties (presented in
catalogues to the growers) may be influenced by
the breeding company’s confidence in the business
climate of those countries with PVP legislation.
The case of Uganda illustrates that a country can
attract a buoyant flower production industry with-
out a PVP regime. If the flower varieties are pro-
tected through PVP in the country of destination
(or if they are trademarked), then PVP in the coun-
try of origin may be irrelevant. The flower industry
in the Netherlands is lobbying for strong IPRs in
the main production countries, however, to create
additional ways to tackle infringements. This pro-
tection is particularly important where a domestic
market and additional wholesale markets develop,
such as direct exports from Kenya to the Middle
East and other parts of Africa. Some producers in
Colombia believe their industry is better positioned
than that of neighboring Ecuador (which does not
have a functioning PVP system).
Business practice
Business practices can also help to combat the ille-
gitimate use of company varieties. The seed in-
dustry in India has had to contend with high
competition and very little legal protection for its
germplasm for nearly two decades. Many compa-
nies place great emphasis on the importance of de-
veloping a brand image as a way of encouraging
farmers’ loyalty and protecting themselves from
imitators. But following up on the misuse of a
brand requires time and resources. One company
has faced repeated instances of people selling
“seed” in falsified bags, but it has been able to catch
perpetrators only twice, and the only case that
made it to court resulted in just a small fine. 
The MNCs are particularly experienced in using
other business practices to help protect their vari-
eties. The most important of these practices is the se-
lection of local partners in the initial stages for
marketing and possibly also production. Companies
repeatedly stress this issue in interviews. While they
will reinforce these agreements with contracts, they
want to minimize the risk that they will end up in a
dispute with their business partner. The MNCs gen-
erally have low expectations of enforcing contracts
in the study countries, and in any case once material
has leaked out it is too late. 
PROTECTING BIOTECHNOLOGY
The MNCs have made exceptionally large com-
mitments to the development of transgenic crops
and are anxious to protect their investments. In in-
dustrialized countries, the effective enforcement of
patents and PVP is sufficient to limit the appropri-
ation of genetic material by competitors (although
a number of complex court cases are concerned
with determining the actual ownership of some of
this technology). Prohibiting seed saving by farm-
ers has proven somewhat more difficult, and
Monsanto invests significant resources in detecting
violations, initiating a number of lawsuits in North
America related to seed saving of its transgenic
varieties. Nevertheless, the illegal use of seed of
transgenic crops is very modest in these countries.
The situation is different for developing coun-
tries, where IPR regimes are not necessarily in
place, enforcement capabilities are often poor, and
the range of informal seed transactions is wide.
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Box 5.2 Protecting Biotechnology: Roundup-Ready Soybean
Source: Authors.
Several countries in South America produce RR soy-
beans, although much cultivation is illegal because of
bans on transgenic crops (for example, in Brazil and
Paraguay). These soybeans were first introduced to
Argentina, where they contributed to an expansion in
soybean cultivation and exports. Although genes can
be patented in Argentina, Monsanto was unable to
make an application in time, so its RR soybean
varieties are protected by PVP only. The great popu-
larity of RR soybean varieties was counterbalanced by
the black market for seed; only a small proportion of
farmers bought seed from legitimate sources, and
Monsanto temporarily stopped selling soybean seed in
Argentina in early 2005. 
Similar problems are evident in Brazil. Owing to
debates and delays regarding official approval for the
cultivation of transgenic varieties, all of the country’s
substantial RR soybean harvest is illegal and based on
black market seed, much of it brought across the bor-
der from Argentina. At one point Monsanto suggested
levying royalties from shippers in Argentina and
Brazil, which provoked much debate. Monsanto has
now taken steps to enforce its patent rights on
Argentinean shipments of soybeans arriving in
Denmark. It appears that the most likely solution is to
charge a royalty based on grain sold at harvest, to be
collected by grain dealers, cooperatives, and proces-
sors. Negotiations are in progress with producers’
organizations and ministries of agriculture, although
there is still considerable opposition, especially with
regard to charging royalties on farm-saved seed.
Monsanto has said that it will not provide advanced
soybean technology to these countries until a satisfac-
tory royalty system is established.
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The MNCs are particularly anxious that develop-
ing countries adopt strict IPR regimes. Foreign
seed companies operating in India that use
biotechnology in their breeding programs expect
that the new patent law will provide effective pro-
tection after an initial maturation period, and
many have filed applications, using a “mailbox”
procedure. Such applications are considered at the
start of the new patent law. The use of this proce-
dure addresses restrictions on late registration. At
the same time, companies are increasingly wary
of working with technologies that may contain
Box 5.3 Protecting Biotechnology: Bt Cotton
Source: Authors.
China has the longest experience with Bt (Bacillus
thuringiensis) cotton of any developing country. In
China, Bt cotton varieties are available through a
joint venture between Monsanto, Delta and Pineland
(DPL), and the Hebei provincial seed company.
Separate gene constructs and Bt varieties have been
developed by the Biotechnology Research Institute
(BRI). It was estimated that almost one-third of all of
China’s cotton area was planted with Bt varieties in
1999, and 58 percent in 2003 (Pray et al. 2002;
James 2003). Monsanto has patent protection in
China for their transformation methods and the 35S
promoter gene, but not for the cry1Ac gene con-
struct. The BRI has patent protection for its two Bt
constructs, but it acknowledges that its marketing
company (Biocentury) faces problems in enforcing
these patents. Cotton varieties cannot be protected
by PVP in China. There is widespread illicit produc-
tion and marketing of Bt seed. DPL’s construct re-
portedly has been crossed into other varieties by
farmers. Some observers believe that biosafety regu-
lations provide the most effective means of limiting
illicit sales, but there is widespread cultivation of Bt
cotton varieties in provinces for which approval has
not yet been granted. 
India’s experience with Bt cotton has also attracted
widespread attention. Its first Bt cotton varieties were
released through a joint venture between Monsanto
and India’s largest seed company, Mahyco, which it
partly owns. When the varieties were released it was
not possible to patent genes in India, nor was the PVP
system in force. Mahyco’s Bt varieties were approved
only for certain states, but a thriving underground
market for the seed developed in other areas. There
are estimates that half the Bt cotton grown in the
country is illegal. Several new Bt cotton varieties were
approved in selected states in 2005, including further
Mahyco varieties and varieties from two local seed
companies that license the Monsanto-Mahyco gene.
Monsanto’s strategy with respect to Bt cotton in India
has now shifted towards technology provision rather
than direct marketing. A joint venture (Mahyco-
Monsanto Biotechnology Ltd.) is providing the Bt gene
for cotton to Indian seed companies. As the company
does not “own” the gene in India, the contract is
based on access to the biosafety data that are neces-
sary for approving any transgenic variety. 
Bt cotton plays a part in the policy of the
Colombian Government to revive its cotton industry.
Both Monsanto and the Colombian government are
anxious that the experiment to introduce Bt cotton in
2004 works well, and considerable care has been
taken to avoid unauthorized production. The produc-
tion and sale of seed of the Bt variety is licensed to a
local seed company. Farmers who want to grow Bt
cotton must register with a cooperative, through
which they sell their harvest. The seed company and
ICA monitor cotton fields to ensure that growers com-
ply with the requirements for planting a non-Bt refuge.
The Bt variety does not yet have PVP; the Bt gene is
not patented in Colombia (which does not allow gene
patents), but Resolution 2046 makes it illegal to save
transgenic seeds on the farm. The strict enforcement is
expected to prevent any illicit activity. 
Bt cotton has also been grown in South Africa since
1998 (Thirtle et al. 2003). A DPL cotton variety was
introduced under very controlled conditions. The seed
is provided by one private company; growers must be
registered members of a farmers’ organization, and the
harvest can be sold only at designated ginneries.
Similar controls characterize the cultivation of
Monsanto’s Bt cotton in Mexico. Farmers have to sign
seed licensing contracts which forbid saving or re-
planting the seed, require sale of the harvest at desig-
nated ginneries, and allow Monsanto officials to make
spot checks on farmers’ fields (Traxler et al. 2001).
components that could be in the “mailbox” and
eventually fall under an Indian patent.
But even when IPR regimes are in place, local
customs and enforcement inadequacies make the
protection of biotechnology a considerable chal-
lenge. Nevertheless, MNCs have been particularly
anxious to establish a foothold for their transgenic
crop varieties in developing countries and have
often been willing to risk operating in situations
where enforcement possibilities are limited. The
gamble has paid off in some instances and pro-
vided valuable lessons in others. The two most
prominent cases concern Monsanto’s technology:
herbicide-tolerant Roundup-Ready (RR) soybean
and insect-resistant Bt cotton (boxes 5.2 and 5.3).
Controlling transgenic varieties
It is particularly difficult to control seed saving of
transgenic varieties by farmers, especially because
even those countries with PVP legislation usually
allow a farmer’s privilege. Latin American farmers’
objections to Monsanto’s proposed royalty collec-
tion at harvest are based on their rights to save
seed. Where hybrid technology is available, it can
make some contribution. For example, the fact that
all of India’s Bt cotton varieties to date are hybrids
(and most Indian cotton farmers are accustomed to
buying fresh seed each season) probably con-
tributes to limiting the degree of informal transfer
of Bt cotton seed in India. Specific seed contracts (as
in Mexico) or government resolutions forbidding
any seed saving of transgenic varieties (as in
Colombia) may help, although it remains to be seen
whether such contracts are considered legal (be-
cause they may contradict the provisions of
Farmers’ Rights) and whether they can be enforced
on a large scale. Where the sale of the harvest can
be monitored and controlled, the company can de-
tect the use of unapproved seed, or (as in the case
of soybean) royalties can be charged. But these
enforcement strategies require considerable ad-
ministrative capacity, and it is not clear if they are
feasible for dealing with large numbers of small
growers spread over a wide area.
In countries that have considerable plant breed-
ing capacity and a large number of commercial
seed producers (China and India, for example),
keeping transgenic varieties from the hands of
black market seed producers is a particular chal-
lenge. Both PVP and patents address this problem,
but the conscientious enforcement of the seed laws
could eliminate much of the illicit transgenic seed
currently available to farmers. A number of ob-
servers in India and China place their hopes on
biosafety regulations for controlling the illegal sale
of transgenic seed, but this form of control is ap-
propriate only at certain levels. Biosafety authori-
ties are mandated to monitor the environmental
and public health aspects of the use of transgenic
crops and are not trained or equipped to police
seed markets. If unapproved transgenic varieties
are detected, sanctions defined in biosafety regula-
tions can be applied, but the biosafety agency is
usually not the appropriate source of enforcement. 
The problem of controlling the use of transgenes
by established competing seed firms would appear
to be the least of the worries of technology owners.
In most cases, a combination of biosafety regula-
tions (identifying the genetic background and con-
ducting field trials before approval) and simple
variety registration requirements would limit
many possible instances of misappropriation. Thus
adequate protection and incentives for transgenic
technology development depend on the appropri-
ate division of responsibilities between seed law,
biosafety regulation, and IPR regimes. Overly rigid
IPRs are not necessarily the answer, and attention
to adequate enforcement of basic regulations is
liable to yield larger dividends.
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IPR regimes for plant breeding have important implications for the
management of public sector agricultural research. NARIs need to de-
velop policies that help them decide when to use intellectual property
for their own inventions, how to enforce these rights, and how to gain
access to protected technologies from elsewhere. Strengthened IPR
regimes are not the only factor that motivates NARIs to consider strate-
gies for generating revenue, but PVP and patents provide additional
opportunities whose management requires careful thought. The pos-
sibilities of earning royalties have implications for the ways in which
scientists are rewarded, the development of enforcement capacity, and
the management of public seed production programs. The pursuit of
IPRs for NARI technology also has significant implications for the
types of crops, breeding strategies, and targets selected by NARIs.
International agricultural research is also affected by IPR regimes,
and IARCs require carefully considered intellectual property policies.
They need to consider how this new environment affects their inter-
actions with NARIs and the private seed sector, and they need to
make sure that their use of protected technology allows them to de-
liver products to their clients.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICIES IN NARIs
Very few NARIs in developing countries have comprehensive IPR
policies. One of the exceptions is Brazil, where the Brazilian
Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa) has long experience in
managing IPRs. In 1996 Embrapa published its policy for managing
IPRs, which included the formation of an Intellectual Property
Committee that meets twice a year to discuss policies and issues
(Sampaio 1999). The policy emphasizes that Embrapa will make max-
imum use of IPRs through the licensing or transfer of proprietary
technology and states that royalty-free licenses will be used only
when their use is consistent with Embrapa’s public service commit-
ments. Embrapa has also reviewed its licenses for biotechnology tools
and has negotiated several agreements with foreign intellectual prop-
erty holders, some of them based on reciprocal access to Embrapa
technology. Embrapa’s individual research units each have an IPR
committee to deal with specific questions. 
Few other large NARIs in the South have advanced this far in
defining IPR policy. China’s public research institutes have consid-
erable experience with IPRs, but most NARIs in China lack written
Impacts of IPRs on Public
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policies on intellectual property management.
However, most Chinese NARIs have guidelines
and rules on IPRs that are understood by employ-
ees and management, although the approaches
vary widely among institutes. Not surprisingly,
institutes working on genetic transformation tend
to have more experience with intellectual prop-
erty management than those whose work is con-
fined to conventional plant breeding. 
The Indian Council of Agricultural Research
(ICAR) also lacks a written intellectual property
policy, and ICAR’s constituent institutes look to
Council headquarters for guidance and direction
on these issues. On its website, ICAR has guide-
lines for seeking patents, and it is issuing instruc-
tions for DUS testing of extant varieties and
registration of germplasm. IPRs are currently man-
aged with very limited resources by a small unit at
ICAR headquarters. Similarly, most Indian agri-
cultural universities do not have an intellectual
property policy. 
Smaller NARIs are still developing their own
IPR policies. KARI, for instance, divides attention
to intellectual property issues between its lawyer
and the head of its biotechnology center. In
Uganda, NARO recognizes that it needs staff with
some intellectual property expertise but is not con-
sidering employing its own lawyer. Some institu-
tions in Eastern Africa do have an intellectual
property policy, developed under the guidance
of the Eastern Africa Regional Network on
Biotechnology (BIOEARN); these policies tend to
concentrate on maximizing revenue.
REVENUE GENERATION
STRATEGIES
IPRs offer possibilities for public institutes to gen-
erate revenue. The prospect of raising revenue is
welcomed by research administrators who have to
contend with inadequate public budgets, but there
is considerable uncertainty regarding both the
level of income that can be expected and the effects
that this revenue might have on research programs
(box 6.1).
Revenues on varieties
Chinese research institutes have considerable ex-
perience with revenue generation strategies. Many
provincial crop research institutes had been selling
exclusive rights for hybrid varieties of rice and
maize to seed companies before the introduction of
PVP. On the other hand, some institutes take re-
sponsibility for their own seed production and rely
on private companies for marketing only. The
Cotton Research Institute (CRI) traditionally has
generated revenue by selling the rights to market
its seed, and the Institute for Vegetables and
Flowers (IVF) has also generated revenue from
seed sales, relying on companies for marketing.
The introduction of PVP has allowed institutes to
request higher prices for their varieties, and in
many cases auctions have been organized. 
Another arrangement that does not necessarily
require IPRs is to collect revenue by selling source
seed (breeder’s or foundation seed) of public vari-
eties to seed producers. For instance, Andhra
Pradesh Agricultural University sells more than 70
tons of breeder seed of its rice varieties every year
to private and public seed producers. Access to
public breeding lines in India is problematic, and
many companies hope that the new IPR regime will
lead to greater public-private collaboration. In a
few recent instances, however, public institutes or
universities have entered into nonexclusive agree-
ments that give seed companies access to breeding
lines, following guidelines set down by ICAR for
such contracts.
In most cases, NARIs will stand a better chance
of attracting licensees if they offer exclusive access
to their varieties or breeding lines, but even if it can
be demonstrated that an exclusive license provides
the most effective delivery route for a variety, such
an arrangement may clash with the expectations
of public service. The KARI administration favors
nonexclusive licensing arrangements for this rea-
son, and it lost the chance to license one of its maize
hybrids to a company because of the exclusivity
issue. In India, a strong public service tradition
makes it unlikely that very many public varieties or
breeding lines will be assigned on an exclusive
basis, and ICAR believes it has an important role in
counteracting trends towards concentration in the
commercial seed market.
The potential for generating revenue through
royalties on public varieties and sales of breeding
lines varies by crop and by country. In countries
that have large, technically proficient public breed-
ing programs and diverse, well-developed com-
mercial agricultural sectors, NARIs will certainly
have things to offer. Even in these cases, the pro-
portion of the budget that can be covered from such
sales may still be quite low. 
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An additional possibility for NARI plant breed-
ing programs to generate revenue is through inter-
action with MNCs. In such cases, the NARI
provides germplasm in return for a share of royal-
ties on any varieties eventually marketed (nation-
ally or internationally). Several international seed
companies are active in India, and in a few cases
they have simply purchased nonexclusive access to
public breeding lines. Once the PBR legislation is in
place, these interactions may be strengthened and
formalized. In Kenya, KARI has an agreement with
Monsanto to provide maize and cotton breeding
lines for possible genetic transformation, in return
for a share (as yet unspecified) of royalties on any
transgenic varieties that are ultimately developed. 
Patents
The patenting of innovations is an additional mech-
anism for NARIs to generate revenue. Among the
case study countries, China’s NARIs have the most
experience with patents. The BRI owns approxi-
mately 10 patents and has another 40 applications
pending, of which 2 have been submitted for over-
seas protection under the PCT. The BRI has pat-
ented two Bt genes and commercialized them in
cotton varieties through a joint venture with
Biocentury Transgene Technology. Although the
revenues have been much less than expected (diffi-
culties in enforcing the patent have led to the emer-
gence of a large black market for Bt cotton seed),
BRI currently generates about 15 percent of its in-
come from patents and expects to increase this
share significantly in coming years. 
India’s public agricultural research institutes
have limited experience in patenting, and policies
and modalities are still being established.
However, there is growing experience in patenting
plant-based products and processes for pharma-
ceutical uses (locally and abroad). The NBRI used
Box 6.1 Licensing Public Varieties
Source: Authors.
Kenya has a well-established PVP law, but there are
few examples of revenue generation by the public
sector to date. An important factor is the continuing
uncertainty about the ownership and protection of
many of KARI’s older varieties, which have been the
exclusive province of the KSC. Another factor is that
very few KARI crop varieties aside from maize hybrids
are of interest to the private sector. The barley vari-
eties used by the beer industry are an exception: KARI
has entered into a nonexclusive agreement with
Kenya Breweries, which pays a 2.5 percent royalty on
the value of the seed of KARI barley varieties that the
company provides to its outgrowers. As a result of the
brewery’s support for barley breeding, PVP is being
sought for several new barley varieties, with Kenya
Breweries and KARI as joint owners. Although KARI
tendered 16 maize hybrids in early 2004, with the
expectation that various seed companies would bid
for production rights, the outcome was disappointing.
Only three of the hybrids were contracted, in each
case to very small seed companies. 
In Uganda, NARO recently licensed different maize
hybrids and OPVs to four different companies that
were willing to enter into contracts and agree to pay
royalties, even though there is no PVP in Uganda.
NARO’s legal advisors believe that NARO can
demonstrate ownership of these hybrids, and in any
case the country’s mandatory seed certification law
would make it difficult for another company to sell
seed of these varieties. 
In Brazil, Embrapa has collaborated with the pri-
vate seed sector since 1989 to market its maize OPVs
and hybrids. Access to the varieties is mediated by a
consortium of small- and medium-sized seed compa-
nies, and the royalties received by Embrapa make an
important contribution to the operating costs of its
maize program (Garcia 1998).
Colombia has several examples of privately funded
commodity research. The cotton growers’ association
provides some funding for cotton breeding to COR-
POICA (the Colombian Corporation for Agricultural
Research, an independent corporation created by the
Colombian government as part of its effort to privatize
research). The growers’ association agreed that royal-
ties would go to a fund for cotton research. Given that
PVP is well established in Colombia, there are surpris-
ingly few examples of contracts between CORPOICA
and the private sector. One of the problems is that
many public varieties are OPVs (beans, maize, wheat,
oats) that are of little interest to the private seed sector. 
this experience in the international patent applica-
tions for its Bt genes, which have not yet been com-
mercialized. One commercially successful case
involves a method for detecting the Bt gene in a
plant, developed by a scientist at the Central
Institute of Cotton Research (CICR). ICAR did
the paperwork to acquire an Indian patent and
(through PCT) to pursue patents in several other
countries. The detection kit is being marketed by an
Indian firm, and royalties go to CICR. Although
this is a success story, the public system has no in-
stitutional mechanism for pursuing patents or
sharing costs and royalties, and there are cases
where scientists in agricultural universities are left
to their own devices to pursue patents. 
Incentives for individual scientists
A particularly important administrative issue for
NARIs is the degree to which royalties are shared
with individual scientists. Staff promotion is gen-
erally determined by a fairly complex set of criteria,
usually including research productivity, publica-
tions, and service to the institute. For breeders, the
number of released varieties is often an important
criterion. As NARIs begin to earn royalties from
protected varieties, breeders may also share
directly in the financial benefits. NARIs are ap-
proaching this issue in various ways. 
Chinese NARIs have the broadest experience in
earning royalties through commercial seed sales,
and breeders generally are given a “bonus” related
to the level of royalties received. This practice was
common even before the introduction of PVP. The
BRI receives one-third of the net revenues from its
joint venture with Biocentury, with half of this
amount going to the research group that developed
the Bt cotton genes and 10 percent to the individual
scientists. The provincial academies of agricultural
sciences and their institutes have developed their
own approaches to revenue sharing, although gen-
erally they seek to ensure that not only breeders but
also other staff benefit from the royalties. 
In Brazil, researchers in public institutes may be
entitled to as much as one-third of the revenues
earned by their institute’s protected inventions. In
Kenya, KARI has yet to establish a policy, but it is
under pressure from the Kenya Plant Breeders
Association to accept a formula for dividing royal-
ties (based on the type of crop) with the breeder; the
association is even lobbying to have this formula
included in the revised Seed Law to apply to both
public and private sector breeders. The director of
KARI acknowledges that deciding how to divide
royalties within the Institute, between and among
programs, is a significant management challenge. 
ENFORCEMENT
Another administrative challenge for NARIs wish-
ing to take advantage of IPRs is the investment re-
quired to enforce agreements. If a NARI sells or
licenses a protected variety or technology for a
fixed fee, then enforcement is not its problem (al-
though possibilities for enforcement can affect
what a company is willing to pay for access to a va-
riety). But royalty collection assumes a capacity for
enforcement.
The issue is similar in public research institu-
tions in the North, where various strategies are fol-
lowed. Early biotechnology inventions, such as
particle gun technology, were provided under an
exclusive license that required just one negotiation
and relieved the owner of the invention (in this
case, a university) from further complex intellec-
tual property management and royalty collection
tasks. The limitations of exclusive licenses caused a
number of U.S. universities to join forces in intel-
lectual property management under the Public
Intellectual Property Resource for Agriculture
(PIPRA), which intends to support both commer-
cial and humanitarian applications of technology.
The management of PVP for publicly developed
varieties is often complex because different seed
producers want to market the varieties. For exam-
ple, the Wageningen University and Research
Centre employs several marketing staff to look
after the commercial interests of the Centre’s straw-
berry varieties. 
In China, rice breeding institutes that are ori-
ented towards generating revenue either sell or li-
cense their varieties to seed companies, in which
they may even have an ownership share. Although
some institutes have considerable experience in
enforcing their rights, others that have recently
acquired their first PVP titles do not. The IVF ac-
knowledges that difficulties in enforcing PVP were
a major factor in its decision to continue exclusively
with hybrids. Staff from the CRI are deployed to
check local shops for illegal seed of their cotton
varieties, but this strategy is only partly effective,
because illegal copies of CRI’s Bt cotton varieties
are readily available, even in Anyang, where the
Institute is located. In other countries, NARIs have
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little experience with enforcement, but NARI ad-
ministrators acknowledge that extra effort will
have to be devoted to establishing agreements with
seed companies, collecting royalties, ensuring that
adequate seed certification and/or sales data are
available to verify seed quantities, checking for
unauthorized sales, and pursuing violations. 
PUBLIC SEED PRODUCTION
NARI seed production
As an alternative to contracting with private seed
companies, NARIs may choose to produce and
market seed themselves. Despite several decades of
generally unhappy experience worldwide with
public seed production schemes, the problems of
interesting private companies in seed production
(even under strengthened IPR regimes), combined
with pressure on NARIs to demonstrate a capacity
to generate revenue, have encouraged several
NARIs to consider their own seed production
strategies (box 6.2). 
The situation in China is particularly complex,
as many research institutes are expected and also
have clear incentives to generate a significant pro-
portion of their own budgets. To maintain control
over parent lines, the IVF has always undertaken
its own production of vegetable and flower seed,
which it sells through retailers. In the cases of cot-
ton and rice, incentives for generating income have
led some research institutes to establish their own
subsidiary production and marketing companies.
Smaller institutes like the Tianjin Cucumber
Research Institute have been formally turned into
successful commercial enterprises. In other cases,
contracts granting exclusive access to new varieties
are negotiated with companies that have a special
relationship with the institute. 
Other public seed production
Public sector seed enterprises have generally de-
clined in developing countries during the past
decade. The advent of IPR regimes may further af-
fect the viability of this sector. 
India’s state seed corporations concentrate al-
most exclusively on the production of public OPVs,
although the public sector still produces some hy-
brid maize seed. (The Maharashtra State Seed
Corporation is an exception in having its own
breeding programs in several crops.) As long as
state universities and ICAR institutes continue to
sell breeder’s seed of their varieties to all seed en-
terprises, most state seed corporations may experi-
ence little change from PVP. Independent of PVP,
state seed corporations are increasingly challenged
by private sector activity. For instance, private
companies now supply more than half of the seed
of public rice varieties in Andhra Pradesh. 
In Kenya, the fate of KSC, which has operated
for many years as a successful commercial enter-
prise with majority shares held by the government,
has yet to be decided. Although KSC continues to
dominate the market, management problems and
irregularities in recent years have left doubts about
Box 6.2 NARI Seed Production Units
Source: Authors.
KARI established a Seed Unit to ensure that source
seed of KARI varieties was readily available to seed
producers. An important rationale for creating the
Seed Unit was the concern that seed of many “or-
phan crops” was unavailable to farmers, because
commercial seed enterprises took little interest in
those crops. It was thought that a more transparent,
efficient facility for producing source seed would
help generate commercial interest and foster smaller
seed enterprises, but the Seed Unit also deals with
hybrid maize in cooperation with small seed firms
and produces other commercial seed stocks (for ex-
ample, potato seed). The Seed Unit has been an im-
portant player in donor projects that support seed
production by local producer groups, but it is unclear
if any of these groups can survive commercially. In
Colombia, CORPOICA has taken a similar route by
establishing a Seed Production Unit that primarily
undertakes seed production as part of its public task
but also produces some commercial seed. The unit is
not always reimbursed by the government programs
that request the seed.
its role and even about the degree of public owner-
ship. The company has lost its previous monopoly
status, but many express the belief that the govern-
ment will still look to KSC as a guarantor of maize
seed sufficiency, and as such the company would
expect certain concessions. PVP on its established
hybrids could provide KSC with some valuable as-
sets to maintain its strong position in the market. 
NARI PLANT BREEDING
PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES
Research investments
The pursuit of royalties for the use of public vari-
eties and breeding lines may have important im-
plications for the nature of public plant breeding.
Certain crops are much more likely to attract
commercial interest than others, raising concerns
that the possibility of earning royalties may shift
NARIs’ resources to the more commercially attrac-
tive crops, even though such a shift might not be in
line with their mandate for agricultural develop-
ment and poverty reduction. Because the private
seed industry values hybrids and other seed with
commercial potential, NARIs that respond to de-
mand from commercial seed producers may shift
their focus away from less commercial seed crops
such as beans, cowpea, cassava, and millet and
towards more commercial crops such as maize,
sunflower, and vegetables. Similarly, research pri-
orities within a particular crop may shift from solv-
ing constraints to smallholder agriculture to
increasing output in commercial agriculture, with
a corresponding shift from OPVs to hybrids. An
examination of crop portfolios, breeding objectives,
and breeding methods in NARIs gives some indi-
cation of these trends, although these shifting pri-
orities cannot be attributed solely to the advent of
an IPR regime. Most NARIs find themselves under
increased pressure for cost recovery, and the ex-
ploitation of IPRs is considered a potentially im-
portant strategy for achieving that goal.
The case of NARO presents an interesting ex-
ample. Uganda’s new agricultural policy empha-
sizes that agricultural research is to be client
oriented and market driven. NARO now sees its
principal role as contributing to the development of
commercial agriculture in Uganda and is prepared
to allocate its resources accordingly. This new pol-
icy means that priority will be given to such crops
as hybrid maize (with the possibility of earning
royalties on seed). It also means that priority will be
given to any crop for which demand is evident, for
example through donor funding for research.
Although NARO has released a number of bean va-
rieties, and several are produced on a modest scale
by private seed companies (often for sale to relief
agencies), no seed company is yet willing to invest
in seed production for climbing bean varieties. It
remains to be seen if this situation will result in di-
minished investment in climbing bean breeding
within NARO. The emergence of PVP in Uganda
thus reinforces a broader, commercially oriented
direction for NARO. 
Agricultural development policy is less well de-
fined in Kenya, but KARI currently assigns high
priority to crops from which it can earn revenue.
The fact that past KARI research produced many of
the maize hybrids that are planted on more than
half of the country’s maize area gives KARI confi-
dence that hybrid maize will be a major revenue
earner, once new hybrids can be offered to the seed
companies operating in the country. The implica-
tions for other crops are less clear, although KARI
leadership acknowledges its public service man-
date and recognizes that Kenyan farmers grow a
range of crops that do not figure in current seed
company portfolios. 
It is difficult to predict how PVP legislation in
India will affect the relative distribution of research
investment across crops. At present there is no in-
dication that research administrators plan to adjust
their portfolios because of potential royalties. ICAR
administrators believe that any royalties will be re-
mitted to ICAR headquarters (and to the Treasury),
thus limiting incentives for shifting priorities in
favor of royalty-earning crops. Administrators of
state agricultural universities emphasize their
mandate to serve state farmers, which sometimes
leads them to give less emphasis to hybrid devel-
opment (in rice or vegetable crops, for example). 
As noted, many crop research institutes in
China generated revenue from sales of varieties
or seed long before the advent of PVP, so the im-
pact on research priorities may be limited.
However, government funding of some insti-
tutes depends on adoption targets. For example,
the Rice Research Institute of Guangdong re-
ceives extra financing based on the area sown
with its varieties. Despite that, the Institute is
concentrating more on hybrid varieties because
of the potential for generating income. The CRI
has a mandate to develop open-pollinated cotton
40 Intellectual Property Rights 
Impacts of IPRs on Public Sector Plant Breeding and Seed Production 41
varieties for poorer farmers. The IVF, however,
concentrated on hybrid varieties and revenue
generation even before the introduction of PVP. 
The orientation of public research towards the
needs of smallholder farmers, which gained special
attention in the 1980s, has led to a wide range of
participatory research processes, including partici-
patory plant breeding (Sperling et al. 2001;
Almekinders and Louwaars 2002). Most NARIs
lack policies that define ownership or benefit shar-
ing arrangements for varieties developed through
participatory approaches. When revenue collection
becomes a guiding principle in NARIs’ research
management, it is not certain whether NARIs will
continue to invest in approaches that feed only into
local seed systems. In such cases, NARIs may con-
sider participatory programs only if they attract
donor funding.
Access to patented technology
NARIs need to think much more carefully about
the implications of their use of protected technol-
ogy. Researchers in most NARIs use patented tech-
nology for activities such as marker assisted
selection or genetic transformation. Few varieties
or other products have yet to emerge from this
work, but only a minority of bench researchers are
aware of the implications of using protected tech-
nology. NARIs in the study countries rarely com-
mission (or have the capacity to undertake) an
intellectual property audit. Frequently their free-
dom to operate is not clear, and other potential con-
sequences of using patented technology are not
understood or addressed. 
The country case studies found two very distinct
attitudes in laboratories towards third-party intel-
lectual property: overapprehension and ignorance.
An example of the former attitude is that some in-
stitutes in ICAR now insist on prior permission for
the use of intellectual property in research, includ-
ing the freedom to commercialize any innovations
that are developed. On the other hand, a 1998 sur-
vey of agricultural research organizations in Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Mexico found
widespread use of proprietary biotechnology tools
and processes but relatively little knowledge of the
IPR implications (Salazar et al. 2000). 
When NARIs enter into formal agreements to
acquire protected technology, they may or may not
be able to bargain effectively. In Kenya, KARI en-
tered into a contract for access to Bt technology. The
contract stipulates how the genes can be used and
who has rights to any inventions that are based on
the technology. It also prescribes that KARI will
have to use new versions of the technology (from
the same supplier) as soon as they become avail-
able. This limits KARI’s opportunities to use other
sources of Bt technology, such as those that go out
of patent. KARI entered into the contract to get
training in the use of the technology and to develop
future scientific collaboration, even though man-
agement knew that the patents on the technology
were not valid in Kenya. It is not clear if the poten-
tial long-term obligations for KARI balance the
short-term value of this arrangement.
IMPACT ON IARCs
Intellectual Property Policies in IARCs
The IARCs within the Consultative Group on
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) have
long been able to operate outside the intellectual
property debate and produce international public
goods that are freely available to primary target
groups in developing countries and commercial
users in industrialized countries. The emergence of
IPRs in the biological sciences and their introduc-
tion in developing countries are forcing the IARCs
to reconsider their approach. The situation is fur-
ther complicated by the shifting focus of the
NARIs, which are some of the primary partners
and initial target groups for the IARCs within the
CGIAR system. 
All of the IARCs with crop breeding mandates
have written intellectual property policies, al-
though some of these policies remain in draft form
and their actual implementation is still evolving.
Several IARCs now have their own lawyers,
whereas others have given staff the responsibility
for intellectual property management. The CGIAR
has also established the Central Advisory Service
on Intellectual Property to assist the IARCs and
help share experiences and practices in intellectual
property management.
Most of these IARCs have seen their principal
role as supporting NARI breeding programs.
In many cases, the IARCs do not release their
own varieties; NARIs either test and release
IARC materials or use IARC germplasm to de-
velop their own varieties. Germplasm, both im-
proved varieties and raw or genebank materials,
is moved within and outside the IARCs under
MTAs. The MTAs that accompany genebank ma-
terials are standard for all IARCs under their
agreement with FAO. These MTAs stipulate that
no IPRs can be claimed on the material in the
form received. On the other hand, MTAs used
with improved germplasm can vary, although
they only allow that rights can be taken out if
such protection can be shown to stimulate wider
distribution and use of the materials. The recipi-
ent also may transfer the materials to third par-
ties provided that the same MTA is used (or the
same provisions are maintained). This rule has
led to discussions about whether it requires
farmers participating in on-farm testing of vari-
eties to sign such agreements and whether it is
fair for farmers to take responsibility for such
reach-through provisions themselves. The main
argument against such strict regulation is that
farmer-to-farmer exchange of materials is a
proven mechanism to reach remote and resource-
poor farmers with improved materials. The
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) has
introduced MTAs for its farmer-cooperators.
There is a strong fear in several IARCs that their
regional nurseries, which share the best varieties
(released or under development) among a consor-
tium of NARIs for testing under different environ-
ments, may collapse because members will not
provide their own materials when protection in all
of the participating countries cannot be guaran-
teed. This concern has arisen in response to the in-
creased commercial attitude of several NARIs,
supported by the rise of IPRs.
Different policies are observed by the IARCs
with regard to the protection of inventions. Some
patent their inventions, either as part of joint re-
search projects with private sector partners in the
North or to facilitate future collaborative agree-
ments. In all of these cases, the basic principle is
that the inventions must be available for small-
holder farmers and be used for poverty alleviation.
Another IARC—the International Center for
Tropical Agriculture (CIAT)—takes another route;
many inventions are published, and CIAT intends
to make sure that all its critical inventions emerge
in patent searches as prior art by sending publica-
tions to national patent offices abroad, notably the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). This
strategy is meant to keep IARC inventions in the
public domain and to stimulate the use of these
inventions in further research. Such “defensive
publication” is only effective, however, when the
published descriptions are sufficiently broad so
that researching “around” the publication and
patenting the results becomes difficult.
One newsworthy application of intellectual
property policy within the IARCs—covered in the
international press—is CIAT’s intervention in a
U.S. patent application for yellow (“Enola”)
beans. The patent might interfere with CIAT’s
bean program in Latin America, where yellow
beans are fairly common. In a wider context, this
challenge serves as an example that the CGIAR,
with its open access to genetic resources, is willing
to defend this access policy in a wider context. The
effort and costs involved in challenging this
patent may serve as an example of how difficult it
is for IARCs to deal with the protection of rights
relevant for their work.
Interactions with Seed Companies
Most IARCs provide their breeding lines not just to
public organizations but also to private seed com-
panies, usually under MTAs that prohibit the pro-
tection of the lines as provided. As domestic seed
companies in the South develop increased breed-
ing capacity, and as they compete with increasing
effectiveness against public seed enterprises, they
will become an ever more important conduit for
IARC research. The emergence of IPR regimes has
encouraged the IARCs to consider various new
strategies for interacting with the private seed sec-
tor (boxes 6.3 and 6.4). Some continue to provide
materials without charge, while others pursue
practices that involve either fees or royalties.
Sometimes IARCs provide materials to the private
sector directly, while other transfers are mediated
by NARIs. In the case of maize, the International
Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT)
provides germplasm to seed companies for use in
developing their own commercial varieties. In
Southern Africa, CIMMYT licenses its hybrids and
OPVs to private companies; the hybrids may be li-
censed on an exclusive basis for a single country,
but the OPVs are always offered on a nonexclusive
basis. CIMMYT takes responsibility for obtaining
national variety release in these cases but has not
pursued PVP and does not collect royalties on
these varieties. 
When CIAT developed a new variety of
Brachiaria (a pasture grass) called Mulato, it found
that the most effective way of promoting its diffu-
sion was to license seed production and marketing
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to a company in Mexico (because of its commercial
and technical capabilities). The Mexican company
in turn licenses local seed companies for distribu-
tion in Colombia and several other Latin American
countries. The Mexican company has to protect
Mulato in the name of CIAT in every country
where it intends to commercialize it, and it has
agreed to pay a royalty to CIAT on seed sales for
the first 10 years. A separate agreement provides
additional royalty payments to CORPOICA,
which participated in the research to develop the
variety. The royalties paid to CIAT go into a spe-
cial royalty fund. 
IARCs’ access to protected technology
Like NARIs, the IARCs must also be concerned
with access to protected technologies. Several
Box 6.3 The Latin American Fund for Irrigated Rice
Source: Authors.
The Latin American Fund for Irrigated Rice (FLAR)
was created in 1995 to fill the gap left by CIAT’s deci-
sion to shift its rice breeding priorities towards virtu-
ally exclusive concentration on marginal production
zones. FLAR currently has a membership of eight
countries (plus CIAT); the budget comes largely from
members’ contributions. Each country has a single
representative, which may be a NARI, a rice produc-
ers’ association, or a group of seed companies. FLAR
manages an extensive regional program of rice breed-
ing, directed by its members. Although FLAR does not
produce finished varieties, it gives members access to
breeding lines at a relatively advanced stage of devel-
opment (roughly the F5 or F6 stage). CIAT’s rice breed-
ing program provides germplasm to FLAR, covered by
MTAs. Each representative or constituent member of
FLAR is responsible for registering and protecting any
varieties it produces from FLAR germplasm. FLAR
requires that any varieties based on its germplasm be
protected under national PVP, but FLAR does not
receive any royalties or additional payments from
released varieties. Members can produce seed them-
selves or license varieties to someone else and
collect royalties. 
Box 6.4 Millet and Sorghum Commercialized through ICRISAT
Source: Authors.
The International Crops Research Institute for the
Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) has given such valuable
support to India’s domestic commercial pearl millet
and sorghum seed sector that companies subscribe to
consortia to gain access to ICRISAT breeding lines and
inbreds. The growth of the hybrid pearl millet and
sorghum seed business is one of the great success sto-
ries of seed market liberalization in India. Until re-
cently, ICRISAT provided germplasm to any legitimate
private company or NARI. In 1999, ICRISAT ap-
proached private Indian seed companies to discuss
ways in which they could support ICRISAT’s research,
leading to the creation of two consortia (for pearl mil-
let and sorghum). Each member pays an annual fee for
access to breeding lines. The consortia include a
range of Indian seed companies, although some of the
very largest and smallest players in the hybrid pearl
millet and sorghum business are not members. A few
companies from other Asian countries are also in-
cluded in the current membership. It is expected that
the Indian companies will apply for PVP for the hy-
brids they produce once India’s PVP law is opera-
tional. Members are asked to provide sales figures to
ICRISAT in order to assess uptake and impact, but no
further royalties or payments are expected. The sub-
scriptions currently cover the entire cost of ICRISAT’s
hybrid pearl millet and sorghum breeding in India. It
should be noted that NARIs in India still maintain full
access to ICRISAT’s breeding material, but the sub-
scribers to the consortia do not see this as a threat. 
commodity-focused IARCs have extensive biotech-
nology research programs. Many of the tools and
genes they use are patented in the North. Some are
specifically licensed for research purposes, but
there is little experience on how to proceed with
products based on such research (box 6.5). CIAT
believes that a transgenic, virus-resistant rice vari-
ety it has developed is nearly ready for diffusion
and has commissioned a freedom to operate (FtO)
search, which identified the principal intellectual
property holders with whom CIAT needs to nego-
tiate. CIAT admits, however, that it is poorly pre-
pared for such negotiations. Similarly, CIMMYT
commissioned an FtO search for its Bt maize vari-
eties for Africa, but the next steps are still unclear.
ICRISAT has developed a number of transformed
crop lines but has yet to do an FtO for commercial-
izing any of them. 
The IARCs also have little experience in patenting
their germplasm-related innovations. CIAT has filed
one patent jointly with Embrapa for a Brachiaria
transformation method, and another for a tissue cul-
ture technique (for guanabana), but these have yet to
be granted. ICRISAT has yet to patent any technolo-
gies, although there are several candidates. Most
IARCs are developing their staff to identify which
research streams might result in patentable products
and hence require different management. 
Recently initiated CGIAR Global Challenge
Programs are expected to yield a wide range of
patentable technologies through collaboration
between IARCs and institutes in developing and
industrialized countries. The Challenge Programs
aim at making all protected technologies and
materials available on a nonexclusive basis to all
who aim at using them to develop products for the
resource-poor. The Generation Challenge Program
intends to include a humanitarian license clause in
its consortium agreement to avoid the negotiation
of individual licenses. Such a clause would require
clear definitions for such terms as “resource-poor”
(Barry and Louwaars 2005).
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Box 6.5 IPRs for Striga Resistance in Maize
Source: Authors.
CIMMYT’s work in Kenya to develop maize varieties
to resist Striga, a parasitic weed, required considerable
attention to IPRs. Research by the Weizmann Institute
and CIMMYT indicated that a herbicide coating for
seed could effectively control Striga by killing the
weed as it germinates in the soil. The innovation
would require maize varieties with herbicide resis-
tance, and collaboration was initiated with BASF, the
owner of a mutant gene that confers resistance to a
herbicide produced by BASF. Because the technology
does not involve a transgene, it does not require
biosafety clearance, as is the case with most other her-
bicide resistance traits. BASF facilitated access to
maize germplasm containing the gene, and CIMMYT
began to develop IR (imidazolinone-resistant) maize
varieties suitable for conditions in Western Kenya.
Three IR maize hybrids have passed Kenya’s variety
approval tests. IR maize is one of the first projects for
the newly formed African Agricultural Technology
Foundation (AATF), which has taken responsibility for
regulatory and commercial arrangements for IR maize.
BASF initially granted access to the IR gene for
research purposes. An agreement is being negotiated
to allow its use in commercial varieties for Kenya.
AATF has agreements with three seed companies in
Kenya to produce the IR varieties, and royalty pay-
ments are likely to be managed by AATF (rather than
CIMMYT or KARI). One IR hybrid underwent exten-
sive field testing and demonstration in 2005. The IR
varieties will be subject to PVP in Kenya; it is not clear
how the IR gene itself would be protected, if this were
seen to be desirable.
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The pressures to strengthen IPRs in plant breeding in developing
countries present both immediate and long-term challenges to policy
makers and donors. The immediate challenges are related to framing
and implementing appropriate legislation that is consistent with
TRIPS and that supports national agricultural development goals. As
part of meeting these challenges, countries will need to develop suit-
able responses to pressure exerted in negotiations of bilateral trade
and investment agreements to go beyond the minimum requirements
of TRIPS. The longer-term challenges are derived from the fact that
an IPR regime, on its own, is not likely to provide the incentives that
elicit the emergence of a robust plant breeding and seed sector.
Attention to other institutions and the provision of an enabling envi-
ronment are also necessary.
This chapter examines ways of addressing these two sets of chal-
lenges. Because most of the responsibility is with stakeholders them-
selves, the first part of the chapter outlines priorities for policy
makers. The chapter concludes with a summary of possible inter-
ventions that the World Bank (or other donors) might undertake to
help support the establishment of an appropriate legal framework
and the development of requisite institutions.
CHALLENGES FOR NATIONAL
POLICY MAKERS
PVP legislation
IPR regimes for plant breeding in developing countries demand ur-
gent attention. Policy makers need to ensure that they have an IPR
regime that is relevant to national conditions and thus supports the
growth of the seed sector, but the regime must not be so restrictive
that it limits future development options or proves unenforceable.
Although TRIPS allows for the possibility of patents for plant vari-
eties, patents are not a suitable alternative for developing countries,
which should focus on establishing a sui generis system of PVP.
The design of a suitable PVP regime will necessarily represent a
dialogue and a series of compromises among various stakeholders,
including the commercial seed industry, public agricultural research,
and farmers. To be effective, the PVP system must elicit broad-based
support, implying that the formulation of supporting legislation and
regulations should be the product of open public debate. Even if leg-
islation is already in place, many developing countries will find that
Lessons7
there are sufficient options for interpretation and
application to warrant a thorough review of proce-
dures and priorities. 
Because PVP legislation must respond to the cir-
cumstances of a particular country and represent
consensus among a range of stakeholders, it is not
possible to provide a blueprint that policy makers
can follow. Models are available (particularly the
UPOV Conventions), but even these include a num-
ber of options that demand the careful attention of
policy makers. The provisions of the 1978 UPOV
Convention generally meet the TRIPS require-
ments, yet now UPOV requires that new members
join under the 1991 Convention. Several options,
discussed below, deserve careful consideration
before a decision is made to use UPOV 1991 as a
model for national legislation. They include the lev-
els of seed saving and seed exchange, the scope of
protection, the breadth of coverage, and the relation
of PVP legislation to the concerns of Farmers’ Rights
(for further details, see Appendix C). 
Seed saving. UPOV 1978 places no restrictions on
farmer seed saving, while UPOV 1991 prohibits
seed saving but allows countries to introduce spe-
cific exemptions, “taking into account the legitimate
interests of the breeder” (see table 2.1 for a compari-
son between UPOV 1978 and 1991). The political
repercussions and enforcement requirements of a
seed saving restriction make it a candidate for
consideration in only a small minority of cases in
developing countries. In cases where industrialized
countries prohibit seed saving (for example, in the
EU), there is usually a small-farm exemption, and
even so the experience has been that royalty pay-
ments on farm-saved seed are often difficult to
enforce. Thus when a developing country frames its
PVP legislation, rather than allowing a blanket pro-
hibition on seed saving, it must be able to defend—
and demonstrate how it will enforce—any res-
trictions on seed saving in specific instances (for ex-
ample, export horticulture or particular field crops
grown by large-scale commercial farmers).
Seed exchange. Seed exchange is less amenable to
precise definition than seed saving. Although
UPOV 1978 is interpreted to allow seed exchange
as part of the farmer’s privilege, UPOV 1991 ex-
plicitly forbids the practice and offers no possibili-
ties for exemption. The term “seed exchange”
covers an exceptionally wide range of practices. At
one end of the scale, resource-poor farmers who
find themselves without seed at planting time may
beg or borrow seed from a neighbor; legislating
against such a practice is both inappropriate and
pointless. At the other end of the scale, larger-scale
farmers may earn considerable income through
informal sales of saved seed, threatening the via-
bility of local seed enterprises. For these reasons,
national PVP legislation needs to be very careful in
respecting local customs of seed provision while
guarding against the possibility of large-scale seed
production in competition with legitimate seed
companies. In many cases, conventional seed law
(which requires registration of seed companies or
mandates seed certification) is a better way to ad-
dress this problem than trying to restrict seed ex-
change through PVP.
Scope of protection. National PVP legislation
consistent with UPOV should have little difficulty
ensuring that protected varieties are available for
research and further breeding. UPOV 1991 in-
cludes additional rights on EDVs and extends pro-
tection to the harvested product of a protected
variety, but these modifications need not cause
significant problems for IPR legislation. It is more
important that policy makers are aware of the cur-
rent debate in which some MNCs are proposing
further restrictions on the use of protected varieties
in breeding programs. These positions may be
translated (for example, through bilateral trade
negotiations) into pressure for corresponding
provisions in PVP legislation in developing coun-
tries. Developing country policy makers must
ensure that such pressures are not used as an
excuse for establishing excessive restrictions on
plant breeding and should defend researchers’
access to protected germplasm in a manner con-
sistent with UPOV 1991.
Breadth of coverage. The coverage of PVP legisla-
tion also needs to be considered. Although UPOV
provides for the eventual protection of all species,
the Conventions allow coverage to be introduced
incrementally. Policy makers should take advan-
tage of this flexibility when introducing PVP. It
makes sense to begin with crops for which the seed
industry or agricultural markets will benefit most
from PVP, building experience and gradually
expanding the coverage to other crops. The treat-
ment of extant varieties also deserves attention.
Attempts to extend excessive protection to varieties
already in farmers’ fields (especially if their owner-
ship might be contested) may unnecessarily com-
plicate the implementation of PVP legislation.
Farmers’ Rights. There is no provision in the
TRIPS Agreement for issues such as benefit sharing
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(which forms part of the concept of Farmers’ Rights
under the IT PGRFA) or the widely discussed pro-
tection of farmer-bred varieties. The inclusion of
these issues in PVP legislation or in national laws
on biodiversity is controversial but must be ad-
dressed. Whether or not the concept is included in
PVP legislation, it is important to ensure that vari-
ous types of legislation are consistent. The concept
of Farmers’ Rights should not create any major con-
fusion with regard to seed exchange or sale or the
novelty requirement for a new variety. A compul-
sory declaration of the source of the materials in ap-
plications for PVP and patents is considered a good
link between IPRs and genetic resource rights by
providing important information that is needed to
encourage benefit sharing. On the other hand, the
establishment of rights to a local variety may ham-
per broader access to useful local germplasm,
which critics of PVP argue is the case for protected
modern varieties. 
Models for PVP legislation. An IPR system for
plant breeding must chart a careful course between
providing sufficient incentives for investment in
research and seed production while protecting
seed security for resource-poor farmers. There is no
need to establish an exceptionally rigid or compre-
hensive IPR regime in the early stages of seed
system development. Commercial seed systems
usually begin with products that are difficult for
farmers to save (hybrids, vegetables) and that
generally require little intellectual property protec-
tion. As the seed industry matures and farmers
recognize the value of commercial seed, companies
offer a wider range of products, some of which may
require attention to IPRs. Seed industry develop-
ment usually parallels the growth of agribusiness,
and markets for particular commodities may de-
mand specific attention to IPRs.
There is considerable pressure on countries to
establish legislation that is consistent with a UPOV
Convention, and there are a number of strong
arguments for following this advice, including the
advantages of participating in a harmonized sys-
tem for characterizing new varieties and being
able to take advantage of the considerable techni-
cal advice and expertise that UPOV and its mem-
bers can offer to developing countries. However,
given that the 1991 UPOV Convention is now the
only option available to further entrants, policy
makers must carefully consider the costs and ben-
efits, as well as the remaining flexibility, of this sys-
tem. For instance, policy makers must recognize
that legislation consistent with UPOV 1991 pro-
hibits farmers from providing seed of protected
varieties to their neighbors under any circum-
stances. On the other hand, carefully designed leg-
islation can exempt specific crops (and/or types of
farmers) from restrictions on seed saving, provid-
ing the possibility for a more targeted approach
relevant to the circumstances of smallholder farm-
ers. The major parameters in the design of a PVP
system and their relation to UPOV 1991 are sum-
marized in table 7.1.
Even within countries, different seed systems
have different requirements for protection. Legal
options may be considered for tailoring IPR
systems to such complex conditions. Strong pro-
tection may be provided for export agriculture,
and weak or no protection to noncommercial sec-
tors that primarily cater for subsistence farmers.
When agricultural development proceeds, certain
crops or conditions may gradually be brought
under strengthened regimes. 
The administration of PVP
Although many developing countries have drafted
legislation to address PVP requirements, relatively
few have begun to implement PVP, and little guid-
ance on appropriate strategies is available. This sec-
tion looks at some of the key decisions facing
agricultural policy makers in the implementation
of PVP. No matter what model of PVP is adopted,
policy makers also need to consider the costs and
enforcement of the system.
The costs of PVP. The establishment of an effective
PVP system goes well beyond drafting and passing
legislation. A PVP system requires the creation of an
administrative office and possibly variety testing
facilities, which entail considerable investments of
financial and human resources. Some countries will
find it difficult to identify staff with sufficient scien-
tific and legal skills for such tasks, and the opportu-
nity cost of redeploying trained personnel (for
example, the release of experienced plant breeders
for variety testing) must be considered. Policy
makers must carefully examine how the costs of
establishing a PVP administration can be mini-
mized. Several areas deserve attention.
• Cost considerations strengthen the argument
for a targeted approach to PVP coverage that
concentrates first on priority crops and areas,
gradually develops competence, and extends
the breadth of crops eligible for protection.
• It is important to explore opportunities for
harmonization and cooperation, which can
reduce costs for both the PVP authority and
the applicants. Using standard criteria for
protection (such as the UPOV criteria) and
uniform test guidelines could offer significant
advantages, particularly for countries with
relatively small plant breeding sectors. Test
reports from other countries could be used,
DUS testing can be assigned to particular
countries in a region, or regional PVP certifi-
cates can be issued. All of these options could
represent a significant savings and would
promote a more effective PVP application
system, irrespective of the type of protection
system that is adopted. 
• A PVP authority can also assign part of the
responsibility for testing varieties (DUS) to
breeders themselves, which will save some
costs. However, this alternative may put
smaller domestic plant breeding firms at a
disadvantage, and thus some flexibility must
be maintained. 
• Attention should be given to establishing an
appropriate fee structure for PVP. Unfor-
tunately, no comprehensive guidance exists for
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Table 7.1 Key Parameters in the Design of a PVP System
Arguments for a Arguments for a less 
Parameter restrictive interpretation restrictive interpretation Relation to UPOV 1991
Seed saving A country may not attract
high-value export crops, such as
flowers, if seed saving for these
species is not restricted.
Saving seed of field crops is part
of farming practice. It is very
difficult to enforce seed saving
restrictions in these cases.
If a crop is not specifically
exempted in national legislation,
UPOV 1991 imposes seed saving
restrictions.
Seed exchange Widespread informal sale of seed
of protected varieties (especially
by large-scale commercial
farmers) is a disincentive to
commercial seed activity.
Seed exchange and informal
sales among small-scale farmers
is customary and difficult to
control. Large-scale informal
seed sales can be controlled by
appropriate seed regulation.
Legislation consistent with UPOV
1991 does not allow any type of
seed exchange of protected
varieties among farmers.
Scope of protection
of germplasm for
breeding
Restrictions on EDVs discourage
copy-cat or cosmetic breeding.
(Some MNCs wish to limit any
use of protected varieties in
breeding programs.)
Both public and private plant
breeding in developing countries
can make effective use of
protected germplasm, and undue
restrictions would hamper their
productivity. 
The use of protected varieties in
further breeding is supported,
with the exception of EDVs.
Breadth of coverage:
number of species 
TRIPS expects that all species
will be eligible for protection.
A gradual introduction of
protection allows PVP authorities
to address priorities and gain
experience.
UPOV 1991 requires initial
protection of at least 3 genera or
species, with phased expansion
to at least 24 in an 8-year period.
Breadth of coverage:
extant varieties
Providing protection to extant
(usually public) varieties may
serve as a reward for past plant
breeding efforts, allow NARIs to
arrange for private seed
production, and provide income
for NARIs.
Excessive privilege assigned to
old public varieties may actually
be a disincentive to further
breeding.
UPOV 1991 makes no
distinction for extant varieties but
allows their protection.
Farmers’ Rights There are arguments for
including Farmers’ Rights within
a single piece of legislation. 
Farmers’ Rights can be covered
in separate legislation. There are
no examples to date of successful
PVP-type rights for farmer
varieties, and enforcement
problems would be considerable.
UPOV 1991 makes no provision
for Farmers’ Rights.
Source: Authors.
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doing so. While cost recovery is certainly a
worthwhile goal, it must also be balanced
against the dangers of excluding applications
for crops with relatively small seed markets or
varieties from companies or institutes that
cannot afford large fees. Many PVP systems
establish a uniform fee schedule for all crops,
but this is not the only possibility. Fees may be
based on the actual cost of evaluation (which
may vary between crops), the value of the pro-
tection (higher fees for crops with larger com-
mercial seed markets), or the type of applicant
(with discounts for crops and varieties directed
towards resource-poor farmers). Subsidies
could be also be considered, at least initially, to
promote particular types of plant breeding, but
policy makers must be able to justify such use
of public funds. See table 4.3 for examples of
costs of PVP applications and maintenance. 
Enforcement. Often the enforcement of PVP entails
considerable problems, which is another reason to
introduce PVP in a gradual manner. Private com-
panies and public institutes that lobby for the es-
tablishment of PVP must be made aware that most
enforcement responsibilities will fall on their shoul-
ders. Experience to date indicates that enforcement
difficulties can undermine confidence in a PVP
system. The difficulty (and political sensitivity) of
enforcing rules on the saving or local exchange of
seed, for instance, provide an important argument
for caution in the initial stages of PVP. Even in cases
involving competing commercial firms, courts are
often unprepared to interpret the infringement,
particularly because of the biological nature of the
protected subject matter. Implementation of IPR
regimes must therefore include attention to
strengthening the judicial system’s knowledge of
IPRs in plant breeding. Attention is also required
for promoting a business environment in which
contracts are expected to be enforced. Private firms
will need to develop their own capacity to monitor
the market and to seek legal recourse when
infringements are detected, and public research
institutes that hope to earn royalties from their
protected technologies must be prepared to invest
in monitoring and legal resources.
A PVP system will not meet its goals if it is not
supported by the full range of stakeholders.
Breeders, seed producers, traders, and farmers
need to understand the objectives of the system in
order to comply with the rights and obligations
associated with it. The development of a PVP sys-
tem should thus include an extensive information
campaign involving all stakeholders, including the
legal profession. Developing judicial experience in
PVP may take some time.
Protecting biotechnology
Patents. Although plant variety patents are not a
reasonable option for developing countries, a num-
ber of issues related to IPRs in biotechnology justify
attention to national patent regimes and their im-
plementation. Many developing countries have
well-established patent offices, but only a few have
the experience and human resources to deal with
patents related to plant breeding and biotechnol-
ogy. Most national patent offices will need to build
their capacities to deal with patents related to agri-
cultural biotechnology, to provide clear guidelines
about what can be patented, and to define the scope
of the protection. If a country hopes to introduce
transgenic varieties, it will need to establish legis-
lation that provides adequate protection, although
this protection does not necessarily have to depend
on the patent system. Several possibilities exist,
such as allowing patents on classes of transgenic
varieties without establishing patent rights on in-
dividual plant varieties, which is the approach
taken by the EU. (In several EU countries, the
farmer’s privilege and breeder’s exemption for
transgenic varieties are valid, even when the scope
of a patent would normally disallow them.) In
many cases, however, providing credible enforce-
ment for the right combination of biosafety regula-
tion, seed laws, and PVP may offer adequate
protection for transgenic varieties, at least in their
early stages of diffusion in developing countries. 
Biosafety. Biosafety regulation can help limit the
misappropriation of transgenic germplasm, but it
is unwise to expect that biosafety authorities will
assume responsibility for enforcing IPRs. Although
the establishment of a competent biosafety author-
ity is a priority for countries that wish to use trans-
genic crops, it is equally important to identify a
clear division of responsibilities between biosafety
authorities, seed regulators, and IPR agencies.
Other incentives for seed
system development
Policy makers must recognize that the develop-
ment of a commercial seed sector depends on a
range of factors that extend well beyond IPR
regimes. These factors cannot substitute com-
pletely for an IPR regime, but they need to be ex-
ploited as policy makers consider how to structure
incentives for seed sector development. India, for
instance, has had a thriving and diverse commer-
cial seed sector for more than two decades but
has only recently implemented PVP legislation.
Uganda’s commercial seed sector is developing
through a partnership between public research and
private seed production, without the help of IPRs. 
Seed regulation. Other regulatory capacities can
contribute to the performance of IPR regimes for
plant breeding. In particular, it will be difficult to in-
stitute an effective PVP system without an adequate
seed regulatory framework, including clear rules
and procedures for variety registration and seed
quality control. A well-administered procedure for
releasing varieties and an adequate system to con-
trol seed quality can limit many instances of the mis-
appropriation of plant varieties or genetic resources.
The effectiveness of seed regulation depends on
competent management, reasonable standards (con-
sistent with enforcement capabilities), and strong
industry participation. It is important that policy
makers concerned with IPRs ensure that an appro-
priate national seed regulatory system is in place.
Commercial seed markets. Initial seed market
development is usually based on seed types that
are difficult for farmers to save, such as hybrid or
vegetable crop seed. Once companies are produc-
ing and selling high-value seed, they will have the
experience and infrastructure to expand into other
types of seed, and once farmers have experience
with using good quality commercial seed, they will
be more likely to broaden their seed demands. An
IPR regime should develop in parallel with this
evolution in seed markets, and policy makers need
to ensure that the enabling environment (charac-
terized by contract enforcement, the availability of
credit, and so forth) is adequate for the growth of
the domestic seed industry 
Agribusiness development. In many cases when
policy makers want to support high-value export
crops, they will need to ensure that adequate IPRs
are in place. More restrictive PVP may be applied
selectively in particular cases when commercial
incentives justify additional protection, such as in
cut flowers.
Public sector breeding. Many NARIs are uncertain
about whether to complement or compete with the
private sector and hence are confused about how to
take advantage of PVP. Policy makers need to set
clear guidelines in this area to ensure that NARIs
fulfill their public service mandate. NARIs need to
distinguish between using PVP in order to stimu-
late the use and delivery of their varieties on the
one hand and seeing PVP as a contributor to their
budgets through the collection of royalties on the
other. In addition, policy makers must recognize
that systems of international germplasm exchange
are being threatened by an almost exclusive focus
on the possible financial advantages accruing to the
control of germplasm, with little appreciation of
the importance of equitable access. In biotechnol-
ogy research, most NARIs are not organized to use
their own assets, such as varieties, breeding lines,
and basic research capacities; to assess their free-
dom to operate when they make use of protected
techniques and tools; and to acquire access to com-
plementary technology on equitable terms. 
Protection may facilitate the development of
public-private partnerships in research, yet this
report highlights a number of examples of how
public research has cooperated effectively with the
private seed sector without IPRs.
CHALLENGES FOR
TRADE NEGOTIATORS
IPRs have become a topic on the international trade
agenda ever since the Agreement on TRIPS was
negotiated and adopted of as part of the overall
package of agreements leading to the creation of
the WTO. TRIPS obliges all WTO members to offer
specified minimum standards of intellectual prop-
erty protection in a wide range of sectors, although
the TRIPS Agreement also leaves developing coun-
tries a certain amount of flexibility in how they
fulfill their obligations. This flexibility allows coun-
tries to design IPR regimes that suit their specific
circumstances. 
IPRs are a tool that can support agricultural de-
velopment, if IPRs are tailored to the conditions
within each country. Developing countries, with
their diversity of farmers and seed systems, present
special challenges for designing a supportive IPR
system. The goal should be to provide incentives
for seed sector development through IPRs such as
trademarks, trade secrets, and PVP, without creat-
ing unnecessary or unrealistic limitations on the
practices and livelihoods of smallholder farmers.
Meeting this goal requires a careful balancing of
rights and obligations, which may imply adapting,
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as opposed to simply adopting, the standard mod-
els available.
The agricultural sector, and in particular plant
breeding, is one area where the flexibility offered
by TRIPS is quite broad. Yet pressures exist for
developing countries to go further than required by
TRIPS, notably in bilateral trade negotiations and
discussions in the framework of WIPO. Trade
negotiators need to realize that IPRs are primarily
meant to support innovation, and that the trade
aspect is secondary. Strengthened IPRs in breeding
thus need to be justified on the basis of careful
assessment of the national breeding and farming
sectors if they are to play a positive role in agricul-
tural development by providing incentives for both
domestic and foreign investments. 
Accepting patent protection for plant varieties or
a sui generis system that complies with UPOV 1991
as a bargaining chip in trade negotiations may not be
very helpful. While it is not essential for the initial
development of a commercial seed sector, a prop-
erly balanced combination of PVP, trademarks, and
patents may contribute to a fair and competitive
business environment that stimulates innovation
and provides transparency for farmers. The use of
the UPOV guidelines for testing new varieties,
however, offers clear advantages. It opens the door
to accepting test reports from other countries and to
initiating regional collaboration on testing. These
alternatives can lower costs for PVP agencies and
applicants, shorten the approval process, and facili-
tate seed trade. The harmonization of criteria for
granting protection does not have to go hand-in-
hand with uniform scope or coverage of protection;
in fact, it maintains the option to refine and adjust
the system as the seed sector develops further.
Care should be taken that trade considerations
do not dictate development pathways for national
seed systems. If IPR systems are overambitious rel-
ative to local needs and capacities, then they are
likely to lead to missed opportunities in seed sector
development, to create implementation problems
that undermine the system’s credibility, and to di-
vert resources and attention from more important
priorities. Admittedly the negotiation of interna-
tional agreements has become a daunting task,
given the range of issues put on the table at once.
Governments need to find ways to ensure appro-
priate consultation—for example, between different
ministries. IPRs are typically under the jurisdiction
of an economic ministry, but in the case of plant
breeding, the MoA will be an equally important
partner for consultation. It is also important that
consultation and debate involve other stakehold-
ers, perhaps first and foremost farmers, who
should be the principal beneficiaries of the devel-
opment of a commercial seed sector. A wider
debate on such decisions should improve under-
standing and commitment in what is often seen to
be a controversial field.
CHALLENGES FOR
RESEARCH MANAGERS IN
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
Before giving their unconditional support to IPRs
in plant breeding and their use in public agricul-
tural research, research managers and policy mak-
ers responsible for public research at the national
and the international level must consider the po-
tential impact on breeding strategies and on costs
and benefits. 
There are three main reasons for public research
institutes to embrace IPRs: recognition, technology
access and transfer, and revenue. IPRs formally
link a variety to a research institute and individual
breeders, thereby conferring recognition of their
achievement. With respect to technology transfer,
the advent of IPRs may facilitate seed production if
only an exclusive license will entice a commercial
seed producer to take a new variety into its prod-
uct range. There may also be expectations that tech-
nology will be acquired more easily if patents can
be traded. Finally, IPRs can serve to recoup re-
search investments by providing a legal basis for
license contracts between breeders and seed pro-
ducers, which would commonly include a royalty
payment. In public research, variety development
is supported through public funds, and research
managers tend to emphasize other research objec-
tives in addition to variety development (see the
next section). However, given the declining public
funding of agricultural research in many countries,
revenue generation is an attractive option for many
public institutions. Income from IPRs can support
the institute as a whole and help managers provide
financial support for particularly productive re-
searchers or research groups. 
Impact on breeding strategies
The introduction of the concept of revenue genera-
tion in public plant breeding is likely to have an
impact on the distribution of funds within the NARI
and on the breeding strategies applied. Since IPRs
can be generated relatively easily in plant breeding
compared to other sciences, the pursuit of revenue
could cause other important disciplines to be mar-
ginalized, such as soil science, social sciences, and
plant pathology. Revenue generation will focus
breeding on commercial farmers and hybrids rather
than on resource-poor farmers and OPVs, which are
unlikely to generate profits for seed companies or
royalties for breeding institutions.
The shift to commercial crops and farmers may
be consistent with recent changes in national agri-
cultural policy and trends of commercialization of
public entities in some countries. In other countries,
however, the public task of NARIs is based on sup-
porting both equity and national agricultural pro-
duction. The trend towards crop diversification
and breeding for low-input agriculture may be
reversed with a public research focus on using IPRs
for revenue generation. Another strategy for
NARIs may be to secure a choice of varieties for
farmers in a market that may otherwise be domi-
nated by large commercial firms because of IPRs.
However, this latter strategy may shift research
priorities away from smallholder farmers’ needs.
Policy makers and research managers need to
take care in assessing the prospective impact of
IPRs in public breeding before including protection
in their research strategies. If NARIs are not sup-
posed to protect their inventions, governments will
have to provide the necessary funds for research.
Impact on public research organizations
Protecting own intellectual property. When a NARI
intends to commercialize its varieties using IPRs, it
has to realize that it needs the capacity to design
commercialization strategies and license contracts,
as well as to follow up on these contracts. Usually
NARIs are unaccustomed to employing marketing
staff and intellectual property specialists. Their
focus on research means they have little experience
in attracting or administering appropriate person-
nel to manage their intellectual property portfolio. 
Research managers also tend to look at the ben-
efits derived from IPRs rather than the costs. Aside
from the cost of additional personnel, the direct
costs of acquiring and implementing IPRs may be
substantial. Application and maintenance fees can
be considerable, and commercial decisions have
to be made to determine which rights to apply for
and which to surrender. An even more significant
cost can arise when rights have to be defended,
especially when the public sector confronts experi-
enced negotiators from commercial companies
with significant resources. NARIs must be pre-
pared to spend money on protecting intellectual
property.
Managing third-party intellectual property. Even
when a NARI does not intend to protect its inven-
tions, the introduction of IPRs may have a signifi-
cant impact on the institute. NARIs will need to
develop ways and means to determine their poten-
tial risks and freedom to operate with respect to
technologies that they use but which are patented
by others. The rights of the patent holder have to be
recognized and consent sought in the research
stage or when research is leading to a product.
Thus NARIs should develop an intellectual prop-
erty plan for each project to decide when and how
contact will be established with the technology
provider—that is, whether to ask for a research li-
cense or wait until a product is developed; whether
to protect their own inventions; and how to com-
mercialize their innovations. This plan starts with a
patent search to establish rights over the technolo-
gies that are being used. Although most biotech-
nologies are not protected in developing countries,
this situation is changing rapidly for large coun-
tries such as China, India, and Brazil. NARIs will
require the capacity to develop intellectual prop-
erty plans and the negotiation skills to gain access
to technologies on favorable terms. This capacity
not only requires access to lawyers, intellectual
property specialists, negotiators, and marketers,
but more importantly calls for an important shift in
culture among researchers, who commonly prefer
to concentrate on their science and not be bothered
by “administrative rules.” 
Impact on IARCs
Strategies for protecting inventions by the IARCs
concentrate on the technology transfer argument
on the one hand and the original objective to de-
velop international public goods on the other.
Several IARCs are developing agribusiness parks
or other mechanisms to link directly with the pri-
vate sector and provide additional pathways for
technology transfer. Another challenge for IARCs
is to get access to protected technologies without
incriminating their primary aim of poverty allevia-
tion. A less debated challenge for IARCs is the
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impact of the commercialization of some NARIs
(owing to the introduction of IPRs) on IARCs’ abil-
ities to reach the resource-poor. Early experience in
using IPRs as a bargaining chip to get access to
commercial intellectual property held abroad
shows that this argument for patenting inventions
is weak.
CHALLENGES FOR FARMERS AND
THEIR ASSOCIATIONS
Farmers’ organizations and NGOs that represent
farmers’ interests need to be prepared to partici-
pate in debates about appropriate IPRs. The imme-
diate link between IPRs and investment in plant
breeding may not always be strong, but farmers
have an interest in creating incentives for the de-
velopment of better planting materials, even if they
may have to pay a bit more for seed. Exceptions
such as the farmer’s privilege may create a useful
balance between the rights of breeders and those of
farmers. In developing countries, a major difficulty
for farmers’ organizations in adopting an appro-
priate position on IPRs in plant breeding is that
different farmers have different interests. The in-
terests of commercial farmers quite closely resem-
ble those of farmers in industrialized countries, and
strong protection for flower varieties, for example,
may be very conducive for the export horticulture
sector. The interests of smallholders may be quite
different, and a strict IPR regime may reduce their
access to potentially good varieties. 
The concept of Farmers’ Rights is often linked to
the IPR discussion, but even though the IT PGRFA
specified this concept, there is little agreement as to
whether Farmers’ Rights should include the right
to save and use seed on-farm or to exchange or sell
farm-saved seed in all circumstances (given the
addition of the words “as appropriate and subject
to national law”).
In some countries, the right of farmers to protect
their own local varieties is included in national IPR
legislation. This right is not in conflict with con-
ventional IPR systems, but several points deserve
attention. If this right is to be implemented by
relaxing the standards for application (especially
uniformity standards for a variety), then there is a
risk that relaxed standards can be misused to pro-
tect broader genepools rather than individual vari-
eties. Others argue that IPR on varieties conflicts
with the moral values of farming communities,
which have always relied on free exchange of
materials, and that such protection should not be
promoted for farmers’ varieties. Finally, protection
itself serves a purpose only when the variety is
commercialized on a sufficiently large scale to
cover at least the cost of protection. At the very
least, an IPR system should avoid granting protec-
tion for farmers’ varieties without the consent of
the community that developed them. 
Farmers’ associations and NGOs that represent
farmers need to be involved in the national debate
on agricultural IPRs. Organizations that represent
farmers need to develop consultation mechanisms
with their members on this issue and to develop a
well-informed capacity to involve them in deci-
sion-making processes. At the same time, national
political systems need to ensure adequate opportu-
nities for open debate about IPR legislation. 
The yes-or-no discussion on IPRs that can be ob-
served in many countries today is not very pro-
ductive. Instead efforts should concentrate on
balancing the different interests. The five-country
study concluded that there is no reason for devel-
oping countries to adopt overly restrictive PVP sys-
tems: the adoption of such systems to acquire trade
benefits reduces the options for broader support to
rural development objectives.
It is possible to serve the interests of different
groups of farmers by providing different levels of
protection within one legal framework. This objec-
tive can be achieved either by providing a minimum
level of protection and adding additional rules for
specific crops or farmers (for example, export crops
can be protected according to the UPOV 1991 model
and subsistence crops by a less restrictive system) or
by designing a stronger IPR system but carefully
delimiting exceptions. For instance, smallholder
farmers should be free to save their own seed of
protected varieties, whereas commercial farmers
should not (as is the case in the EU both for seed pro-
tected by plant breeder’s rights and patents). In
cases where the rights are weaker, it is important to
recognize that private sector incentives for invest-
ment will be correspondingly lower and that public
sector plant breeding will need to be well financed
to provide the necessary support.
POTENTIAL ROLE FOR THE
WORLD BANK
The World Bank can assist developing countries by
providing immediate support to national efforts at
developing and implementing PVP legislation as
well instituting longer-term strategies that foster
the development of seed sector institutions.
Immediate support for appropriate
IPR legislation
Discussion forums. The framing of PVP legislation
must be an open process that considers the inter-
ests of all stakeholders. Even in countries where
legislation is already established, usually many as-
pects of implementation and interpretation de-
serve careful review. The Bank can support
opportunities for national (or, where relevant, re-
gional) forums that promote debate and discus-
sion about the shape of PVP legislation and its
implementation. Although the Bank cannot offer
specific blueprints, it can encourage stakeholders
to take into account both poverty reduction strate-
gies and the trade dimension of IPRs. Stakeholders
should recognize (1) the possibility of providing
different levels of protection for different types of
crops, (2) the necessity of structuring IPR regimes
to evolve in concert with national seed systems,
and (3) the importance of key parameters in PVP
legislation (table 7.1). The Bank can also sponsor
meetings and other activities that explore possibil-
ities for regional collaboration in the administra-
tion and management of PVP, as well as encourage
stronger regional mechanisms for patent applica-
tions, including those in biotechnology.
Research. Because there is so little experience
with PVP in developing countries, further analysis
is needed to offer more precise advice to policy
makers. In a few years, it would be useful to con-
duct a follow-up study, similar to the present one,
to monitor progress and synthesize what will
surely be a considerable amount of new experience
as many more countries institute PVP systems and
begin to gain experience with patents in biotech-
nology. Analysis as part of sector strategies can
allow the Bank to help countries identify situations
in which inappropriate or ineffective IPRs may
restrain the development of specific crop sectors or
market segments. Furthermore, there are specific
instances of research that might be undertaken,
such as an examination of how to structure fee rates
for PVP, how IPRs and Farmers’ Rights may effec-
tively be combined, and how to support modalities
such as patent pools and clearinghouses to ensure
that excessive restrictions imposed by biotechnol-
ogy patents do not limit the development of a com-
petitive seed industry.
Bilateral trade negotiations. Although the TRIPS
requirements for the protection of plant varieties
allow countries considerable flexibility, bilateral
trade negotiations with industrialized countries
may include proposals to adopt more restrictive
IPRs, such as plant variety patents. Wherever the
Bank can use its influence, it should encourage both
partners in such negotiations to carefully consider
possible impacts on equitable agricultural devel-
opment and to recall that IPRs can be differentiated
by crop and allowed to evolve.
Additional opportunities for strengthening
seed sector institutions 
This report argues that the potential contribution of
IPRs to strengthening national seed sectors de-
pends on a range of other factors, including the
business environment, the nature of the agricul-
tural economy, and public agricultural research ca-
pacities. Contributions from a donor like the World
Bank to relevant institution building in a particular
country should be based on a long-term strategy.
IPR regimes in plant breeding will make a stronger
contribution to seed system development through
complementary attention by the World Bank to in-
stitution building. Examples include IPR institu-
tions themselves, seed regulation, the commercial
seed industry and agribusiness, and public agri-
cultural research and extension.
IPR institutions. Many countries will require as-
sistance in the design and development of the IPR
institutions (for both PVP and patents) needed to
support agricultural innovation and development.
This assistance may include support to ensure that
IPR systems are transparent and efficient, encour-
agement for exploring regional and international
harmonization, and opportunities for supporting
human resource development. Capacity building
may also be supported for breeders, seed produc-
ers, traders, and farmers to understand the objec-
tives of the system in order to support compliance
with the rights and obligations associated with it.
The development of a PVP system should thus
include an extensive information campaign
involving all stakeholders. Support could also in-
clude the following:
• In some countries, the PVP system may not
have access to adequate technical capacity in
conducting or interpreting DUS tests, and
short-term training courses would be useful. 
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• As more PVP systems are put into practice, of-
ficials and technicians from PVP offices
would profit from occasional opportunities to
meet with their counterparts, exchange expe-
riences and learn about new developments;
the Bank could provide a suitably neutral
aegis for such workshops. 
• Examiners from national patent offices could
profit from short-term training related to the
protection of biotechnology innovations, and
they could learn from the experience of the
European Patent Office (EPO) or USPTO. 
• The judicial systems of developing countries
will need to gain experience in PVP and
patents in plant science, and suitable training
activities would be very useful.
• Countries may require assistance in provid-
ing information to stakeholders in the seed
system regarding the rights and obligations
associated with national IPR regimes for plant
varieties and biotechnology.
Seed regulation. As responsibilities for seed produc-
tion in developing countries shift from the public to
the private sector, the management and responsi-
bilities of national seed regulatory agencies must be
reconsidered. Various donors (including the World
Bank) have encouraged the rationalization and har-
monization of seed regulations (for example, in
Sub-Saharan Africa). Because competent seed reg-
ulation is needed to support an IPR regime for
plant varieties, further attention to seed regulatory
reform, at both the national and regional levels,
would have high payoffs. Areas that might be con-
sidered for donor attention include:
• Training and advice that allows seed regula-
tory agencies to tailor regulatory procedures
and requirements to their financial resources.
• Further support to regional collaboration and
harmonization.
• Building competence in seed companies so
that the private sector can assume greater reg-
ulatory responsibilities.
• Shifting some public regulatory investment
towards consumer (farmer) education and
consumer protection.
The seed industry and agribusiness. The World Bank
can also support the growth of the private sector,
including the commercial seed industry and
agribusiness development. An appropriate PVP
system should encourage the growth of the do-
mestic private seed sector. The Bank may find op-
portunities to stimulate the sector through, for
instance, support for seed industry associations.
Agribusiness projects also have relevance to PVP,
especially if they require the use of high-quality
seed or planting material. Bank assistance to such
projects should include a thorough review of the
IPR implications:
• Are IPRs relevant for the success of the pro-
posed project (how, what type)?
• Do stakeholders participating in the project
have access to sufficient intellectual property
protection?
• Are complementary or supporting actions re-
quired to ensure that intellectual property
protection is not a constraint to project suc-
cess?
• Is it clear that the relatively strict types of IPRs
required for agribusiness do not interfere
with the provision of seed for subsistence
agriculture?
Public agricultural research and extension. Because the
establishment of IPR regimes for plant varieties
may have a significant impact on NARI strategies,
the Bank should consider how to include this
theme in its support for agricultural research, both
at the national and international level. One priority
is to assist NARIs in developing their IPR strategies
and policies to take advantage of national IPR
regimes. In many cases NARIs also need advice on
using the private seed sector to promote public va-
rieties. This includes advice on developing skills in
contracting with seed companies, ensuring that a
source seed production system is in place, and
building competencies in promoting new varieties
and monitoring their uptake. In addition, NARIs
may need assistance in developing the capacity to
assess their freedom to operate with protected tech-
nology. NARIs need assistance to formulate intel-
lectual property policies and strengthen their legal
and negotiation capacities.
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GENES AND DNA SEQUENCES
Transgenic crops are distinguished by the pres-
ence of several types of “foreign” genetic material.
These include functional genes (that is, genes that
code for insect resistance, herbicide tolerance, or
other desired characteristics); selectable marker
genes (which have characteristics easily identifi-
able in the laboratory and, when linked to a func-
tional gene, facilitate the detection of transformed
cells); promoters (which regulate the timing and
location of the expression of functional or marker
genes); and end sequences (portions of DNA that
terminate transcription). These different types of
genes and sequences (and their combination in a
“construct”) are all candidates for patenting, and
most industrialized countries allow patents on
genes and sequences. 
The situation in developing countries is more
complex. Some countries specifically prohibit gene
patents (for example, the Andean Pact countries);
others, such as China, allow gene patents; and most
have yet to formulate a clear policy. In general,
claims on plants are not allowed in developing
countries. On the one hand, this policy provides
freedom to operate for research; on the other, it ham-
pers investment in biotechnology for agriculture. 
It is important to recognize that patents on plant
genes affect more than just the production of trans-
genic varieties. It is possible to identify and protect
genes that are used in more conventional breeding
procedures. For instance, several herbicide-tolerant
crop varieties commercially available in North
America incorporate patented genes that have been
identified through techniques such as mutagenesis
or whole cell selection and then incorporated in
new crop varieties through conventional breeding.
Another example is IR maize, which is being tested
in Kenya. The key to patent protection in these
cases is the definition of novelty—that is, some
countries prohibit patent protection on substances
found in nature, which are considered to be dis-
coveries rather than innovations. In most cases, a
discovery must be further developed in order to be
considered an innovation and eventually gain a
patent that may effectively include the discovery.
Genes discovered and developed in the course of
conventional breeding can be patented in several
countries, however. A good example is the resis-
tance to aphid (Nasonovia ribisnigri) in lettuce,
patented by Rijk Zwaan (a breeding company in
the Netherlands) in the USA and Europe. The
European patent is, however, under appeal from
various sides, including some important vegetable
seed companies. 
Although the possibility of patenting genes is
controversial, the concept itself seems straightfor-
ward. Even so, several issues contribute to making
this area a particularly complex one for patent law.
One problem is related to broad patent claims,
which may cut a swath as wide as “all genetically
engineered cotton plants.” Although such compre-
hensive claims may be more difficult to make now
than in the early years of biotechnology, the issue of
broad patents remains a concern for many areas of
research, including the plant breeding industry
(Barton 2000). Another issue that affects gene patent-
ing is the degree to which claims are allowed for
genetic material whose functions are incompletely
understood. For instance, the Human Genome
Project witnessed a rush towards patents for a wide
range of DNA sequences without any correspond-
ing characterization, and although such practices are
more prevalent in the pharmaceutical industry than
in plant breeding, they illustrate that there is not yet
a widely accepted definition of how genetic mater-
ial qualifies for a patent. This issue is related to a
third issue, which concerns the type of genes or
DNA sequences that might be patented. Claims
have been made for protecting DNA that does
not constitute a complete gene, including promot-
ers, nucleic acid probes (used to identify DNA
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sequences), and polymorphisms. On the other hand,
patents have been sought for collections of genes,
from bacterial cloning vectors to entire genomes.
Both EPO and USPTO now have stronger guidelines
concerning claims on genes: there must be a good
knowledge and description of the gene’s function.
A fourth issue that complicates the granting and
defense of gene patents is the variable nature of the
genes themselves. A good example of the difficul-
ties in identifying what precisely is eligible for pro-
tection is provided by the Bt genes that are used for
insect resistance in cotton, maize, and other crops.
The Bt bacterium produces certain insecticidal pro-
teins and has been used as a source of “natural”
insecticide for many years. The techniques of bio-
technology have allowed the identification and
transfer of the genes that code for these crystalline
(“Cry”) proteins; the nomenclature describes a
series of different cry genes (found in different
strains of the bacterium), each coding for a distinct
Cry protein that is effective against specific insects.
(Thus the cry 1Ac gene codes for the Cry 1Ac pro-
tein that is effective against the cotton bollworm
and is the basis of most versions of Bt cotton.) Not
only are there various claims on genes that code for
specific Cry proteins; the cry genes that are used in
transgenic plants are synthetic and significantly
different from the original “wild” genes found in
the bacterium. In most cases, the Bt genes are
“codon modified” because part of the code that
functions in a bacterium must be changed to be
more effective in a plant. So although the insectici-
dal protein that is produced by the transgenic plant
may be essentially identical to that produced by the
bacterium, the governing gene may look somewhat
different, and patent claims can be made on the
modified gene and the techniques used for its mod-
ification. A cry gene may be further altered by elim-
inating certain portions to produce a truncated
form of the gene (which may prove more effective),
and research has also created “fusion” genes that
code for novel proteins combining parts of two dif-
ferent Cry proteins. The various types of cry genes
must be linked with specific promoters as well. The
potential patent claims on various aspects of the
process and disputes over definitions of novelty
explain why Bt technology causes considerable
uncertainty among scientists in developing coun-
tries and is the subject of continuing legal disputes
among the major biotechnology MNCs. One of the
main cases was recently won by Dow after almost
two decades of dispute. Although the Bt example is
particularly complex, it illustrates that genetic
modification is rarely a case of simply identifying
and moving a gene from one organism to another
and demonstrates how patent claims on genes may
cover a range of issues. 
TRANSFORMATION METHODS
The possession of appropriate genes and sequences
is obviously not sufficient to produce a transgenic
plant variety. There are two major techniques for
introducing foreign genetic material into an organ-
ism. One is based on Agrobacterium tumefaciens, a
bacterium that is able to insert its own or other
genes into a plant genome. This transformation is
accomplished through a plasmid (an autonomous
piece of DNA) from the bacterium. The plasmid is
used as the basis to construct a vector that incorpo-
rates the genes that are to be transferred to the
plant. Tissue of the target plant is incubated in a
culture of Agrobacterium that includes the transfor-
mation vector, and the modified plant cells are then
regenerated to develop viable transformed plants.
The second type of transformation technique is
based on the direct, physical transfer of foreign
genes into target plant cells. The most common
example is particle bombardment (biolistics), in
which metal particles are used as carriers of plas-
mids containing transgenes and are introduced
into target plant tissue at high velocity. The plant
cells are tested for successful transformation and
then regenerated. Both Agrobacterium and biolistic
transformation techniques are complex procedures
characterized by a wide range of modifications and
improvements. For instance, the Agrobacterium
methodology was initially unsuccessful at trans-
forming monocotyledons (such as cereals), but
several recent advances have overcome this limita-
tion. Similarly, the success of biolistics depends on
a number of engineering considerations governing
particle delivery. Hence both technologies are sub-
ject to a large number of broad and specific patent
claims that make their utilization (and any claims
on the resulting varieties) far from straightforward.
The particle gun technique was developed by
Cornell University and licensed exclusively to
Dupont, thus providing an exclusive right to
use and sublicense the technique. A development
that may address restricted access to transforma-
tion methodology is the recent announcement by
CAMBIA of the discovery of transformation meth-
ods based on several genera of bacteria other than
62 Intellectual Property Rights 
Appendix A. Patents on Biotechnologies 63
Agrobacterium and the establishment of an “open
source” licensing facility for these techniques
(Broothaerts et al. 2005). Whether this methodology
proves as efficient as the older methods remains to
be seen.
REGENERATION METHODS
The transformed plant cells (the products of
Agrobacterium or biolistic methods) must be regen-
erated to produce whole (genetically modified)
plants. Various techniques, part of the science of
tissue culture, are used to accomplish this goal, and
each regeneration protocol is appropriate to partic-
ular species or even varieties. The majority of these
transformation methods are described in the pub-
lished literature and hence are available to all
researchers, but modifications that provide higher
efficiency or that are appropriate to specific species
may be kept secret by individual laboratories,
because it is impossible to detect their utilization in
the final product.
DIAGNOSTIC TECHNIQUES
The other major area of biotechnology relevant to
the plant breeding industry is diagnostic tech-
niques that allow the identification of genes or se-
quences associated with particular functions or
characteristics. Many of these methods are known
as marker systems, and their application in breed-
ing is referred to as “marker assisted selection”
(MAS). The application of these methods can en-
hance the efficiency of plant breeding by accelerat-
ing the identification of desired plant types, but the
end result of the process is usually a conventional
(nontransgenic) variety. Although private firms
rarely discuss their breeding techniques, MAS tech-
niques have already contributed to a certain pro-
portion of the varieties that are commercially
available. Many public breeding programs in
developing countries also use MAS, and a few
products are beginning to appear (such as a downy
mildew-resistant variety of pearl millet released
recently in India). The potential applications for
MAS continue to grow, but because the costs of
these breeding techniques are usually higher, care-
ful decisions must be made regarding when to in-
vest in these techniques (Dreher et al. 2002).
The different MAS techniques are all based on
the ability to detect differences in DNA sequences
between selected plants. In some cases, the DNA is
digested with restriction enzymes that cut it into
segments of different lengths; the patterns of DNA
fragments are compared, and the pattern associ-
ated with the desired genotype is identified. An
early example of this method is restriction frag-
ment length polymorphism (RFLP). In other cases,
specific short nucleotide sequences in DNA are
identified and multiplied (“amplified”) through
the polymerase chain reaction (PCR); differences in
the resulting patterns are correlated with different
plant functions or characteristics. The most impor-
tant techniques include random amplified poly-
morphic DNA (RAPD), amplified fragment length
polymorphisms (AFLPs), and microsatellites. By
identifying a close linkage between the marker and
a preferred gene (allele), MAS provides an effective
method to screen large numbers of plants to deter-
mine if the gene is present. The elements of these
MAS techniques are subject to varying degrees of
protection. They rely on DNA sequences and
probes, some of which may be available publicly
whereas others are covered by patents. The AFLP
technology is recognized as being particularly
powerful. It is available in commercial kit form, but
its components are subject to a number of patents.
Although MAS techniques are used in conven-
tional plant breeding and no foreign DNA se-
quences become part of any resulting variety, the
use of patented diagnostic technology may have
implications for a plant breeder’s ability to claim
ownership of the final product. The exact situation
will depend on the conditions under which the
technology was acquired and the wording of any
contract with the supplier. So-called “reach
through claims” have not seemed to play a signifi-
cant role in this area to date. Patent offices have also
become aware of the negative effect of these claims
and are very critical in granting wide claims. 

65
PUBLIC SECTOR RESEARCH IN
CASE STUDY COUNTRIES
China
China’s public agricultural research system in-
cludes more than 1,600 research institutes. Approx-
imately 10 percent of the research is carried out at
the national level, while 90 percent takes place in
provincial and prefectural institutes. The total
budget for agricultural research was US$ 1,025 mil-
lion in 2002. About 73 percent is for crop-based
research, of which 40 percent is devoted to crop
breeding. China has invested heavily in agricul-
tural biotechnology research—an estimated
US$ 112 million in 1999 and a staff of more than
2,000 (Huang and Hu 2000).
Agricultural research at the national level is the
responsibility of the Chinese Academy of Agri-
cultural Sciences (CAAS), which comprises numer-
ous institutes concentrating on specific crops, such
as the CRI and IVF, as well as the BRI, with its focus
on biotechnology. The BRI undertakes a wide
range of agricultural biotechnology research and
has developed its own Bt gene. This general insti-
tutional structure is replicated at the provincial
level. Thus in Hunan, a major rice-producing
province, the Hunan Academy of Agricultural
Sciences has a Hunan Hybrid Rice Research Center
as well as a Hunan Rice Research Institute. 
The public agricultural research system in
China has undergone a number of changes
(Huang et al. 2003), including a shift from core
funding to a competitive grant basis and assigning
responsibility to research institutes for raising
their own funds. Increased commercialization of
the public agricultural research system is leading
to overlapping roles and a shifting away from
goals of food security, poverty reduction, and
environmental sustainability. Thus despite the
system’s impressive achievements, it faces many
challenges, particularly given the projected
growth in China’s population, income, and asso-
ciated food needs.
Colombia 
Public agricultural research in Colombia was for-
merly in the hands of ICA, but the government
introduced an initiative to privatize research in the
early 1990s with the creation of an independent
research corporation, CORPOICA. ICA remained as
a regulatory entity while all research functions were
transferred to CORPOICA. In theory CORPOICA is
supposed to be supported by contract research from
producer organizations and private industry, but in
fact the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development still provides most of CORPOICA’s
budget by “outsourcing” research tasks. CORPOICA
is responsible for research on most of the agricul-
tural crops in Colombia, but research for important
cash crops is in the hands of a number of semipublic
institutes supported in part by grower associations
(for coffee, sugarcane, and palm oil, for example).
CORPOICA’s budget for 2004 was US$ 13.8 million
and it employed about 300 researchers (compared to
about 500 employed 10 years ago). CORPOICA has
a biotechnology department, although it has not
done any transformations.
India 
Responsibilities for public agricultural research in
India are divided between the ICAR institutes and
the state agricultural university system. ICAR
coordinates 89 research institutes, most of them
specializing in particular commodities or disci-
plines. ICAR employs about 4,100 scientists. Much
of the responsibility for agriculture in India is left
to individual states, and 34 state agricultural uni-
versities (and 120 affiliated zonal research stations)
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carry out research and outreach (with partial sup-
port from ICAR). The total research expenditure in
2000 was estimated to be US$ 625 million, equiva-
lent to 0.42 percent of agricultural GDP (Pal and
Byerlee 2003), with about 55 percent contributed by
the central government and 45 percent by the
states. It is estimated that approximately US$ 25
million is spent on biotechnology research. 
Kenya 
The major responsibility for agricultural research is
with KARI, although some public agricultural
research is also conducted by Kenyan universities.
KARI is one of the stronger NARIs in Sub-Saharan
Africa, but even so its operations are severely lim-
ited by its budget. The KARI budget for 2004/05
was nearly US$ 40 million, a sharp increase from the
previous year (US$ 25.5 million), mostly owing to a
significant expansion of donor funding, which
covers slightly more than half the total budget.
KARI has long experience in plant breeding and has
been particularly successful in producing maize hy-
brids for the highland regions that constitute the
major maize growing area. KARI has invested in
biotechnology and has inaugurated a biotechnology
facility that will support work on transgenic insect-
resistant maize and other projects.
Uganda 
Uganda’s public agricultural research is managed by
NARO, which is also responsible for livestock, fish-
eries, and forestry research. Its budget for 2004/05
was US$ 11.1 million, 70 percent of which is provided
by donors. NARO is currently reorganizing to
accommodate the Plan for the Modernization of
Agriculture (PMA). NARO is expected to contribute
to the PMA by conducting research that is demand
driven and market responsive. Future funding for
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Table B.1 Variety Release in the Case Study Countries
Country Rice Maize Beans Cotton
Chinaa 1996-1999: 237 public
and 3 private
2000-2002: 189 public
and 28 private (54% of
releases hybrid)
1996-1999: 170 public
and 4 private
2000-2002: 105 public
and 34 private (all
releases hybrid)
1996-1999: 107 public
and 10 private
2000-2002: 85 public and
15 private (8% of releases
hybrid)
Colombia 1992-2003: 25 varieties
(5 public)
1990-2003: 80 varieties
(11 public)
1950-1989: 33 varieties
1990-2003: 20 varieties
(all public)
1990-2003: 29 varieties
(6 public)
India 1995: 14
2000: 33
2001: 20
2002: 22
(all public)
1960-1999: 120 public
hybrids and OPVs, plus
an approximately equal
number of unnotified
private hybrids
1995: 5
2000: 6
2001: 7
2002: 9
(mostly public) plus many
unnotified private hybrids
Kenya 1960-1999: 17 hybrids
and 5 OPVs (all public)
2000-2003: 43 private
hybrids and 4 private
OPVs; 8 public hybrids
1982-2003: 15 varieties 
(7 since 1999) (all public)
Uganda 2000-2003: 12 varieties
(all public)
1995-2003: 12 varieties
(all public)
Source: Louwaars et al. (2004).
a. In China, a “private variety” is one marketed by, but not necessarily bred by, a private firm.
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research will come not only from central govern-
ment and donor contributions but also from private
contracts and local governments. It is thus expected
that NARO will generate a significant amount of its
own funding, although the Research Act leaves
open the question of NARO’s control over any funds
it generates. The new policy envisions research
funding rising from its current 0.6 percent of agri-
cultural GDP to 2 percent. 
Variety Release
Trends in the release of varieties developed by the
public and private sector in the case study coun-
tries are summarized in table B.1.
THE SEED SECTOR IN THE CASE
STUDY COUNTRIES
China
Until recently, seed in China was supplied primar-
ily by public seed production organizations. Their
monopoly on sales was removed with a new seed
law in 2000. This law permits private companies,
research institutes, or individuals to produce and
market seed provided they obtain the necessary
certification from the provincial agricultural ad-
ministrative department. In addition, public seed
companies and research institutes are allowed to
retain some of the profits from seed sales. The new
law strengthened a number of trends already visi-
ble in the seed sector in the 1990s. While public in-
stitutes could already license their varieties and
some private seed companies had appeared, local
markets were still in the hands of the public seed
companies operating at the county level. This has
now changed. Many of the public seed companies
at both the county and prefectural levels have gone
bankrupt or have become cooperative companies,
selling primarily nonhybrid or unprotected hybrid
seed. In 2002, there may have been as many as
20,000 seed companies in China, including individ-
uals selling only small amounts at the local level.
A certain amount of consolidation has been taking
place since then, underlining the current unsettled
climate for the sector. 
Many research institutes are extending their tra-
ditional breeding activities to include production
and marketing. Some private seed companies
have also begun investing in breeding activities.
Although foreign companies began marketing
wheat and maize seed in the 1990s through Chinese
partners, direct foreign investments in joint ven-
tures (as minority shareholders) in seed production
and marketing have been permitted since 2002
only. The most notable example is a joint venture
for production and marketing of Bt cotton between
Monsanto/DPL and two provincial seed compa-
nies. The government’s role has been less pro-
nounced in regulating the vegetable seed sector,
and private companies, including joint ventures
with foreign companies, have been selling veg-
etable seed in China since at least the early 1990s. 
Colombia
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Colombian government
was involved heavily in the seed sector, operating
a state seed company and offering subsidized
credit to support the use of certified seed. The state
company marketed mostly ICA varieties and a few
imported commercial hybrids of maize and
sorghum. Government policy encouraged private
firms to replace the state seed company, and these
firms thrived under a regime of support prices and
government grain purchasing until 1990, when
government policy changed. At one point there
were 25 domestic seed companies, but the current
number is less than half that; these are comple-
mented by several MNCs. The domestic seed com-
panies do most of their business in rice seed
(6 companies have their own rice breeding capac-
ity). The largest player in the market is FEDEAR-
ROZ, the national rice growers’ association, which
has moved from simply marketing inputs to breed-
ing rice varieties and selling its own seed. Several
small local companies breed and sell their own
maize hybrids, but the market is dominated by hy-
brids from the MNCs. The MNCs have the major-
ity of the cotton seed market as well. A range of
public programs and producer organizations is re-
sponsible for seed production of many other crops,
including wheat, barley, beans, and potatoes. 
India
One of the contributors to India’s Green Revolution
was the development of state and national seed
corporations, which provided seed of the new rice
and wheat varieties as well as other public crop
varieties. With the exception of some vegetable
seed production and imports, the private seed sec-
tor did not have a significant presence in India until
the mid-1980s. Policy changes in the 1980s opened
the doors to domestic private plant breeding and
seed production and also allowed the participation
of foreign seed companies. The economy-wide
reforms of 1991 further liberalized the seed sector,
particularly for the participation of MNCs. The ini-
tial expansion was based on hybrid seed, beginning
with hybrid sorghum, pearl millet, and maize.
Public research had developed cotton hybrids by
the early 1980s, and private companies quickly
adopted the technology, making India the world’s
leading producer of hybrid cotton seed. The
prospect of hybrid rice drew a number of private
companies into this area, although hybrids still
account for a tiny fraction of India’s rice seed mar-
ket. Vegetable seed production is also mostly in the
hands of the private sector, which largely produces
proprietary hybrids (including some imported
seed) but also some public hybrids and OPVs. Most
of the public seed corporations survive, although
their performance and financial stability vary
widely between states. The public corporations are
relied upon mostly for producing nonhybrid seed
of major crops such as wheat, rice, and pulses. The
participants in the private seed sector range in size
from large, diversified national firms (some with
MNC participation) to tiny local operations that
may specialize in the multiplication and distribu-
tion of seed of a single crop.
Kenya
Until recently, all seed production in Kenya was the
responsibility of the parastatal KSC, and no other
commercial seed operations were allowed. The KSC
had exclusive rights to all KARI varieties and also
established its own breeding program, principally
for maize (although work was also done on wheat,
pasture grasses, and sorghum). A policy shift in the
early 1990s allowed MNCs (including some from
South Africa and Zimbabwe) to sell hybrid maize
(and to a lesser extent sorghum and sunflower)
seed. The policy change also encouraged a domes-
tic seed industry to develop. There are currently
three seed companies (besides KSC) with their own
breeding programs, and several other small compa-
nies produce and market seed of public varieties.
KARI and KSC signed an agreement awarding roy-
alties to KARI for the use of varieties currently
under KSC production, although some details of
that agreement are still in doubt, including the de-
gree to which KSC has exclusive access. 
Uganda
Uganda has never had a very strong seed sector, but
its new policies for agriculture have encouraged an
expansion of activity. Earlier, virtually all seed (of
public varieties) was produced and marketed by the
parastatal Uganda Seed Project, which had several
production facilities. This operation was recently
converted to Uganda Seed Ltd., which has been a
candidate for divestiture since 1998. Uganda Seed
Ltd. continues to produce a small amount of seed,
but it is now challenged by five local companies that
have emerged in the past few years, mostly based on
experience in grain trading and participation in seed
acquisition for regional emergency seed operations.
Only one of these companies has its own plant
breeding capacity (it relies on IARC germplasm);
most companies multiply and sell NARO varieties.
Several multinational and regional companies pro-
duce seed in Uganda for export and some also mar-
ket seed in Uganda (mostly hybrid maize seed). 
SEED REGULATION IN THE CASE
STUDY COUNTRIES
China
China’s first seed law was decreed in 1989, followed
in 2000 by the “Seed Law of the People’s Republic
of China.” Previous regulations required that new
varieties of the major crops must pass two to three
years of trials and be approved at the state or the
provincial level before being extended and used.
Currently this requirement applies to rice, wheat,
maize, cotton, soybean, and one or two other crops
determined by the agricultural administration de-
partment at the state council and the people’s gov-
ernment of the provinces, autonomous regions, and
municipalities. The criteria for new varieties are es-
tablished by the MoA or at the provincial level. The
new seed law has not stipulated any approval
mechanisms for less important crops.
There are rules for seed production and man-
agement, including a licensing system for seed
producers and traders. Based on “The Regulation
of Crops Seed Production and Operation Licenses
Approval,” decreed by the MoA, there are four
types of licensed seed companies. The first type
is permitted to produce and market seed of
conventional crops. The second can also deal with
hybrids. The third type of seed company can be
involved in foreign seed trade in addition to
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producing and marketing any kind of seed locally.
The fourth type of seed company can have its own
breeding program. All seed companies have the
right to carry their own trademarks and have their
own seed packages according to their respective
licenses. Although Chinese seed regulation is
relatively comprehensive, resources dedicated to
enforcement are far from adequate.
Colombia
All crop varieties offered for sale in Colombia must
be tested for agronomic performance and officially
released. The testing process involves trials in one
or more of five agroecological zones in the country
(varieties are released for specific zones). Until re-
cently, these trials were run by ICA, but a new reg-
ulation (Resolution 2046, which aimed to adjust
Colombian seed legislation to “the evolution in the
domestic seed industry and to bring it in line with
international norms”) allows companies with their
own plant breeding capacity to conduct these tests
and submit the results to ICA. All seed of agricul-
tural crops sold in Colombia must be certified, and
ICA is the official certification agency. Some seed
companies complain that ICA does not have the ca-
pacity to fulfill this function efficiently, and there is
pressure from the industry for ICA to license com-
panies to certify their own seed. ICA is also re-
sponsible for monitoring seed sales and detecting
violations of regulations.
India
All public crop varieties must be officially released
and notified through a process that includes per-
formance tests at either the state or national level
and notification by the Central Seed Committee.
The national level performance testing is managed
through the extensive All-India Coordinated Crop
Improvement Programs (AICCIP). Private vari-
eties do not require release or notification in order
to be sold. Private varieties may be entered in the
AICCIP trials, although the fees for the private
companies are currently quite high. In practice,
only a minority of private hybrids are officially no-
tified, although companies acknowledge that data
from the tests is useful and that notification is an
aid to promoting a variety in the market. Seed cer-
tification is managed by state seed certification
agencies, and only notified varieties may be certi-
fied. Certification is not compulsory, even for
notified varieties, although various agricultural
programs and subsidies require that farmers use
certified seed. Most private seed, and a substantial
minority of public sector seed, is sold as “truthfully
labeled,” requiring the name of the variety and
minimum germination and purity standards.
Officers of the state departments of agriculture are
assigned to monitor seed sales and collect samples
of commercial seed to test for conformity with cer-
tification tags or truthful labels. The seed regula-
tions are being reviewed, partly in light of recent
IPR legislation, and a revised Seed Act (which took
effect in 2005) makes some form of variety testing
and registration compulsory and provides for op-
tional seed certification, involving possibilities for
self-certification by companies.
Kenya
Variety approval and release in Kenya was reorga-
nized recently and placed under the auspices of
KEPHIS. All varieties of field crops (public and pri-
vate) must be entered in National Performance
Trials, which are divided into agroecological zones.
All varieties must be registered, including DUS
testing, and this testing takes two years. Seed of
most field crops also must be certified. The respon-
sibility for seed certification lies with KEPHIS and
is managed from several regional stations. There is
some pressure from seed companies for possible
accreditation to certify their own seed, but no ac-
tion has been taken. The certification requirement
has been enforced even for small-scale, formal seed
production (by donor-supported producer groups,
for example) for crops such as beans and sorghum.
However, KEPHIS has indicated that in the future
small-scale seed producers will be able to sell seed
for some crops (but not maize) as “standard seed,”
which requires only seed quality testing. Kenya,
Tanzania, and Uganda recently concluded a har-
monization of seed regulations for Eastern Africa.
The new accord includes an agreement that vari-
eties released in any one of these countries will
have a “fast track” in variety testing in the others.
The accord also adopts common certification
requirements, including a short list of crops with
mandatory certification. 
Uganda
Variety release in Uganda still follows the system
established for public plant breeding. Candidate
varieties (public or private) must undergo a series
of field trials that take at least three seasons and in-
clude at least seven sites; the trials are managed by
NARO. If a variety progresses to the most ad-
vanced stage, DUS testing begins, managed by the
National Seed Certification Service (NSCS).
Performance and DUS data are presented to a com-
mittee that is in charge of official variety release;
NSCS maintains a national variety list. Seed of
major field crops must be certified by NSCS,
although the agency is underfunded and the in-
dustry is anxious to see a system in which compa-
nies can be accredited for certification. Uganda
participated in the recent Eastern African harmo-
nization of seed policies and regulations. 
PVP legislation in the case study countries
Table B.2 provides details on the coverage, length
of protection, and other parameters of PVP legisla-
tion in the case study countries.
SEED USE IN THE CASE
STUDY COUNTRIES
China
In China, farmers’ sources of seed vary by region
and crop. Marketed rice seed is divided roughly
equally between OPVs (214,000 tons in 2002) and
hybrid seed (250,000 tons). Over 90 percent of the
area sown to hybrids is sown to seed purchased
each year, whereas the corresponding area figure
for OPVs is estimated to be 30 percent. Hybrid rice
seed has gained considerable market share since
1980, despite its higher cost for farmers, and now
accounts for almost half of the area planted to rice.
On the other hand, approximately 35-40 percent of
the rice area is sown with farm-saved or informally
acquired seed. The cotton seed market is domi-
nated more heavily by OPVs: hybrid seed accounts
for only about 15 percent of the estimated annual
sale of 78,000 tons. Purchased cotton seed from
formal sources is estimated to account for 35 per-
cent of the total seed requirement, highlighting the
importance of saved and exchanged seed. In 2003,
approximately 56 percent of the cotton area was
planted to Bt cotton (James 2003), and sales of Bt
cotton seed are 58 percent of total sales. Since its
release, Bt cotton has been absorbed into farmers’
seed systems, with a considerable amount of seed
saving and crossing taking place. The situation in
vegetable seed is quite different, given the extent of
development of hybrid varieties. Replacement
rates are estimated to be almost 100 percent for
most major vegetable crops, such as Chinese cab-
bage, tomato, chili, and cucumber (Hu 1998; Koo
et al. 2003). 
Colombia
Colombia’s dualistic agriculture is reflected in pat-
terns of seed use. For rice, approximately half of the
area is sown with purchased seed each year. Seed
purchase is quite high in this largely commercial en-
terprise, although the industry is concerned about
the amount of unauthorized seed sales by farmers.
Maize is much more of a small-farm crop, and the
proportion of purchased seed is much lower than
for rice. However, the commercial maize sector,
which grows maize mostly for feed, depends heav-
ily on purchased hybrid seed. Currently three
MNCs account for about 80 percent of the hybrid
maize seed market. Cotton is also dominated by
MNCs, but official statistics indicate that the degree
of seed saving varies widely from year to year.
Although beans are an important crop in Colombia,
local varieties account for the vast majority of pro-
duction, and there is little formal seed sale.
India
Seed use in India also varies by crop and by region.
Nearly 90 percent of rice seed is still farm saved or
locally acquired, but important regional differ-
ences prevail. Very little commercial seed is sold in
some states, whereas in others, such as Andhra
Pradesh, more than one-quarter of rice farmers
buy commercial seed in a given season. The situa-
tion for maize is even more variable, depending in
part on the farming system. In some states, hybrids
account for less than 10 percent of seed use, while
in others, where maize is more of a cash crop,
hybrids account for more than three-quarters of
maize seed use. Proprietary hybrids constitute the
vast majority of maize seed sales, although state
seed corporations and some small companies sell
public hybrids and OPVs. Most vegetable growers
purchase seed from the private sector. Vegetable
hybrids are important for many species; these may
be products of domestic private plant breeding or
imported, but some public hybrids and OPVs are
also on the market. For cotton, there are distinct re-
gional patterns of seed use. Northern India relies
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Table B.2 PVP Legislation in the Case Study Countries
Parameter China Colombia India Kenya Uganda
Legislation Regulations of the
People’s Republic of
China on the
Protection of New
Varieties of Plants
(1999). Member of
UPOV (1978) since
2000.
Law 243 of 1995
establishes PBR.
Resolution 2046
(2003) deffines limita-
tions on seed saving.
Member of UPOV
(1978) since 1996.
Protection of Plant
Varieties and Farmers’
Rights Act (2001)
establishes PBR. India
has applied to join
UPOV.
Seed and Plant
Varieties Act (Cap
326) amended in
1991 and 1994 to es-
tablish PBR. Kenya
joined UPOV (1978)
in 1999.
A draft Plant Variety
Protection Act,
debated in Parliament
in 2004, deffines PBR
as well as farmer and
community rights.
Scope of
coverage
41 crops currently eli-
gible. Certifficates is-
sued for 15 species to
date; cotton not eligi-
ble for protection.
All crops eligible. In
practice certifficates is-
sued for 7 agricultural
crops and 15 horticul-
tural crops.
No crops excluded,
but exemption for va-
rieties whose commer-
cial exploitation
would be a danger to
public order, public
health, and so forth.
No crops excluded; to
date applications have
been accepted for 31
agricultural crops and
23 horticultural crops.
No crops excluded.
Length of
protection
20 years for vines,
fruits, and ornamen-
tals; 15 years for all
other crops.
25 years for trees and
horticultural crops; 20
years for ffield crops.
18 years for trees and
vines; 15 years for
other crops.
18 years for trees and
vines; 15 years for
other crops.
25 years for trees and
vines; 20 years for
annual crops
Farmer seed
saving and
exchange
Seed saving and ex-
change are permitted.
(Local and informal
seed sales are regu-
lated by seed law.)
Farmers with more
than 5 ha not allowed
to save seed of pro-
tected varieties. No
farmer’s privilege for
horticultural or tree
crops or transgenic va-
rieties.
Seed saving, ex-
change, and sale by
farmers are permitted,
but not sale of
“branded seed.”
Seed saving currently
permitted, but moving
towards UPOV 1991.
(Local seed sale re-
stricted by certiffication
requirements)
Farmers have the right
to use, exchange, and
sell farm-saved seed
of protected varieties
but not “on a com-
mercial scale.”
Breeder’s
exemption
Protected varieties
may be used for
breeding. (No special
rules for EDVs.)
Protected varieties
may be used for
breeding.
Protected varieties
may be used for
breeding. Protection
of EDV depends on
rights of original
breeder.
Protected varieties
may be used for
breeding, but moving
towards UPOV 1991.
Protected varieties
may be used for
breeding.
Protection of
extant varieties
Protection offered for
varieties that were in
China up to 4 years
before a species/
genus becomes eligi-
ble for protection (ap-
plication to be made
within 1 or 2 years,
woody and agricul-
tural species resp.)
Amnesty for 1 year
when PVP was intro-
duced for offficially
released varieties.
Protection period
based on remaining
period, counting from
year of release.
Varieties already re-
leased and notiffied
will be eligible for
protection (from date
of original notiffica-
tion).
Public varieties al-
ready released eligible
for protection (from
date of ffiling), but de-
cision contested.
Extant varieties not eli-
gible for protection.
Plant variety
patents
Hybrids can fall under
the scope of a patent
for a “breeding
methodology.”
Genetically modiffied
organisms may be
patented because not
found in nature.
No patents of plant va-
rieties.
No patents of plant va-
rieties.
No patents of plant
varieties.
Source: Louwaars et al. (2004).
to a large extent on OPV cotton (in large part be-
cause suitable hybrids have not yet been devel-
oped for this region); these are largely public
varieties, produced by both private and public
seed companies. In central and southern India, in
contrast, most of the cotton sown is hybrids
(mostly private), produced almost exclusively by
private firms. 
Kenya
The star performer of the Kenyan seed sector
continues to be hybrid maize. Kenya was one of
the first countries in Sub-Saharan Africa to pro-
duce hybrid maize, and many farmers have long
experience with relying on hybrid seed. Most of
these farmers are in the more productive high-
lands, the center of commercial maize produc-
tion in Kenya. Nationwide, annual purchase of
commercial maize seed accounts for about 45
percent of maize area; the vast majority of this is
hybrid seed, with some OPVs (public and pri-
vate) being sold in more marginal production
areas. Maize seed sales are still dominated by
KSC, which accounts for roughly 90 percent of
the market; the remainder is divided among six
other companies. Little seed of other crops is
sold, although a few companies sell a small
amount of seed of KARI bean varieties, and some
MNCs market sunflower hybrids. Virtually all
vegetable seed is imported. Most seed of crops
for dryland areas (sorghum, millet, pigeon pea,
and so forth) is produced only through special
donor- or government-supported projects.
Uganda 
Although seed production and sales are increasing
in Uganda, the majority of the industry’s business
is still through special projects or NGOs rather than
over-the-counter sales. The major product is maize
seed; sales in recent years were under 2,000 tons
but jumped to nearly 5,000 tons in 2003. Beans are
in second place, with roughly 800 tons sold annu-
ally. Smaller amounts of seed of sorghum, ground-
nuts, and several other food crops are also sold. 
Summary data on the use of purchase seed
Table B.3 presents comparative data on the use of
purchased seed for major field crops in the case
study countries.
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Table B.3 Seed Use for Major Field Crops in the Case Study Countries
Rice Maize Cotton
Area Area sown with Area Area sown with Area Area sown with 
planted purchased seed planted purchased seed planted purchased seed 
Country (000 ha) (%) (000 ha) (%) (000 ha) (%)
China 30,000 30 (OPV)
90 (hybrid) 23,000 96 3,200 35
Colombia 470 50-60 550 15 44 35-65
India 45,000 11 6,100 25 8,500 65
Kenya 1,600 45
Uganda 540 20-35 160 -
Source: Louwaars et al. (2004).
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For historic background and general policy issues
related to IPR systems, please refer to chapter 3. This
appendix provides an analysis of the differences be-
tween existing protection systems under the UPOV
Conventions of 1978 and 1991, and the US utility
patent system. (Plant patents have not been in-
cluded, because they cover a very limited range of
crops in one country only.) This appendix also pro-
vides a brief introduction to Farmers’ Rights and the
protection of biotechnological inventions. 
FARMER’S PRIVILEGE
The traditional right of farmers to save seed from
their harvests to plant the following season is an
important aspect of sui generis systems and is one of
the most contentious aspects of IPRs in plant breed-
ing. Although this practice is often described as a
“farmer’s right,” it is referred to here by the UPOV
term of “farmer’s privilege” to distinguish it from
the broader concept of “Farmers’ Rights,” dis-
cussed below. 
The 1978 UPOV Convention assumed that
farmers were permitted to save and reuse seed of
protected varieties as part of “private and non-
commercial use.” However, article 15(2) of the
1991 UPOV Convention rules that on-farm seed
saving is not permitted without the consent of the
breeder, although it allows member states to spec-
ify crops for which the use of farm-saved seed is
permitted, “taking into account the legitimate in-
terests of the breeder.” In the EU, this provision is
interpreted as the right of smallholder farmers to
save seed for specific crops and the right of the
breeder to collect royalties on farm-saved seed
used on larger farms. The 1991 Convention also
prohibits any transfer of seed of protected varieties
(through sale, barter, or gift) between farmers.
Utility patents on plant varieties are even more
rigid, and a patented variety normally cannot be
saved for subsequent use as seed on the farm or
traded or exchanged with other farmers.
Various interpretations of farmer’s privilege
have favored the adoption of laws based on the
more liberal 1978 UPOV Convention in many de-
veloping countries. In most cases in these countries,
restrictions on saving seed of food crops on the farm
are neither administratively feasible nor politically
acceptable. Making the transfer of seed from farmer
to farmer illegal is widely considered incompatible
with the traditions of small-scale farming. 
The issue of seed saving is a good example of
how IPRs in plant breeding must be tailored to the
conditions of national seed systems. Even within a
single country, the requirements and conditions of
different crop production systems are not uniform,
and countries could consider legal options that
address this variability. For instance, earlier seed
law in the Netherlands included severe restrictions
on saving planting materials for ornamental crops,
while field crops were regulated on the basis of the
more liberal UPOV 1978 Convention. Many vege-
tatively propagated commercial flower species can
be multiplied very rapidly by farmers, which
would considerably reduce revenues for breeders
and provide inadequate incentives for innovation
in a sector that is very important for Dutch agricul-
ture. Thus an amendment to the law made the
farm-level propagation of such species illegal. This
example emphasizes that countries need to design
appropriate levels of protection for different types
of commodities, in accord with the domestic agri-
cultural economy and plant breeding capacities.
BREEDER’S EXEMPTION
The breeder’s exemption is the right of a breeder to
use a protected variety for developing new vari-
eties. This exemption stems from the traditionally
unrestricted use of seed by farmers and breeders. 
Appendix C. 
Major Issues in Current IPR
Systems for Plant Varieties
It is seen as a way of promoting the development of
the best varieties for farmers, limiting the develop-
ment of long-term commercial advantages,
improving opportunities for smaller breeding com-
panies, and thus promoting competition in the sec-
tor. Unlike the farmer’s privilege, the breeder’s
exemption has not dramatically changed in later
UPOV Conventions, prompting some companies
in the USA to look to the patent system for protect-
ing their germplasm (box C.1). The only modifica-
tion in the 1991 Convention is the limitation on
EDVs, which may fall under the rights of the origi-
nal breeder. The EDV provision is meant to limit
the possibility of “cosmetic breeding,” which pro-
duces a variety that is only slightly different from
the original through techniques such as mutation
breeding, repeated backcrossing, or genetic trans-
formation (for example, simply inserting a trans-
gene in a protected variety). The EDV concept is
susceptible to different interpretations, however,
and is the subject of an ongoing debate among
breeders (ISF 2004). An EDV can be protected when
it is DUS and new, but to commercialize the vari-
ety, the breeder of the EDV must have the consent
of the person or entity that holds the rights to the
original variety. Some larger companies would like
to introduce the concept of “genetic distance” in the
definition of an EDV, but others fear that this step
could lead to the monopolization of certain gene
pools. After much debate, seed company represen-
tatives recently agreed upon arbitration rules for
EDV disputes (ISF 2005).
OTHER ISSUES RELATED TO
PLANT VARIETY PROTECTION
Regardless of whether they want to follow UPOV,
countries face several additional important IPR is-
sues that require attention. These issues include the
choice of crops eligible for protection, the protec-
tion of harvested materials, and the requirements
for variety registration. 
Although it is expected that a country’s IPR
regime for plant breeding eventually will provide
some type of protection for all cultivated species,
both the 1978 and 1991 UPOV Conventions pro-
vide guidelines for phasing in this protection.
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Box C.1 Breeder’s Exemption and the Patent System.
For seed companies in the USA, one of the attractions
of patents for plant varieties is the absence of a
breeder’s exemption: patented varieties cannot be
used to develop new varieties without the consent of
the patent holder. The research exemption available
under patents in the USA is much narrower than in
many other countries, essentially eliminating the pos-
sibility of using a patented variety in a research pro-
gram, and some US seed companies would like to see
this as a pathway for eliminating the breeder’s exemp-
tion for protected varieties. Although most other coun-
tries do not grant patents on plant varieties, there is a
danger that biotechnology patents could effectively re-
move the breeder’s exemption where, for instance, a
PVP-protected variety contains a patented gene. 
The EU has attempted to resolve this conflict be-
tween patents and PVP by providing a farmer’s privi-
lege, where applicable, in the patent system, and the
option of compulsory cross-licensing, in the spirit of
the breeder’s exemption (EC 1998). But the conditions
for granting such licenses imply a limitation of the
breeder’s exemption, compared to the freedom avail-
able under PVP (Eaton and van Tongeren 2006). The
seed industry association, representing majority opin-
ion among its members, has stated that it would prefer
to see an unencumbered breeder’s exemption remain
(ISF 2003), without the complications posed by cross-
licensing (ESA 2004). The breeder’s exemption on va-
rieties that also include patented components is
currently maintained through a “gentlemen’s agree-
ment” among companies, but it is not clear now how
long this situation will last. A workable legal solution
to maintaining the breeder’s exemption while at the
same time respecting patents for plant components
has yet to be developed. Controversial discussions,
however, have started recently in certain sectors of the
seed industry to delay access to the breeder’s exemp-
tion under the UPOV system. Such an action would
significantly reduce the difference between patents
and PVP.
Source: Authors
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The 1991 Convention expects initial coverage of 3
genera or species with a phased expansion to 24
over an 8-year period. There is debate over whether
this phased expansion is compliant with the TRIPS
Agreement, which specifies that countries have to
provide for the protection of varieties of (any) crop
species. Countries must also decide how to treat va-
rieties that are already in commercial seed produc-
tion, the majority of which are likely to be publicly
released varieties. Such extant varieties may be
given a full term of protection, be protected for the
requisite period beginning from their original re-
lease date, or be excluded from protection.
One of the innovations of the 1991 UPOV
Convention is the possibility of expanding protec-
tion to harvested materials. This regulation allows
the breeder to protect his or her rights not only in
the seed market but also in the market of the har-
vested product, if the breeder has not had the “rea-
sonable opportunity to exercise his right” on the
propagating material. The principal application of
this regulation occurs where access to seed or
planting material cannot be controlled (for exam-
ple, in production areas in countries that do not
have an operational PVP system) and the product
enters markets where the variety is protected. This
rule is used particularly in the flower industry
when flowers are produced in developing coun-
tries and shipped to Europe and the USA. Now that
the most important flower producing countries in
the South are members of UPOV, there is a debate
whether breeders should still claim rights on the
harvested products, but shipments from these
countries have occasionally been seized in the im-
porting countries.
The establishment of a PVP system also requires
decisions regarding the nature of the variety regis-
tration process. UPOV provides detailed guide-
lines on descriptors for variety registration. In
theory, an application must be compared with all
varieties of common knowledge, but the great
worldwide increase in variety registration is mak-
ing it more difficult to assess the uniqueness of a
variety. There are calls for greater collaboration
among PVP offices and the establishment of an
effective reference collection, but problems will
remain for some time (Le Buanec 2004). The re-
sponsibility for data collection must also be deter-
mined. In some cases, breeders are responsible for
providing the data required for a DUS application;
in other instances, a national PVP office does the ex-
amination, or it contracts DUS testing to indepen-
dent research institutions or purchases DUS re-
ports from other authorities. Decisions also need to
be made regarding the registration of hybrids
(and/or inbreds) and the provision or deposit of
germplasm, especially in the case of hybrids, which
are often treated as trade secrets.
FARMERS’ RIGHTS
An issue that falls outside of the TRIPS require-
ments for IPRs in plant breeding but which elicits
considerable debate is the concept of Farmers’
Rights, which has several aspects, such as the right
of farmers to save (and use, exchange, and sell)
seed derived from their own harvests. The IT
PGRFA brought three basic concepts under the
scope of Farmers’ Rights: (1) the right of benefit
sharing, which gives farmers the right to be com-
pensated for their contributions to the develop-
ment and maintenance of genetic resources and for
making them available for use in breeding; (2) the
right to be involved in the development of national
policies; and (3) rights related to the protection of
traditional knowledge relevant to genetic re-
sources. As a corollary, farmers may also claim
ownership over their local varieties and apply for
PVP. There is controversy over whether some of
these aspects of Farmers’ Rights should be in-
cluded in PVP legislation to allow countries to com-
ply with TRIPS, CBD, and IT PGRFA through one
piece of legislation. Many national PVP laws make
no mention of these issues, but India recently en-
acted “The Protection of Plant Varieties and
Farmers’ Rights Act,” and the Organization of
African Unity produced model legislation for “The
Protection of the Rights of Local Communities,
Farmers, and Breeders, and for the Regulation of
Access to Biological Resources.” In a given country,
decisions on how to treat Farmers’ Rights will need
to be based on an assessment of the major sources
of innovation in plant breeding in the country, the
aspirations of farming communities, and possibili-
ties for administering and enforcing the wider as-
pects of Farmers’ Rights. 
The right of benefit sharing would seem to offer
attractive possibilities for ensuring that farmers’
ingenuity and experience are fairly rewarded. As
a number of observers have pointed out, however,
there is virtually no experience in the actual im-
plementation or management of such rights in
agricultural crops. The CBD would require a direct
link between the benefit sharing and the use of a
particular genetic resource. However, the extent to
which particular local varieties (with identifiable
“owners”) may be used in the development of new
crop varieties, and the problems in calculating the
exact contribution of such a variety, monitoring
seed sales, and collecting the appropriate royalties,
make the management of such compensation
mechanism hugely problematic (see, for example,
Srinivasan 2003). A declaration of source is cur-
rently discussed in the framework of the CBD.
A multilateral approach to benefit sharing is in-
cluded in the IT PGRFA for a number of important
crops, but the implementation rules have yet to be
designed. Similarly, the degree to which farmer-
bred varieties can be identified, registered, and
marketed has yet to be tested (see, for example,
Ramanna and Smale 2004).
PATENTS AND BIOTECHNOLOGY
In the past two decades, the contributions of
biotechnology have transformed the science of
plant breeding. The most visible (and controver-
sial) aspect of plant biotechnology is the ability to
transfer segments of DNA from one organism to
another, resulting in transgenic varieties. The
range of commercial transgenic crop varieties is
still quite narrow (the majority feature herbicide
tolerance or insect resistance), and about one-third
of the global area planted to transgenic crops is in
developing countries (the majority in Argentina,
Brazil, China, India, and South Africa) (James
2004). Nevertheless, a recent review demonstrates
considerable progress in research capacity for
genetic transformation in the South (although con-
centrated in relatively few countries), including a
range of crops and characteristics well beyond cur-
rent commercial offerings (Atanassov et al. 2004).
A less publicized but equally important contribu-
tion of biotechnology to plant breeding is the de-
velopment of a range of tools and processes that
allow plant breeders to link particular functions to
specific genes or sequences of DNA and to track
their presence during the course of conventional
plant breeding. The genes and techniques used in
developing transgenic crops, as well as the diag-
nostic tools and processes of marker-assisted
breeding used to produce conventional plant vari-
eties, are all candidates for patent protection (see
Appendix A).
National patent systems have been unable to
keep pace with the rapid development of plant
biotechnology, leaving many areas of uncertainty
and dispute. In developing countries, only a small
minority of patent offices have begun to consider
applications related to plant biotechnology, while
in several industrialized countries a number of
claims to basic technologies are still the subjects of
complex court cases. It is therefore impossible to
chart an unambiguous course for the development
of effective IPR regimes for biotechnology, but it is
important to recognize the major parameters and to
identify the issues that will affect IPR policy in the
coming years. Areas of particular concern include
the protection of genes and other sequences, the
methods used for genetic transformation, informa-
tion in bioinformatics databases, and the diagnostic
techniques that biotechnology offers conventional
plant breeding.
IPRs for biotechnology thus present a complex
set of issues that will challenge policy makers, re-
searchers, and the commercial sector for many
years to come. Developing countries need to
strengthen their capacity to understand the issues
and to develop appropriate policies regarding the
patentability of various biotechnologies and their
products in order to support domestic develop-
ment of biotechnology and promote access to for-
eign technologies.
If biotechnology is to contribute to poverty alle-
viation and rural food security, a greater effort
must be made to place technologies in the public
domain. The promotion by CAMBIA of an open-
source model for biotechnology innovations is a
challenging example. Although some important
technologies are in the public domain, most of the
key elements of plant biotechnology are controlled
by a small number of MNCs. Important court cases
are in progress to define the boundaries of some of
these claims, but the results will merely assign
rights to one firm or another, or result in further
cross-licensing that keeps most of the technology in
the hands of a few large firms. 
Agricultural research in developing countries
needs better access to this technology. Certainly
there are instances in which these firms are willing
to provide humanitarian licenses for some of the
technology; the example of “Golden Rice” is the
most highly publicized case. Such licenses may
focus on segmented markets (particular countries
or classes of farmers) and on public-private part-
nerships in which NARIs can trade access to some
of their own technology (Byerlee and Fischer 2002).
One recent example is the PIPRA initiative of major
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U.S. universities, foundations, and nonprofit re-
search institutions to make agricultural technolo-
gies more easily available for breeding varieties
of subsistence crops in the developing world,
partly through humanitarian licensing. In addition,
researchers can use technologies that are not
patented in their own countries without fear of im-
mediate sanction from the patent holder, as long as
the products do not enter into international trade
(Binenbaum et al. 2003). However, some argue that
such use could impede future negotiation of legiti-
mate licensing agreements for new technologies. 
In most cases, developing country researchers
will need to do a thorough FtO analysis to under-
stand the ownership implications of the tools, ma-
terials, or processes that contribute to a particular
research project. The technology they use may have
been acquired through nonofficial channels, by
means of an MTA that may allow only research
use, or through commercial purchase that includes
other types of contractual restrictions. As biotech-
nology research in developing countries moves
from theory to practice, an explicit understanding
of the nature and implications of access to pro-
tected technology becomes increasingly important
if products are to be delivered into farmers’ hands.
A point of equal importance is that national
patent offices must be prepared for a growing
number of applications in plant biotechnology.
They will have to define the types of claims that
may apply for protection, given the details of
the national law, and establish guidelines for
determining the novelty of particular biotechnol-
ogy inventions. 

